Just a day after his "triumphant" return from the first ICC hearing of the Ocampo-Six case at The Hague, Ruto had reason to be even more genuinely euphoric. A Kenyan court cleared him of fraud charges that have haunted him for eight years. The charges had forced his suspension as minister and senior member of the cabinet some months ago.
The big question now is: will he return to the cabinet? Some argue that the return, like the suspension, will be automatic, given the provisions of the constitution.
Others insist that Prime Minister (PM) Raila Odinga will have something to do with it, given the provisions of the National Accord, and should block Ruto's return. Raila is the leader of ODM, the party to which Ruto nominally belongs still, despite his very public and continuous tussle with the PM. The reasoning here is that the law gives the PM the authority to make the decision, given the National Accord that underpins the coalition government headed by the President and the PM.
At a time, in any case, when a cabinet reshuffle is deemed both in Kenya and elsewhere to be overdue, it will be difficult for President Kibaki to effect changes on the ODM side of the cabinet without Raila's concurrence.
I think Raila has, should and will claim a say on this matter. But what kind of a say should we hear from him? Many, "friend and foe", I think, expect an emphatic no from him. It would not be consistent, however, and it would not be judicious -- above all, it would not be smart to say no, despite the very troubling circumstances of Ruto's acquittal. Let the appeal process, if any, deal with that.
My advice would be: Raila should welcome Ruto back to the cabinet with no conditionalities whatsoever. In fact, he should make those intentions crystal clear to the public even before the scheduling of his next formal consultation with President Kibaki on the matter of Ruto's return.
If, after that, Ruto continues to be as deeply mean-spirited and hateful toward Raila as he has been, let him be the one to have to explain why to the nation -- and, in particular, to his Rift Valley constituents.
And if, after September 2011, the ICC hearings force Ruto out of the cabinet once again, as per the constitution, let that be yet another pulsating dynamic.
ENDNOTE: I expect Ruto's exuberance to cool appreciably in the coming months, as the reality dawns on him that he will not be the presidential choice of the emergent G7 coalition of presidential aspirants and leading politicians -- let alone Kenya's President following the 2012 elections. At best, he can only hope to be Uhuru Kenyatta's running mate. As to how many Rift Valley votes he will be able to deliver, as a running mate, to Uhuru -- that remains a one billion shilling question.
Evidence of culpability adduced at The Hague between April and September 2011, and beyond, might yet stop the Uhuru-Ruto alliance in its tracks. It is hard to imagine that Uhuru has not begun to worry how long it will take for his alliance with Ruto to begin to sour, along the lines of the one between Raila and Ruto. And Ruto's supporters must surely be wondering about the assurances they can possibly have that an Uhuru-Ruto coalition will not be a repeat of the "mistreatment" that Raila's supporters believe he has endured since 2008 at the hands of President Kibaki and his kitchen cabinet.
Showing posts with label Kibaki. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Kibaki. Show all posts
Sunday, April 17, 2011
Friday, February 18, 2011
Kenya: House Speaker Marende's ruling on President Kibaki's list of nominees
Yesterday's ruling by Kenya's Parliamentary Speaker, Kenneth Marende -- in which he returned to sender the President's list of nominees to four powerful positions provided for in the new constitution, and crucial to its timely implementation: Chief Justice (Judge Alnasir Visram), Attorney General (Prof. Githu Muigai), Director of Public Prosecutions (Kioko Kilukumi, William Ruto's ex-lawyer) and Controller of Budget (William Kirwa, allegedly a Ruto man) -- is not a victory for the Prime Minister, Raila Odinga, though it seems amply so. Ruto has lately become Kibaki's own preferred/de facto/secret Prime Minister, whose advice is heeded and whose suggested nominees (unlike Raila's) are actually nominated.
The Prime Minister acquiesced in the President's rush to short-circuit due process in a double-edged, silent, but ill-advised war -- a war against the Hague's ICC (via a gullible, bird-of-a-feather, African Union and, wishfully, the UN Security Council itself) and a war of his own succession (in which, as was clear to any adult, Raila was to be the biggest loser).
The PM had hoped that, sitting just the two of them, they would cut the cake into two even-handed parts. Bad idea. That is not Kibaki's style. The PM should have known that from the flawed February 2008 power-sharing deal, which cost him a lot of erstwhile friends, which continues to haunt him to this day, and which, ironically, PNU has been increasingly turning to its unprincipled advantage in the ever-shifting coalition landscape. The two "Princials" did consult, but obviously did not reach a consensus. Raila pulled away. The President, who appears hostage to the Ocampo Six chose to press on (needlessly, if you forget the O6)with his list.
Despite threats, Speaker Marende has done the right thing by urging the President and Prime Minister to do things right. He has asserted:
Worryingly, there is no guarantee that the PM would himself have done the right thing, had he been in President Kibaki's shoes these last 30 days or so. It is just that it was Kibaki's move to make, and in the eyes of many, it seems, the President made a blatant KKK move. If the CJ couldn't be his "preferred choice" (a Justice Kariuki?), then better a middle-tier Kenyan Indian (Judge Alnasir Visram) any day than someone more senior who happens to be from Nyanza -- or another middle-tier Judge from "Western", or even Mungatana's Pokomo group, if you like.
So it seems like Raila's voctory; but the victory, if it is, is pyrrhic. The toxic level in Kenya's political landscape continues to rise, as we approach 2012. The ICC and Ocampo clearly remain our best safeguard against our collective, suicidal, "darker side" as a nation. Anyone who does not see the blood-letting that is to come with the ICC taken out of the 2012 succession equation, has lost the power to reason coherently -- and lost touch even with common sense.
When Marende referred the Kibaki list to two House Committees, some ten days ago, he was roundly condemned as timid and spineless. But the wisdom in that move is that he allowed s considerable amount of national debate to take place. Many stakeholders availed themselves the opportunity to take a stand. Massive national consensus has built up, it seem clear to me,and Marende's ruling both reflects it and has been aided by it.
Was I sure then, absolutely sure, that Marende would make the ruling that he has no made? No. You can never be that sure. But I believed, based on the circumstances of the case and his previous rulings, that that was the only decision that he could make -- had to make.
So whose victory is it? First, the people of Kenya in their many ethnicities -- who are all too often ambushed with political decisions they have little time to reverse. Second, the new constitution -- which Kenyans are determined to implement and to have in its fullness. It is a victory, too, against impunity, ethnic myopia and lingering traces of an imperial presidency.
The Prime Minister acquiesced in the President's rush to short-circuit due process in a double-edged, silent, but ill-advised war -- a war against the Hague's ICC (via a gullible, bird-of-a-feather, African Union and, wishfully, the UN Security Council itself) and a war of his own succession (in which, as was clear to any adult, Raila was to be the biggest loser).
The PM had hoped that, sitting just the two of them, they would cut the cake into two even-handed parts. Bad idea. That is not Kibaki's style. The PM should have known that from the flawed February 2008 power-sharing deal, which cost him a lot of erstwhile friends, which continues to haunt him to this day, and which, ironically, PNU has been increasingly turning to its unprincipled advantage in the ever-shifting coalition landscape. The two "Princials" did consult, but obviously did not reach a consensus. Raila pulled away. The President, who appears hostage to the Ocampo Six chose to press on (needlessly, if you forget the O6)with his list.
Despite threats, Speaker Marende has done the right thing by urging the President and Prime Minister to do things right. He has asserted:
Consultations are not made if the House receives the list on which there is open disagreement between the President and the Prime Minister. As such, it is unconstitutional and the unconstitutionality cannot be cured by this House.
Worryingly, there is no guarantee that the PM would himself have done the right thing, had he been in President Kibaki's shoes these last 30 days or so. It is just that it was Kibaki's move to make, and in the eyes of many, it seems, the President made a blatant KKK move. If the CJ couldn't be his "preferred choice" (a Justice Kariuki?), then better a middle-tier Kenyan Indian (Judge Alnasir Visram) any day than someone more senior who happens to be from Nyanza -- or another middle-tier Judge from "Western", or even Mungatana's Pokomo group, if you like.
So it seems like Raila's voctory; but the victory, if it is, is pyrrhic. The toxic level in Kenya's political landscape continues to rise, as we approach 2012. The ICC and Ocampo clearly remain our best safeguard against our collective, suicidal, "darker side" as a nation. Anyone who does not see the blood-letting that is to come with the ICC taken out of the 2012 succession equation, has lost the power to reason coherently -- and lost touch even with common sense.
When Marende referred the Kibaki list to two House Committees, some ten days ago, he was roundly condemned as timid and spineless. But the wisdom in that move is that he allowed s considerable amount of national debate to take place. Many stakeholders availed themselves the opportunity to take a stand. Massive national consensus has built up, it seem clear to me,and Marende's ruling both reflects it and has been aided by it.
Was I sure then, absolutely sure, that Marende would make the ruling that he has no made? No. You can never be that sure. But I believed, based on the circumstances of the case and his previous rulings, that that was the only decision that he could make -- had to make.
So whose victory is it? First, the people of Kenya in their many ethnicities -- who are all too often ambushed with political decisions they have little time to reverse. Second, the new constitution -- which Kenyans are determined to implement and to have in its fullness. It is a victory, too, against impunity, ethnic myopia and lingering traces of an imperial presidency.
Friday, August 28, 2009
Kenya: Raila's Stunning Victory in the Bomachoge and Shinyalu By-Elections
Congratulations to PM Raila Amolo Odinga are in order, after his stunning, almost single-handed, victory in the Bomachoge and Shinyalu Parliamentary by-elections.
I think the nation will allow him to crow and thump his chest for a while. I suspect that in Nyanza lots of tongues are wagging with, at their tips, the nickname Agwambo. I susect that at State House President Kibaki and his kitchen cabinet are, instead, tongue-tied; nay, dumbfounded. VP Kalonzo must be lost for words too. I myself am amazed at Raila's nine lives; at his escape-artistry.
While this victory doesn't change/amend Raila's flawed inner, "private" character (which is what I suspect riles Ruto & else and everyone that doesn't fit into Raila's idea of his own future), it is nevertheless integral to his enduring and deepening public persona. The man is in our face, whichever way we turn -- and very much a part of what Kenya really is today -- warts and all. Kenya and Raila are, in our time (which is the only time we have), inextricable. This is an effect you cannot, honestly, ascribe Kibaki, who increasingly belongs in the past, or Kalonzo. There's a qualitative difference here -- whatever your ethnic background. Right?
All this is said against the background (which, indeed, reinforces it) of the recently widespread, and even believable, predictions of the political doom and gloom that awaited Raila post the just concluded by-elections. He was in recent days constantly attacked and ganged-up on by all and sundry -- Ruto, Moi, Jirongo, Livondo & else (na wengineo). It did not seem that there was a way he could get out of all that quagmire unscathed. The man seemed cornered.
Political (and military) campaigns are all about victory. Victory has a great and convergent effect, all in all. It converts non-believers into believers, ardent or passive or reluctant; and the greater and more consequential the victory, the greater the effect.
Raila is the victor now, nationally; though no one really knows about tomorrow. His party, ODM, wasn't even the incumbent in Bomachoge, Kibaki's PNU was, via Nyachae's Ford-People! The man seems unstoppable right now. I think the better word is: He seems so inevitable. As the saying goes, however, a week in politics is an eternity.
As we look forward to the 2012 elections, is it safe to say the following (Ruto and The Hague always being the wild cards): that as things stand now Raila will still sweep Nyanza and Western Provinces (whichever ways they are split before 2012); that those two provinces will be massive anchors for his fight for the hearts and minds of Nairobi voters, who in any case have generally tended to lean his way; that he will get far better than 25% (and enough) of Rift Valley votes (remember that his camp also won the last two by-elections in the Rift Valley, despite Ruto's nonchalance); and that Coast and North Eastern votes are his for the taking? And Central Province? Isn't he day-dreaming if he continues to harbour thoughts of winning it -- or even faring decently there? I'll leave most of Eastern Province to "native son" Kalonzo.
Having said all that, who our next President will be in 2012 remains a twenty billion shilling question; for 2012 remains eternities away.
I think the nation will allow him to crow and thump his chest for a while. I suspect that in Nyanza lots of tongues are wagging with, at their tips, the nickname Agwambo. I susect that at State House President Kibaki and his kitchen cabinet are, instead, tongue-tied; nay, dumbfounded. VP Kalonzo must be lost for words too. I myself am amazed at Raila's nine lives; at his escape-artistry.
While this victory doesn't change/amend Raila's flawed inner, "private" character (which is what I suspect riles Ruto & else and everyone that doesn't fit into Raila's idea of his own future), it is nevertheless integral to his enduring and deepening public persona. The man is in our face, whichever way we turn -- and very much a part of what Kenya really is today -- warts and all. Kenya and Raila are, in our time (which is the only time we have), inextricable. This is an effect you cannot, honestly, ascribe Kibaki, who increasingly belongs in the past, or Kalonzo. There's a qualitative difference here -- whatever your ethnic background. Right?
All this is said against the background (which, indeed, reinforces it) of the recently widespread, and even believable, predictions of the political doom and gloom that awaited Raila post the just concluded by-elections. He was in recent days constantly attacked and ganged-up on by all and sundry -- Ruto, Moi, Jirongo, Livondo & else (na wengineo). It did not seem that there was a way he could get out of all that quagmire unscathed. The man seemed cornered.
Political (and military) campaigns are all about victory. Victory has a great and convergent effect, all in all. It converts non-believers into believers, ardent or passive or reluctant; and the greater and more consequential the victory, the greater the effect.
Raila is the victor now, nationally; though no one really knows about tomorrow. His party, ODM, wasn't even the incumbent in Bomachoge, Kibaki's PNU was, via Nyachae's Ford-People! The man seems unstoppable right now. I think the better word is: He seems so inevitable. As the saying goes, however, a week in politics is an eternity.
As we look forward to the 2012 elections, is it safe to say the following (Ruto and The Hague always being the wild cards): that as things stand now Raila will still sweep Nyanza and Western Provinces (whichever ways they are split before 2012); that those two provinces will be massive anchors for his fight for the hearts and minds of Nairobi voters, who in any case have generally tended to lean his way; that he will get far better than 25% (and enough) of Rift Valley votes (remember that his camp also won the last two by-elections in the Rift Valley, despite Ruto's nonchalance); and that Coast and North Eastern votes are his for the taking? And Central Province? Isn't he day-dreaming if he continues to harbour thoughts of winning it -- or even faring decently there? I'll leave most of Eastern Province to "native son" Kalonzo.
Having said all that, who our next President will be in 2012 remains a twenty billion shilling question; for 2012 remains eternities away.
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Friday, May 29, 2009
Kenya: That Unobscure Object of Ridicule
Kenya's youth no longer have any political heroes, and they have no champions. Nor do the poor and the hungry and the marginalized and those ill of health. Their erstwhile heroes have committed the political equivalent of hara kiri before their own eyes -- theirs and theirs. Any name picked from a list overpopulated by the discredited lot is likely to be met with hoots of derision and dismissive laughter, whichever name is mentioned as a possible exception and a potential hero in the days ahead.
At the helm of the political class are, of course, President Mwai Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga, the most ridiculed twosome in all of Kenya's post-independence era; a sort of two-headed gargoyle. In their official prominence, and enormous capacity for attention-grab, the pair has become that inobscure object of ridicule -- and loathing. This is a tragedy of monumental proportions, both for the duo and the nation, for all societies must have an acknowledged leadership -- which must be trusted to lead, and lead with vision and coherence to be trusted. But there is no trust here, for there is no coherence and no vision. The public interest does not matter. In its place there is brazen parochialism. And there is pathological greed, mean-spiritedness and myopic self-interest.
More and more Kenyans, it would seem, are cultivating the view that it will not matter who wins the next Presidential election in 2012. So, there may well be no "fire next time", contrary to widespread concerns here and abroad. There will be no one worth fighting for, or dying for. What is more likely to happen is that certain political fortunes will come to a dead stop at the hands of an electorate that at last rejects, with finality, their decades-old Presidential and related ambitions. Kibaki will, of course, be retiring. So the future is not as forbidding for him as for Raila, for whom time is clearly running out; and who does not seem to see that Kibaki is perhaps letting the time run out unhindered and even, by design, quirkily -- at whatever cost, that is.
The face which the twosome appears bent on presenting to the nation elicits only opprobrium, on a large scale, which is infecting the entire political class; which, incidentally, is not guilty merely by association, but by brazen deeds, acts of omission and, in effect, broad-daylight contempt for the peoples' sovereign aspirations. There is now mutual contempt, as Parliament degenerates and descends into a den that will defend its own at every turn and every opportunity, against a public opinion that has gone hoarse in its incessant call for accountability, simple justice, equity and the practice of basic principles of elective representation.
At the helm of the political class are, of course, President Mwai Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga, the most ridiculed twosome in all of Kenya's post-independence era; a sort of two-headed gargoyle. In their official prominence, and enormous capacity for attention-grab, the pair has become that inobscure object of ridicule -- and loathing. This is a tragedy of monumental proportions, both for the duo and the nation, for all societies must have an acknowledged leadership -- which must be trusted to lead, and lead with vision and coherence to be trusted. But there is no trust here, for there is no coherence and no vision. The public interest does not matter. In its place there is brazen parochialism. And there is pathological greed, mean-spiritedness and myopic self-interest.
More and more Kenyans, it would seem, are cultivating the view that it will not matter who wins the next Presidential election in 2012. So, there may well be no "fire next time", contrary to widespread concerns here and abroad. There will be no one worth fighting for, or dying for. What is more likely to happen is that certain political fortunes will come to a dead stop at the hands of an electorate that at last rejects, with finality, their decades-old Presidential and related ambitions. Kibaki will, of course, be retiring. So the future is not as forbidding for him as for Raila, for whom time is clearly running out; and who does not seem to see that Kibaki is perhaps letting the time run out unhindered and even, by design, quirkily -- at whatever cost, that is.
The face which the twosome appears bent on presenting to the nation elicits only opprobrium, on a large scale, which is infecting the entire political class; which, incidentally, is not guilty merely by association, but by brazen deeds, acts of omission and, in effect, broad-daylight contempt for the peoples' sovereign aspirations. There is now mutual contempt, as Parliament degenerates and descends into a den that will defend its own at every turn and every opportunity, against a public opinion that has gone hoarse in its incessant call for accountability, simple justice, equity and the practice of basic principles of elective representation.
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Wednesday, April 29, 2009
Six Sigma Obama: Marking His First 100 Days as President
Barack Obama's two-year campaign for the White House displayed, in virtually all his speeches, policy statements and promises, a determination to deliver, not just change we could believe in, but six sigma leadership as well -- and not just for the United States. It was going to be change of Renaissance proportions, or so it often sounded (for more on the Renaissance, click here).
To mark the first 100 days of his Presidency, report cards are flying in from all over the planet. And they are all, it seems to me, quite good. All, that is, bar perfection -- and bar the likes of Newt Gingrich and Karl Rove. This morning, on CNN, some journalist types were asked how they rated him. I saw several 9/10s and one 7/10. That was getting close to accurate, but I sensed that they were suppressing some of their enthusiasm. There was no need to. It is early days yet, and if you feel that something's good, it's good. Go ahead, say it. I believe I heard one commentator say that Obama has been the most effective US president since FDR. He wasn't mincing words -- there were no words to mince.
So, how do I myself rate his Presidency over the 100 days, in terms of hard-nosed policy actions and nuance, in terms of substance and even form? I say, without equivocation, Six Sigma! Hard days will surely come in the days ahead, as the same rubber mets more of the road, and the ratings may/will slide. Comes with the territory. But things look pretty optimistic right now, around the world generally, despite the economic meltdown and the very recent outbreak of swine flu.
As a Kenyan, I have even more reason to be enthusiastic, given the kind of toxic, roller-coaster, self-serving leadership that our President, Mwai Kibaki, and Prime Minister, Raila Odinga, continue to display here at home. It is a shame tempered only by the knowledge that Obama, one of us, shines by example elsewhere; and that, precisely for that reason and that example, all is not lost.
Didn't Kenneth Marende, Speaker of Kenya's National Assembly, reinforce that essential optimism in the substance and nuance of his Solomonic ruling yesterday afternoon in Parliament, when he declared himself (to the collective relief of the nation) interim Leader of the House Business Committee for as long as Kibaki and Raila Odinga (the One Sigma duo) fail to agree on one, and publicly wrangle? Let Marende hold the seat till 2012, if you ask me! Who knows, perhaps we have just dicovered in him Kenya's Plan B!
To mark the first 100 days of his Presidency, report cards are flying in from all over the planet. And they are all, it seems to me, quite good. All, that is, bar perfection -- and bar the likes of Newt Gingrich and Karl Rove. This morning, on CNN, some journalist types were asked how they rated him. I saw several 9/10s and one 7/10. That was getting close to accurate, but I sensed that they were suppressing some of their enthusiasm. There was no need to. It is early days yet, and if you feel that something's good, it's good. Go ahead, say it. I believe I heard one commentator say that Obama has been the most effective US president since FDR. He wasn't mincing words -- there were no words to mince.
So, how do I myself rate his Presidency over the 100 days, in terms of hard-nosed policy actions and nuance, in terms of substance and even form? I say, without equivocation, Six Sigma! Hard days will surely come in the days ahead, as the same rubber mets more of the road, and the ratings may/will slide. Comes with the territory. But things look pretty optimistic right now, around the world generally, despite the economic meltdown and the very recent outbreak of swine flu.
As a Kenyan, I have even more reason to be enthusiastic, given the kind of toxic, roller-coaster, self-serving leadership that our President, Mwai Kibaki, and Prime Minister, Raila Odinga, continue to display here at home. It is a shame tempered only by the knowledge that Obama, one of us, shines by example elsewhere; and that, precisely for that reason and that example, all is not lost.
Didn't Kenneth Marende, Speaker of Kenya's National Assembly, reinforce that essential optimism in the substance and nuance of his Solomonic ruling yesterday afternoon in Parliament, when he declared himself (to the collective relief of the nation) interim Leader of the House Business Committee for as long as Kibaki and Raila Odinga (the One Sigma duo) fail to agree on one, and publicly wrangle? Let Marende hold the seat till 2012, if you ask me! Who knows, perhaps we have just dicovered in him Kenya's Plan B!
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Saturday, March 07, 2009
Wambui's Persona
The headline in today's issue of Nairobi Star, a newspaper whose motto is "Real Life Stories Every Day" is: "Wambui's Security Guards Removed." Yes, that same Mary Wambui who has on measured occasions been in our face since Mr. Mwai Kibaki became Kenya's third President (after Kenyatta and Moi) in 2003. That same Wambui who, as the story goes, makes Lucy Kibaki -- that's right, the President's one and only "dear wife", as the President himself, being in "a foul mood", felt compelled to remind Kenyans and all-and-sundry others on prime-time TV last Tuesday -- see really, really red when she, Wambui, puts on her activist act. It seems that she's been in Lucy's face, blatantly and through (in Lucy's mind) surrogates, so much more than she's been in ours. Yes, Ma'am, we have an idea who the surrogates are, and more's the pity.
Lucy shall have no peace, thusly; particularly when people like Paul Muite, she thinks, are having a laugh; and when loudmouths like Saitoti and Ongeri meddle in her own business when they visit Nyeri or Othaya, but will not mind their own (even when Kenyans mightily suffer); and when the local media, and foreign journalists, keep their ears cocked and their eyes and cameras wide-angled in order, seemingly, to savour and cheer all this nonesense about this "ka thing" that does not even exist!
So, Wambui has suffered a dip in her public persona, but will it last? Will she disappear into an oblivion to which Lucy, it seems, wants, with such loud body language, and against all odds, to consign her? Doesn't look likely, and Wambui, after a fashion, is letting us all know. "Hata siyo kuteleza!" she might add, in her familiar, and familial, NARC/PNU activist's tone, if anyone -- anyone, really -- wants to know. In which case one might counsel, "Wacha tuu, Mama!"
Now, Wambui's government-provided security guards from the dreaded GSU (General Service Unit), who have given her security cover befitting a First Lady since 2003, were withdrawn only last Wednesday -- the day after President Kibaki publicly denied having any other wife. He had issued a similar denial in 2005, which few Kenyans have had little reason to believe -- or take seriously. So you know what Kibaki and Lucy think that Kenyans are thinking now. It's like: "Kama huna, huna! Ukiwa nayo, usiseme huna -- usigutuke!" And that's at the heart of Lucy's obvious frustration.
Kibaki, the man, threatens to sue the likes of you know who -- for alluding to "the President and his wives" in their public utterances. He says on TV, "They will see me in court, or wherever they will see me." Lucy informs the media that she nearly visited KTN offices the other day (or night?) -- a sort of encore to her visit to Nation Group offices, in the middle of the night, a while back. And Muite, far from apologizing, writes (dares to write!) to His Excellency to say that he stands by the remarks to which His Excellency obviously takes great exception. Elsewhere, it is reported, he dares the President to sue him -- and of course nearly everyone thinks he's being a bit puerile because he knows that the Presidency is too lofty to allow M. Kibaki to sue him. But Lucy will, she says, if Kibaki won't. Yet why does Kibaki threaten to sue, if he knows (as he might) that he can't -- and not just for lofty reasons? That's the big question; but perhaps it will all drift away.
Only last night, however, Wambui (she of Kensington Holdings and the Artur saga) was at her needling self again, knowing what a thorn in the flesh she truly is. At a function in Kiambu (the heartland of the Kenyatta political machine), reported on KTN, she made a not-so-cryptic remark -- in the Presence of Mama Ngina, Kenya's first First Lady (Lucy is the second, though M. Kibaki is, as noted earlier, the third President), whose own son wanted to be the third President, but will now want to be the fourth, come 2012. She allowed as to how, now that her "husband will be retiring", there'll be need soon enough, as it were, to see what to do.
It was not just Uhuru she was talking about, if she is smart. You see, she could then go for the vacated Othaya seat herself -- if Saitoti splits it, as he's suggested he would, or not. Then she wouldn't have to go to Kiambu to talk about her now, at last, retired husband. Her presence alone in the august House would do it all for her, all the time. The Speaker wouldn't have to allow it, even. Talk about killing two, three, birds with one (soap?) stone! It is a true soap opera. As the Luo would tell it, with a wink (or tongue outside cheek), this is full-blast, all-too-familiar, nyiego. And Kenyans are loving it, as much as they love Lucy.
When Wambui talks of her husband, everybody understands that it is not her first husband she has in mind, but her daughter Winnie's father. And everyone believes they know who Winnie's father is -- and they say just look at the kind of nose she has, if you are in any doubt, and it's not a nose job but the kind of genes she has. And I think Winnie's father, who perhaps thinks that none of us suspects that he thinks that he's sufficiently under cover [though under cover of what, pray tell, for what, for/from whom, for how long?], sufficiently incognito, to ever be found by any of us and so told to his face "There you are!", loves Winnie dearly. And no one has ever disowned Winnie, is why I think so. No one period, not even during her engagement and aborted marriage (I don't think it happened in secret) to one of the Artur "Supermen". But you see, having a second wife is not un-African, but it is un-Catholic. It is what can banish you from holy communion and a Catholic burial (if the potentially complicated matter of disowning whoever is second is not concluded prior to the funeral), if the Pope and his bishops are strict enough.
And so, or be that as it may, Wambui has a hold on whoever her husband is that no one, not even Lucy, however riled -- and whom we love for shooting from the hip -- can shake. And this is why, I suspect, Muite (he of the toned down Rwandese looks) thinks he cannot lose a court case built on any and all of (all of) this. And this is why Lucy will not let this matter go, please.
Lucy shall have no peace, thusly; particularly when people like Paul Muite, she thinks, are having a laugh; and when loudmouths like Saitoti and Ongeri meddle in her own business when they visit Nyeri or Othaya, but will not mind their own (even when Kenyans mightily suffer); and when the local media, and foreign journalists, keep their ears cocked and their eyes and cameras wide-angled in order, seemingly, to savour and cheer all this nonesense about this "ka thing" that does not even exist!
So, Wambui has suffered a dip in her public persona, but will it last? Will she disappear into an oblivion to which Lucy, it seems, wants, with such loud body language, and against all odds, to consign her? Doesn't look likely, and Wambui, after a fashion, is letting us all know. "Hata siyo kuteleza!" she might add, in her familiar, and familial, NARC/PNU activist's tone, if anyone -- anyone, really -- wants to know. In which case one might counsel, "Wacha tuu, Mama!"
Now, Wambui's government-provided security guards from the dreaded GSU (General Service Unit), who have given her security cover befitting a First Lady since 2003, were withdrawn only last Wednesday -- the day after President Kibaki publicly denied having any other wife. He had issued a similar denial in 2005, which few Kenyans have had little reason to believe -- or take seriously. So you know what Kibaki and Lucy think that Kenyans are thinking now. It's like: "Kama huna, huna! Ukiwa nayo, usiseme huna -- usigutuke!" And that's at the heart of Lucy's obvious frustration.
Kibaki, the man, threatens to sue the likes of you know who -- for alluding to "the President and his wives" in their public utterances. He says on TV, "They will see me in court, or wherever they will see me." Lucy informs the media that she nearly visited KTN offices the other day (or night?) -- a sort of encore to her visit to Nation Group offices, in the middle of the night, a while back. And Muite, far from apologizing, writes (dares to write!) to His Excellency to say that he stands by the remarks to which His Excellency obviously takes great exception. Elsewhere, it is reported, he dares the President to sue him -- and of course nearly everyone thinks he's being a bit puerile because he knows that the Presidency is too lofty to allow M. Kibaki to sue him. But Lucy will, she says, if Kibaki won't. Yet why does Kibaki threaten to sue, if he knows (as he might) that he can't -- and not just for lofty reasons? That's the big question; but perhaps it will all drift away.
Only last night, however, Wambui (she of Kensington Holdings and the Artur saga) was at her needling self again, knowing what a thorn in the flesh she truly is. At a function in Kiambu (the heartland of the Kenyatta political machine), reported on KTN, she made a not-so-cryptic remark -- in the Presence of Mama Ngina, Kenya's first First Lady (Lucy is the second, though M. Kibaki is, as noted earlier, the third President), whose own son wanted to be the third President, but will now want to be the fourth, come 2012. She allowed as to how, now that her "husband will be retiring", there'll be need soon enough, as it were, to see what to do.
It was not just Uhuru she was talking about, if she is smart. You see, she could then go for the vacated Othaya seat herself -- if Saitoti splits it, as he's suggested he would, or not. Then she wouldn't have to go to Kiambu to talk about her now, at last, retired husband. Her presence alone in the august House would do it all for her, all the time. The Speaker wouldn't have to allow it, even. Talk about killing two, three, birds with one (soap?) stone! It is a true soap opera. As the Luo would tell it, with a wink (or tongue outside cheek), this is full-blast, all-too-familiar, nyiego. And Kenyans are loving it, as much as they love Lucy.
When Wambui talks of her husband, everybody understands that it is not her first husband she has in mind, but her daughter Winnie's father. And everyone believes they know who Winnie's father is -- and they say just look at the kind of nose she has, if you are in any doubt, and it's not a nose job but the kind of genes she has. And I think Winnie's father, who perhaps thinks that none of us suspects that he thinks that he's sufficiently under cover [though under cover of what, pray tell, for what, for/from whom, for how long?], sufficiently incognito, to ever be found by any of us and so told to his face "There you are!", loves Winnie dearly. And no one has ever disowned Winnie, is why I think so. No one period, not even during her engagement and aborted marriage (I don't think it happened in secret) to one of the Artur "Supermen". But you see, having a second wife is not un-African, but it is un-Catholic. It is what can banish you from holy communion and a Catholic burial (if the potentially complicated matter of disowning whoever is second is not concluded prior to the funeral), if the Pope and his bishops are strict enough.
And so, or be that as it may, Wambui has a hold on whoever her husband is that no one, not even Lucy, however riled -- and whom we love for shooting from the hip -- can shake. And this is why, I suspect, Muite (he of the toned down Rwandese looks) thinks he cannot lose a court case built on any and all of (all of) this. And this is why Lucy will not let this matter go, please.
Monday, February 23, 2009
Ruto Wants Waki's Envelope to Head to The Hague, Now!
William Ruto, energized by his emphatic victory against a vote of no confidence moved in Parliament last week, over the maize scandal, has now turned his attention to that other matter of post-election violence, in which nearly everyone believes he was so complicit that his name cannot but be in the list in Waki's envelope. In a surprising move, he declared over the weekend, as reported in the media, that Kofi Annan should take Waki's envelope straight to the Hague. To him, all this talk of a local tribunal and a two-month extension of Waki's deadline is merely a waste of time -- a beating about the bush -- which he will have none of.
In this, Ruto is openly disagreeing with Raila, the Prime Minister, who is mulling another initiative to establish a local tribunal as an alternative to the Hague, despite that idea's recent rejection by a Parliament in which Raila's coalition has a slim majority. And I agree with him. Raila even reported, astonishingly, that Annan had allowed Kenya a two month extension, at most; astonishing because nobody seemed to know that Annan had the mandate to extend/alter Waki's deadline, and nobody, except perhaps Raila, believes that he has. Let's let it go now!
The country's future political health clearly requires a visit to the Hague. The paradox is that a presumed culprit is all for it, while those who would presumably benefit from his fall -- and who would like to see him suffer and out of the way -- rather nervously want to keep him as far away from that same Hague as they possibly can! He wants to go, but they don't want him to -- a perfect sado-masochist bind.
Are there beans they fear he will spill, even as he falls? Might such spilling lead to their own irreparable fall -- their own inevitable path to that same place? I see that Sudan's Al Bashir is increasingly and publicly beside himself with trepidation arising from his own likely indictment by the mighty ICC, a date with which is not a picnic -- and from which, in the end, no one can hide. If Ruto was, he seems no longer to be; but someone else apparently is! What is it that someone knows that Ruto knows that shouldn't be known by Tom, Dick and Harry -- and Wanjiku?
If President Kibaki and Raila -- who on a previous occasion Ruto had said should be the ones going to the Hague (since, he had argued, all post-election violence was carried out in their name) -- want a local tribunal for the spanner-boys, the small men, of the violence, that's fine. However, the big boys should all be headed to the Hague, to meet their match. They can have all the time they want there, as we watch with waning interest from afar. All that may be far from good for many, but it will be good from far for just as many.
In this, Ruto is openly disagreeing with Raila, the Prime Minister, who is mulling another initiative to establish a local tribunal as an alternative to the Hague, despite that idea's recent rejection by a Parliament in which Raila's coalition has a slim majority. And I agree with him. Raila even reported, astonishingly, that Annan had allowed Kenya a two month extension, at most; astonishing because nobody seemed to know that Annan had the mandate to extend/alter Waki's deadline, and nobody, except perhaps Raila, believes that he has. Let's let it go now!
The country's future political health clearly requires a visit to the Hague. The paradox is that a presumed culprit is all for it, while those who would presumably benefit from his fall -- and who would like to see him suffer and out of the way -- rather nervously want to keep him as far away from that same Hague as they possibly can! He wants to go, but they don't want him to -- a perfect sado-masochist bind.
Are there beans they fear he will spill, even as he falls? Might such spilling lead to their own irreparable fall -- their own inevitable path to that same place? I see that Sudan's Al Bashir is increasingly and publicly beside himself with trepidation arising from his own likely indictment by the mighty ICC, a date with which is not a picnic -- and from which, in the end, no one can hide. If Ruto was, he seems no longer to be; but someone else apparently is! What is it that someone knows that Ruto knows that shouldn't be known by Tom, Dick and Harry -- and Wanjiku?
If President Kibaki and Raila -- who on a previous occasion Ruto had said should be the ones going to the Hague (since, he had argued, all post-election violence was carried out in their name) -- want a local tribunal for the spanner-boys, the small men, of the violence, that's fine. However, the big boys should all be headed to the Hague, to meet their match. They can have all the time they want there, as we watch with waning interest from afar. All that may be far from good for many, but it will be good from far for just as many.
Friday, February 20, 2009
A Foul Governmentality
It was supposed to be a somber prayer and fund-raising occasion at the Kenyatta International Conference Centre, Nairobi, yesterday, for the victims of the recent Nakumatt Downtown and Sachang'wan fire disasters. The guests of honour were Kenya's President and Prime Minister. There were prayers, indeed, and some Kshs. 80,000,000 (or just over US$1 million) was raised -- a near-record of sorts, I understand. There was much more, as the unexpected stole the show to drive home the public's outrage at rampant high-level stealing in public offices. The dailies reported the proceedings in detail.
In an obviously pre-meditated move, five of Kenya's leading clerics, under the umbrella of the Inter-Religious Forum, seized the opportunity of the nationally televised occassion to put a spotlight on the leaders' failure to lead, and their "beggar thy subject" governmentality. They touched on the problems of internally displaced persons, youth unemployment and extra-judicial killings, noting that no obvious or genuine effort was being made to solve any.
Archbishop Nzimbi, of the Anglican Church, led the charge against shameless plunder of public assets, and even threatened mass action. Prof. Abdulghafur El-Busaidy, of the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims, saw politicians as "the greatest threat to peace and prosperity," and forcefully accused them of dividing Kenyans along ethnic lines, unilaterally increasing their own allowances and refusing to pay tax. Bishop Adoyo, of the Evangelical Alliance of Kenya, pointedly told the leaders, "You have been reluctant to punish some of your perceived friends who are corrupt and greedy...We urge you to take charge and restore equity, justice, unity and dignity of all Kenyans." The people, he noted, were "discouraged, ashamed, disillusioned and angry." The other men of the cloth were just as critical, emphasizing that Kibaki and Raila were presiding over grand corruption.
The two principals of the Grand Coalition government should be getting used to this sort of thing -- this public rebuke by people they cannot fire but might be tempted to "silence" -- as it will not cease while they continue to watch as their colleagues and appointees engage in a corrupt feeding-frenzy. Namwamba, of the stalled Grand Opposition, may have been incorporated into, or compromised by, a system which is bent on monopolizing all political power; but silencing Voice is a hard thing. It just keeps popping up. The thing is not to silence it, but to answer it -- and not with empty, faded, pathetic promises, or a plea for more time.
Just a week ago an Anglican cleric was reported by the media to have received an immediate tongue lashing from Raila in Bondo, during Jaramogi Odinga's anniversary services, for declaring that the Coalition Government had failed the people. Raila wanted the coalition, which had not even marked its first anniversary (which comes on February 28th), to be judged less harshly and, in particular, to be given more time to deliver on its promises. I see a connection between the harsh rebuke of the cleric in Bondo and the uncompromising stand taken by the clerics in Nairobi (where Raila opted for relative silence) and Kisumu a week later.
Kenyans are past being deceived with posturings and promises and words -- their own words regurgitated by luminaries bent on building political dynasties and family fortunes in the billions (of $s, Sterling, Euros, or whatever), even as they, the people, knowingly watch.
Deeds, man, deeds!
In an obviously pre-meditated move, five of Kenya's leading clerics, under the umbrella of the Inter-Religious Forum, seized the opportunity of the nationally televised occassion to put a spotlight on the leaders' failure to lead, and their "beggar thy subject" governmentality. They touched on the problems of internally displaced persons, youth unemployment and extra-judicial killings, noting that no obvious or genuine effort was being made to solve any.
Archbishop Nzimbi, of the Anglican Church, led the charge against shameless plunder of public assets, and even threatened mass action. Prof. Abdulghafur El-Busaidy, of the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims, saw politicians as "the greatest threat to peace and prosperity," and forcefully accused them of dividing Kenyans along ethnic lines, unilaterally increasing their own allowances and refusing to pay tax. Bishop Adoyo, of the Evangelical Alliance of Kenya, pointedly told the leaders, "You have been reluctant to punish some of your perceived friends who are corrupt and greedy...We urge you to take charge and restore equity, justice, unity and dignity of all Kenyans." The people, he noted, were "discouraged, ashamed, disillusioned and angry." The other men of the cloth were just as critical, emphasizing that Kibaki and Raila were presiding over grand corruption.
The two principals of the Grand Coalition government should be getting used to this sort of thing -- this public rebuke by people they cannot fire but might be tempted to "silence" -- as it will not cease while they continue to watch as their colleagues and appointees engage in a corrupt feeding-frenzy. Namwamba, of the stalled Grand Opposition, may have been incorporated into, or compromised by, a system which is bent on monopolizing all political power; but silencing Voice is a hard thing. It just keeps popping up. The thing is not to silence it, but to answer it -- and not with empty, faded, pathetic promises, or a plea for more time.
Just a week ago an Anglican cleric was reported by the media to have received an immediate tongue lashing from Raila in Bondo, during Jaramogi Odinga's anniversary services, for declaring that the Coalition Government had failed the people. Raila wanted the coalition, which had not even marked its first anniversary (which comes on February 28th), to be judged less harshly and, in particular, to be given more time to deliver on its promises. I see a connection between the harsh rebuke of the cleric in Bondo and the uncompromising stand taken by the clerics in Nairobi (where Raila opted for relative silence) and Kisumu a week later.
Kenyans are past being deceived with posturings and promises and words -- their own words regurgitated by luminaries bent on building political dynasties and family fortunes in the billions (of $s, Sterling, Euros, or whatever), even as they, the people, knowingly watch.
Deeds, man, deeds!
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Thursday, January 22, 2009
Kenya: A Tale of Two Prime Ministers, One De Facto and One Ceremonial
Kenya's all-powerful opposition, embodied in ODM, fought spiritedly for the creation of the post of an Executive Prime Minister and a ceremonial President. Alas, what ODM ended up with in the Grand Coalition was the post of, to all intents and purposes, a ceremonial Prime Minister! How did that happen under our very noses, and how is the situation to be rectified within the strict confines of the democratic process?
In an interview with Edmund Sanders of the Los Angeles Times, which appeared on page 8 of Kenya's The Standard on Saturday of 10 January 2009, Raila Odinga made a stunning admission. He stated (indeed "argued") that Mr. Francis Muthaura, the Permanent Secretary in the Office of the President, is (as has always been the case) Kenya's de facto Prime Minister. He made this remark when asked about his relations with Mwai Kibaki, who even in the Grand Coalition government remains, constitutionally, the country's Executive President -- meaning that he is at once the head-of-state, the head of government and commander in chief of the armed forces. Here is the verbatim answer (I have highlighted the main point):
Clearly, ODM was aware of the role that the said Permanent Secretary's office has played since Kenya became a republic. It was ODM's responsibility (and it was in its fundamental interest) to raise the red flag on this -- before the agreement was signed and the flawed duties of office assumed! I think the ODM side was naively satisfied with the (Prime Minister's) job title, forgetting that substantive power, in any corporate entity, lies in the job description. That is an elementary management fact. We should never find ourselves in a situation where two job descriptions are identical; but if we inadvertently do, the way to deal with it is to immediately eliminate one, or to rewrite its description.
Can the situation be reversed along the lines that Raila seems to suggest? That is, can the Prime Minister's job description be enlarged and enriched by stealthily "clawing power from the presidency" -- ostensibly through an "erosion" of day-to-day practice reinforced with well-timed voice (and threats of exit), all of which will make it unnecessary to go the more straightforward constitutional amendment way? Not quite; and even if it were possible, it would be unconstitutional -- and it would be dangerous. I think it is important to respect the rule of law. Law, which is surely an ass we must respect, has effectively given us two Prime Ministers for the value of one (and even one Prime Minister for the value of two), neither of whom is about to cede perfectly legitimate power to the other, simply on the other's muscular say so.
In the Sunday Nation of January 11, 2009 (p. 16), James Orengo claims that Mr. Muthaura is acting illegally. I think he is wrong on this one. Mutula Kilonzo, in the same issue, rejects the suggestion that the office of the Head of Public Service be abolished so that its functions may be performed by the PS in the PM's office -- that, certainly, would be a solution (but Kilonzo dismisses it as attempting a coup). Instead, he argues, "If ODM wants powers of the President, then let them bring a motion to amend the Constitution. There are no shortcuts."
It's not going to be easy to give Raila what Raila wants. So we are stuck with a tale of two Prime Ministers, one de facto and one ceremonial. Ceremonial in the sense that he is most publicly visible in the press conferences and "launching" ceremonies which the Ministers he supervises and coordinates are so clearly fond of. Ceremonial, too, in that, as Raila reckons, the real work he is supposed to do is substantively being done by another!
In an interview with Edmund Sanders of the Los Angeles Times, which appeared on page 8 of Kenya's The Standard on Saturday of 10 January 2009, Raila Odinga made a stunning admission. He stated (indeed "argued") that Mr. Francis Muthaura, the Permanent Secretary in the Office of the President, is (as has always been the case) Kenya's de facto Prime Minister. He made this remark when asked about his relations with Mwai Kibaki, who even in the Grand Coalition government remains, constitutionally, the country's Executive President -- meaning that he is at once the head-of-state, the head of government and commander in chief of the armed forces. Here is the verbatim answer (I have highlighted the main point):
"It's fairly positive and cordial. We have weekly meetings in which we compare notes and agree on agendas. The problem really is with people you call the president's men, the powers behind the throne. They try to undermine. You find they try to frustrate implementation. There is an office in the civil service that used to be very powerful...permanent secretary of the office of the president. That was the [de facto] prime minister, but headed by a civil servant. He's still there."He was then asked, "So you are competing with that office?" His answer put a spotlight on how Mr. Muthaura exercised his de facto (indeed constitutional) powers of "supervision and coordination". He worked (always in the name of the President) through the Permanent Secretaries, traditionally the accounting officers of their respective ministries. In this way, he technically bypassed ministers (through whom the Prime Minister was supposed to "supervise and coordinate") government ministries. Here's what Raila said (emphasis mine):
"He's still holding regular meetings with the permanent secretaries [ofThe question he was not asked is: does that conflict suggest unconstitutional conduct by Muthaure, or an unresolved "overlap" in the constitutional job descriptions of the Permanent Secretary and the Prime minister? To my mind, there is an ironic "overlap" which should have been sorted out constitutionally before the Grand Coalition agreement was signed last year.
government ministries] and giving them instructions. These president's men want to be like the prefect for the permanent secretaries who supervise the workings of the government, but that is now the function of the prime minister. Sometimes there is a conflict."
Clearly, ODM was aware of the role that the said Permanent Secretary's office has played since Kenya became a republic. It was ODM's responsibility (and it was in its fundamental interest) to raise the red flag on this -- before the agreement was signed and the flawed duties of office assumed! I think the ODM side was naively satisfied with the (Prime Minister's) job title, forgetting that substantive power, in any corporate entity, lies in the job description. That is an elementary management fact. We should never find ourselves in a situation where two job descriptions are identical; but if we inadvertently do, the way to deal with it is to immediately eliminate one, or to rewrite its description.
Can the situation be reversed along the lines that Raila seems to suggest? That is, can the Prime Minister's job description be enlarged and enriched by stealthily "clawing power from the presidency" -- ostensibly through an "erosion" of day-to-day practice reinforced with well-timed voice (and threats of exit), all of which will make it unnecessary to go the more straightforward constitutional amendment way? Not quite; and even if it were possible, it would be unconstitutional -- and it would be dangerous. I think it is important to respect the rule of law. Law, which is surely an ass we must respect, has effectively given us two Prime Ministers for the value of one (and even one Prime Minister for the value of two), neither of whom is about to cede perfectly legitimate power to the other, simply on the other's muscular say so.
In the Sunday Nation of January 11, 2009 (p. 16), James Orengo claims that Mr. Muthaura is acting illegally. I think he is wrong on this one. Mutula Kilonzo, in the same issue, rejects the suggestion that the office of the Head of Public Service be abolished so that its functions may be performed by the PS in the PM's office -- that, certainly, would be a solution (but Kilonzo dismisses it as attempting a coup). Instead, he argues, "If ODM wants powers of the President, then let them bring a motion to amend the Constitution. There are no shortcuts."
It's not going to be easy to give Raila what Raila wants. So we are stuck with a tale of two Prime Ministers, one de facto and one ceremonial. Ceremonial in the sense that he is most publicly visible in the press conferences and "launching" ceremonies which the Ministers he supervises and coordinates are so clearly fond of. Ceremonial, too, in that, as Raila reckons, the real work he is supposed to do is substantively being done by another!
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Sunday, December 14, 2008
Independence Day
The people deserve the leaders they get, so the saying goes. Then the leaders get the respect they deserve from the people, who deserve them, or so it seems these days.
Kenya's Independence Day celebrations of 12th December 2008, the 45th since 1963, were the most chaotic ever. We prefer to call it Jamhuri Day – Republic Day – for on December 12th 1964, exactly a year after independence, Kenya became a republic – finally putting an end to the Queen of England’s constitutional role as Kenya’s residual Head of State. That same Elizabeth II who, once upon a time in Kenya, went up a tree a princess and came down a queen the very following morning! We still love her!
A DIGRESSION: Don’t get me wrong: chaos, Santayana teaches, is any order that causes confusion in our minds. The confusion is not in the order, not in the extant state of affairs, but in our minds, says he. It’s the mind that the order, ordered as the order might be, confuses. Yet Santayana does not say whose mind’s eye sees the order when our minds are, as he sees it, confused. DIGRESSION ENDS.
For the first time ever, unthinkable (funny?) but it’s true, the President could not finish his address to the nation – historically the centerpiece of the day’s events. The speech is in fact supposed to cascade throughout the country. Not only is it aired live by the electronic media, but the text is also read out, though not simultaneously, in all of Kenya’s Provinces by the Provincial Commissioners (PCs), in all the Districts by the DC’s, and in all the Divisions by the District Officers (DOs). In the Districts and Divisions, the occasion offers an opportunity to local dignitaries to address the gatherings before the President’s speech is read and the proceedings closed.
Incidentally, on this same occasion last year, near Holo, the Kisumu West DC would not let me talk, though he was aware of my presence and allowed others conected to the incumbent MP, who was himself not there. I belonged to the wrong party, I suppose; but I also thought he was trying to stay on the right side of an incumbent several aspirants were trying to dislodge. I was of course disgusted, and I could see that other people were too. I felt the kind of discust which I imagine all gagging engenders, and which the President must have felt this December 12th.
But some eight Kilometers away at Kombewa, last year, I had caught up with the on-going events at the Divisional level, and the DO, a lady, had let me speak without a fuss and even with the respect befitting a parliamentary aspirant. I was pleased and, let me confess, offered crates of soda to the 150 or so raia in attendance. Others drank too. It was a hot day, but talk about cocacolonization! I also knew that the President entertains plenty at State House on this day, after the public gathering, but he does not use his own money!
Back to this year: It is not Yambo who cannot speak at the District gathering, I was happily at my computer “on” Gandhi Wing this time, but the President who cannot complete his speech, and so continue a tradition, at the national event! It is not Yambo whom some District “arm of government” with no civic virtue stops, but the President (and I suspect the Prime Minister) whom the people give the respect they think he deserves (both deserve) these days – just about two weeks from the first anniversary of his ECK-declared ”victory”, and the latter's "defeat”!
Exactly what happened this December 12th, and why, is all over Saturday's newspapers. Let me summarize as follows: There were demonstrations and heckling in Nairobi and certain other parts of Kenya at venues where the day’s celebrations were held. The crowd was simply not its usual cheering self – something which had been noticed with less buzz at Raila’s home-coming party in the Kibera slums about two weeks ago. It had reason, reasons, to be glum. And serious security lapse was witnessed, at the VIP section of Nyayo Stadium, the venue. An un-vetted man with an agenda, a Mr. Frederick Odhiambo – a known member of Bunge la Wananchi (Parliament of the People, or The People’s Parliament) – deliberately found his way to a seat just ten meters away from the President. He did not sit quietly throughout, nor did make noise till close to the end (which is when his presence was noticed by the President’s security detail, and his unscripted noise caused a helter-skelter of action) – which is when the Nyayo Stadium show came to a sudden stop!
Let’s put it this other way: The public’s foul mood was already much in evidence when that happened. And so was the President’s. Both President Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga had already been openly heckled. The manhandling earlier in the day, in full view of the crowd, of a protesting Mong’are (aka Nyambane), one of Kenya’s most famous comedians, had not helped matters. It was all so contagious, as Christakis might have noted were he there. Still, the belated discovery of Odhiambo’s presence was the proximate catalyst for that abrupt end.
Three wedge issues were the reason for all this unbecoming turn of events on a great ceremonial day. First, the continuing shortage and escalating price of unga (maize flour) and other consumables across the country. This is partly the consequence of widespread post-election violence which the country suffered early this year, and partly the result of mafia-like scheming in certain high places broadly in the docket of the Minister for Agriculture. Talk on the street is that YK92 is regrouping at the Ministry. Lack of access to unga of course means njaa (hunger), which sections of the crowd periodically reminded the leaders of.
Second, the disquieting continuation of tax-free emoluments to Parliamentarians and other holders of constitutional offices. Third, the passage by Parliament of the much-resented Media Bill -- the Kenya Communications (Amendment ) Bill, 2008, known in certain quarters as the ICT Bill – whose effect will be, inter alia, to vigorously gag the media, and which now awaits only the President’s assent before it becomes law.
It is of course hypocritical for certain circles in ODM to declare belatedly that they will take government to court, a government in which they are coalition partners, if the President signs the Media Bill into law. Where were they when Parliament, in which they control nearly 50% of the votes, was voting in the bill? Yet that is not the only reason for the public’s gripe, and it is hypocritical to make pronouncements and act as though it is. Why have they not mobilized their voting block to get Parliamentarians to pay taxes like other law-abiding citizens? In fact, to demonstrate seriousness of purpose and unequivocal empathy with the people, ODM MPs should voluntarily ask for their pay to be taxed as they wait for Parliament to act. Anything less than that is just so much hot air.
Kenya's Independence Day celebrations of 12th December 2008, the 45th since 1963, were the most chaotic ever. We prefer to call it Jamhuri Day – Republic Day – for on December 12th 1964, exactly a year after independence, Kenya became a republic – finally putting an end to the Queen of England’s constitutional role as Kenya’s residual Head of State. That same Elizabeth II who, once upon a time in Kenya, went up a tree a princess and came down a queen the very following morning! We still love her!
A DIGRESSION: Don’t get me wrong: chaos, Santayana teaches, is any order that causes confusion in our minds. The confusion is not in the order, not in the extant state of affairs, but in our minds, says he. It’s the mind that the order, ordered as the order might be, confuses. Yet Santayana does not say whose mind’s eye sees the order when our minds are, as he sees it, confused. DIGRESSION ENDS.
For the first time ever, unthinkable (funny?) but it’s true, the President could not finish his address to the nation – historically the centerpiece of the day’s events. The speech is in fact supposed to cascade throughout the country. Not only is it aired live by the electronic media, but the text is also read out, though not simultaneously, in all of Kenya’s Provinces by the Provincial Commissioners (PCs), in all the Districts by the DC’s, and in all the Divisions by the District Officers (DOs). In the Districts and Divisions, the occasion offers an opportunity to local dignitaries to address the gatherings before the President’s speech is read and the proceedings closed.
Incidentally, on this same occasion last year, near Holo, the Kisumu West DC would not let me talk, though he was aware of my presence and allowed others conected to the incumbent MP, who was himself not there. I belonged to the wrong party, I suppose; but I also thought he was trying to stay on the right side of an incumbent several aspirants were trying to dislodge. I was of course disgusted, and I could see that other people were too. I felt the kind of discust which I imagine all gagging engenders, and which the President must have felt this December 12th.
But some eight Kilometers away at Kombewa, last year, I had caught up with the on-going events at the Divisional level, and the DO, a lady, had let me speak without a fuss and even with the respect befitting a parliamentary aspirant. I was pleased and, let me confess, offered crates of soda to the 150 or so raia in attendance. Others drank too. It was a hot day, but talk about cocacolonization! I also knew that the President entertains plenty at State House on this day, after the public gathering, but he does not use his own money!
Back to this year: It is not Yambo who cannot speak at the District gathering, I was happily at my computer “on” Gandhi Wing this time, but the President who cannot complete his speech, and so continue a tradition, at the national event! It is not Yambo whom some District “arm of government” with no civic virtue stops, but the President (and I suspect the Prime Minister) whom the people give the respect they think he deserves (both deserve) these days – just about two weeks from the first anniversary of his ECK-declared ”victory”, and the latter's "defeat”!
Exactly what happened this December 12th, and why, is all over Saturday's newspapers. Let me summarize as follows: There were demonstrations and heckling in Nairobi and certain other parts of Kenya at venues where the day’s celebrations were held. The crowd was simply not its usual cheering self – something which had been noticed with less buzz at Raila’s home-coming party in the Kibera slums about two weeks ago. It had reason, reasons, to be glum. And serious security lapse was witnessed, at the VIP section of Nyayo Stadium, the venue. An un-vetted man with an agenda, a Mr. Frederick Odhiambo – a known member of Bunge la Wananchi (Parliament of the People, or The People’s Parliament) – deliberately found his way to a seat just ten meters away from the President. He did not sit quietly throughout, nor did make noise till close to the end (which is when his presence was noticed by the President’s security detail, and his unscripted noise caused a helter-skelter of action) – which is when the Nyayo Stadium show came to a sudden stop!
Let’s put it this other way: The public’s foul mood was already much in evidence when that happened. And so was the President’s. Both President Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga had already been openly heckled. The manhandling earlier in the day, in full view of the crowd, of a protesting Mong’are (aka Nyambane), one of Kenya’s most famous comedians, had not helped matters. It was all so contagious, as Christakis might have noted were he there. Still, the belated discovery of Odhiambo’s presence was the proximate catalyst for that abrupt end.
Three wedge issues were the reason for all this unbecoming turn of events on a great ceremonial day. First, the continuing shortage and escalating price of unga (maize flour) and other consumables across the country. This is partly the consequence of widespread post-election violence which the country suffered early this year, and partly the result of mafia-like scheming in certain high places broadly in the docket of the Minister for Agriculture. Talk on the street is that YK92 is regrouping at the Ministry. Lack of access to unga of course means njaa (hunger), which sections of the crowd periodically reminded the leaders of.
Second, the disquieting continuation of tax-free emoluments to Parliamentarians and other holders of constitutional offices. Third, the passage by Parliament of the much-resented Media Bill -- the Kenya Communications (Amendment ) Bill, 2008, known in certain quarters as the ICT Bill – whose effect will be, inter alia, to vigorously gag the media, and which now awaits only the President’s assent before it becomes law.
It is of course hypocritical for certain circles in ODM to declare belatedly that they will take government to court, a government in which they are coalition partners, if the President signs the Media Bill into law. Where were they when Parliament, in which they control nearly 50% of the votes, was voting in the bill? Yet that is not the only reason for the public’s gripe, and it is hypocritical to make pronouncements and act as though it is. Why have they not mobilized their voting block to get Parliamentarians to pay taxes like other law-abiding citizens? In fact, to demonstrate seriousness of purpose and unequivocal empathy with the people, ODM MPs should voluntarily ask for their pay to be taxed as they wait for Parliament to act. Anything less than that is just so much hot air.
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Thursday, September 25, 2008
Zimbabwe: Power-Sharing and Triple Redemption
The recent power-sharing agreement in Zimbabwe, brokered by South Africa's Thabo Mbeki, is a cause for optimism for the future of governmentality in Zimbabwe, but more importantly of its long-suffering citizens in the complexity of their day-to-day lives. Skeptical as many observers were that such a deal was at all possible -- Mugabe had been so demonized, particularly in pronouncements out of London and Washington, and had so demonized himself (in rantings out of his own mouth) as to make hope for any sensible outcome of the elections itself hopeless -- there you are! We (let me use that plural and all-inclusive word) do have a deal; as good a deal as such products of political manoeuvre can be. Indeed, for Tsvangirai, a better deal nominally (in fact qualitatively, as some may insist) than Kenya's Raila brokered for himself and ODM last March.
So here we are. One obvious consequence of the deal is, to me, a triple redemption of sorts for the principals. Mugabe has succeeded in brokering his own redemption. He has recouped a measure of the social (and/or political) capital that had so precipitously eroded from his bleeding hands -- certainly in African eyes. Now, we can and will all bury him, when the time comes, without equivocation. Raila will most likely attend, perhaps with 100 bulls in tow, and with such flamboyance and depth of engagement in these matters as only he, in all of Africa, can muster.
Mbeki, likewise, has redeemed himself from the self-inflicted and precipitous slide into ignominy and ineffectualness which had been, particularly in the last year or two (if we say nothing of his quaint narrative of the causality of HIV/Aids), the hallmark of his leadership in South Africa (remember South Africa's xenophobia against fellow Africans, remember the Zuma case) and Africa as a whole (remember Darfur). In Zimbabwe, he snatched victory and optimism from the jaws of defeat and defeatism, and of pessimism. Now he can ride into that sunset, which we will all ride into -- if we are lucky to be alive when the sun sets -- with the knowledge that, whatever mars his presidential record, he will always be remembered with some fondness by all who think and remember deeply.
Tsvangirai, whom I had thought a coward when he called off his campain for the run-off elections, has redeemed himself in my eyes and, it is obvious to me, the eyes of millions of Zimbabweans. He has redeemed himself not so much in securing a deal (any coward can do that), but a good deal -- at least on paper. The taste of the pudding is in the eating, of course, but you can't eat your cake if you don't have (or bake) it! He has the ingredients, though there will be delays such as we have already witnessed -- and perhaps power outages.
Zimbabweans insist on a view that they are not Kenyans, which they are and are not, and that they do their things differently -- and perhaps in a more dignified way. The jury is out. There are many hints in the Zimbabwean deal that the Kenyan model was very much on the minds of the negotiators. Tsvangirai probably secured a better deal because Raila's, which he was clearly aware of, was in the eyes of many bad. This capacity for a quantum leap is the late-comer's advantage. Likewise, Mugabe was probably inclined to give Tsvangirai (his Oliver Twist) more because Kibaki's selfishness would be seen by history to have been greater -- in which case, on that score, Mugabe would not be at the bottom of African history's list. Did Mbeki whisper that prospect in his ear, I would like to know?
So here we are. One obvious consequence of the deal is, to me, a triple redemption of sorts for the principals. Mugabe has succeeded in brokering his own redemption. He has recouped a measure of the social (and/or political) capital that had so precipitously eroded from his bleeding hands -- certainly in African eyes. Now, we can and will all bury him, when the time comes, without equivocation. Raila will most likely attend, perhaps with 100 bulls in tow, and with such flamboyance and depth of engagement in these matters as only he, in all of Africa, can muster.
Mbeki, likewise, has redeemed himself from the self-inflicted and precipitous slide into ignominy and ineffectualness which had been, particularly in the last year or two (if we say nothing of his quaint narrative of the causality of HIV/Aids), the hallmark of his leadership in South Africa (remember South Africa's xenophobia against fellow Africans, remember the Zuma case) and Africa as a whole (remember Darfur). In Zimbabwe, he snatched victory and optimism from the jaws of defeat and defeatism, and of pessimism. Now he can ride into that sunset, which we will all ride into -- if we are lucky to be alive when the sun sets -- with the knowledge that, whatever mars his presidential record, he will always be remembered with some fondness by all who think and remember deeply.
Tsvangirai, whom I had thought a coward when he called off his campain for the run-off elections, has redeemed himself in my eyes and, it is obvious to me, the eyes of millions of Zimbabweans. He has redeemed himself not so much in securing a deal (any coward can do that), but a good deal -- at least on paper. The taste of the pudding is in the eating, of course, but you can't eat your cake if you don't have (or bake) it! He has the ingredients, though there will be delays such as we have already witnessed -- and perhaps power outages.
Zimbabweans insist on a view that they are not Kenyans, which they are and are not, and that they do their things differently -- and perhaps in a more dignified way. The jury is out. There are many hints in the Zimbabwean deal that the Kenyan model was very much on the minds of the negotiators. Tsvangirai probably secured a better deal because Raila's, which he was clearly aware of, was in the eyes of many bad. This capacity for a quantum leap is the late-comer's advantage. Likewise, Mugabe was probably inclined to give Tsvangirai (his Oliver Twist) more because Kibaki's selfishness would be seen by history to have been greater -- in which case, on that score, Mugabe would not be at the bottom of African history's list. Did Mbeki whisper that prospect in his ear, I would like to know?
Tuesday, September 23, 2008
Kriegler's Verdict
South Africa's Judge Johann Kriegler, Chair of Kenya's Kriegler Commission (and the person who oversaw South Africa's first post-apartheid elections), held a press conference in Nairobi last Friday, September 19th, at which he highlighted the Commission's findings regarding the controversy and widespread violence that surrounded Kenya's Presidential elections held in December 2007. The Commission's main task had been to determine who actually had won the contest, Kibaki or Raila, and to recommend the way forward.
Why had the Commission been seen as the vehicle for settling the dispute? According to Kofi Annan, "They had considered everything, recount, re-tallying or forensic audit, all agreed an independent committee was the viable option."
What was the verdict of the Kriegler Commission, as reported in the media? First and foremost, that it was impossible to determine who actually won the Presidential contest. Why? Because in the December elections, his Commission had found, "ballot boxes were stuffed all over the country...there was vote-buying, bribery, intimidation, and women were not allowed to stand for certain offices."
And this was not a one-off event. As he had noted on KTN's live TV show Thursday night (see last week's issue of The Standard on Saturday):
Moreover, he added, this "problem of many decades" is:
So that now, he said at the press conference:
In his view (in The Standard on Saturday), "The integrity of the process and the credibility of the results were so gravely impaired by...manifold irregularities and defectsthat it is irrelevant whether or not there was actual rigging at the national tally centre. The results are irretrievably polluted."
Hey, wait a minute, a number of commentators have argued: Doesn't that mean that President Kibaki is in office illegally? No, answered the Judge on TV Thursday night, "but I do think the question of the legitimacy of the elections will become a very serious problem in future if people do not decide that they are tired of playing games of democracy and decide that they are entitled to choose their leaders through the ballot."
Clearly, pending specific constitutional reforms, a disputed Presidential election favours any incumbent who believes he/she has won, and on that basis chooses to stay put. On what grounds would the opponent(s) legally, or even forcefully, remove him/her in order to take over? Failure to determine who won does not now, as it did not in January, add any iota of rationale or legitimacy for a Raila takeover. Thus, we can only look to the future for a solution, starting now -- if not yesterday.
One option for the future is to constitutionally mandate the Speaker or Chief Justice, or, in their "absence" (or due to specified incapacity), or their deputies, to assume the office of Acting President while disputed results are sorted out -- even through a fresh election.
Concurrent with this would have to be the requirement that no swearing-in of a new President, or an incumbent in his/her second term, shall take place earlier than 14 days from the date of the announcement of the Presidential election results. This will give time for petitions to be lodged and heard, and will discourage the mischief of hurried and even secretive swearings-in which Kenya has witnessed twice already.
The Kriegler Commission's verdict has, at the very least, put a stamp of judicial authority on an educated view which most thoughtful Kenyans had already silently formed months ago -- as early as January. There are millions of this silent majority, who nevertheless found themselves powerless to influence the post-election turn of events in the crucial first 40 to 60 days or so. Both the President (Kibaki) and the Prime Minister (Raila) have now accepted the verdict, and promised to implement its recommendations. We will just have to wait and see.
Clearly, the Electoral Commission would have to be overhauled, as recommended. However, if there was one item that the Kriegler Commission failed to pay adequate attention to, it was the even greated mess that occurred within the constituencies in relation to Parliamentary and Civic elections. These were so intertwined with the Presidential elections that it is something of a deliberate abdication of duty not to have included in the Commission's terms of reference items specific to these levels, and not to have had something sobstantial to say in the report.
We cannot clean up the presidential election process if we do not also, or first, clean up the process at these lower levels. In very many constituencies, the agents of the presidential candidates were also the agents of their parties' parliamentary and civic candidates -- or vice versa. I saw it in Kisumu Rural. Doing all the dirty work for the presidential candidate, or seeming to, provided a perverse sort of justification (and cover) for doing as much dirty work as was necessary to ensure the parliamentary or civic candidate's own victory.
The corruption is systemic, but has so far been treated as the secret weapon for electoral victory -- which the likes of Kriegler should not be made fully privy to, and certainly should not take away in one "pathetic" instance of inquiry. That's why we'll just have to wait and see.
Why had the Commission been seen as the vehicle for settling the dispute? According to Kofi Annan, "They had considered everything, recount, re-tallying or forensic audit, all agreed an independent committee was the viable option."
What was the verdict of the Kriegler Commission, as reported in the media? First and foremost, that it was impossible to determine who actually won the Presidential contest. Why? Because in the December elections, his Commission had found, "ballot boxes were stuffed all over the country...there was vote-buying, bribery, intimidation, and women were not allowed to stand for certain offices."
And this was not a one-off event. As he had noted on KTN's live TV show Thursday night (see last week's issue of The Standard on Saturday):
"You have been having very bad elections for many years, you have had violence, fraud, vote buying, bribery, intimidation, so election after election you have been prepared for that process... It has now caught up with you and it was a lesson that made Kenyans think of what to do...with what has not been a very good election track record."
Moreover, he added, this "problem of many decades" is:
"...partly the leaders, partly the people, partly your history, partly the electoral commission's fault...everybody has some answering to do for what went wrong that day."
So that now, he said at the press conference:
"If you think it's vital to find out if there was rigging at KICC [where voting results from the country's 210 constituencies were tallied by the Kivuitu-led Electoral Commission] to determine if Raila or Kibaki won...God help you! We could not." And, "If we didn't settle somebody's wish as to who won, I am sorry we are not members of a Jockey Club, we had a job to do."
In his view (in The Standard on Saturday), "The integrity of the process and the credibility of the results were so gravely impaired by...manifold irregularities and defectsthat it is irrelevant whether or not there was actual rigging at the national tally centre. The results are irretrievably polluted."
Hey, wait a minute, a number of commentators have argued: Doesn't that mean that President Kibaki is in office illegally? No, answered the Judge on TV Thursday night, "but I do think the question of the legitimacy of the elections will become a very serious problem in future if people do not decide that they are tired of playing games of democracy and decide that they are entitled to choose their leaders through the ballot."
Clearly, pending specific constitutional reforms, a disputed Presidential election favours any incumbent who believes he/she has won, and on that basis chooses to stay put. On what grounds would the opponent(s) legally, or even forcefully, remove him/her in order to take over? Failure to determine who won does not now, as it did not in January, add any iota of rationale or legitimacy for a Raila takeover. Thus, we can only look to the future for a solution, starting now -- if not yesterday.
One option for the future is to constitutionally mandate the Speaker or Chief Justice, or, in their "absence" (or due to specified incapacity), or their deputies, to assume the office of Acting President while disputed results are sorted out -- even through a fresh election.
Concurrent with this would have to be the requirement that no swearing-in of a new President, or an incumbent in his/her second term, shall take place earlier than 14 days from the date of the announcement of the Presidential election results. This will give time for petitions to be lodged and heard, and will discourage the mischief of hurried and even secretive swearings-in which Kenya has witnessed twice already.
The Kriegler Commission's verdict has, at the very least, put a stamp of judicial authority on an educated view which most thoughtful Kenyans had already silently formed months ago -- as early as January. There are millions of this silent majority, who nevertheless found themselves powerless to influence the post-election turn of events in the crucial first 40 to 60 days or so. Both the President (Kibaki) and the Prime Minister (Raila) have now accepted the verdict, and promised to implement its recommendations. We will just have to wait and see.
Clearly, the Electoral Commission would have to be overhauled, as recommended. However, if there was one item that the Kriegler Commission failed to pay adequate attention to, it was the even greated mess that occurred within the constituencies in relation to Parliamentary and Civic elections. These were so intertwined with the Presidential elections that it is something of a deliberate abdication of duty not to have included in the Commission's terms of reference items specific to these levels, and not to have had something sobstantial to say in the report.
We cannot clean up the presidential election process if we do not also, or first, clean up the process at these lower levels. In very many constituencies, the agents of the presidential candidates were also the agents of their parties' parliamentary and civic candidates -- or vice versa. I saw it in Kisumu Rural. Doing all the dirty work for the presidential candidate, or seeming to, provided a perverse sort of justification (and cover) for doing as much dirty work as was necessary to ensure the parliamentary or civic candidate's own victory.
The corruption is systemic, but has so far been treated as the secret weapon for electoral victory -- which the likes of Kriegler should not be made fully privy to, and certainly should not take away in one "pathetic" instance of inquiry. That's why we'll just have to wait and see.
Wednesday, September 10, 2008
Gallup Poll: Latest Numbers From Kenya
Results of the most recent Gallup poll in Kenya -- conducted between June 19 and July 9, 2008 -- were released to the media on Monday, September 8th. Though the poll covered a fairly wide range of issues, the two leading newspapers ( Daily Nation and The Standard) headlined the poll results with the public's verdict on the President's and the Prime Minister's performance. So let us start with that.
President Kibaki's approval rating stands at only 63%, while Prime Minister Raila Odinga has a rating of 85%. This large, 22 percentage-point, advantage for the PM is surprising only in its magnitude and not in its skew. It reflects the general perception that the PM has been more visibly active in public affairs than the President, since March. The President's laid-back approach to things (all things considered) is well known, if not legendary. Has it not often been claimed that he never found a fence he didn't (wouldn't?) sit on? In the end, though, he seems to always have it (have things go) his way, doesn't he?
In contrast, Raila thrives on media attention, and is patently indefatigable. Moreover, while the President's role is clearly defined in the constitution, so that Kibaki does not have to endeavour to carve a niche for himself, or to prove himself, the PM's role continues to lack clear definition, and one suspects that Raila seeks to define it, in the public's eye, by word and deed -- on a day-to-day basis -- if those (including him!) who should do so constitutionally are dragging their feet.
In the process, though he is supposed to coordinate, he ends up seeming, or falling to the temptation, to take over the roles he was supposed merely to coordinate. He has been learning on-the-job, without much of local experience to draw on. Jomo Kenyatta's 12-month stint in the PM's seat so long ago (from December 12, 1963 to December 12, 1964) has not been much of a help in the absence of written memoirs and in view of the dramatically different or changed circumstances.
He has, in other words, been learning by doing -- and ruffling some feathers in the process. But the public sees all this as hard work. At least two ministers (Uhuru and Mwakwere) and/or their supporters have publicly complained that the PM is encroaching on their ministerial turf. I suspect that several other ministers have had their feathers just as ruffled -- though the public sees all this as whining, and the whining as not being in the public interest. That's just one step away (isn't it?) from being reshuffled, if it were not for the "letter" of the Grand Coalition agreement.
The truth of the matter, however, is that the PM has a habit of appropriating ministers' shine and basking in their limelight -- and he sucks out all the oxygen from the room. And the point is that he should give ministers a chance to get some credit for work well done, for that is a major component of what motivated public servants thrive on. It would be worrisome, long-term, if, in the structure of our politics, the PM should be the only minister who should shine. It would be worrisome because it would distort our politics and the structure of our public administration.
Let us now turn to other issues covered in the poll. When asked to identify "the most pressing problem that the coalition Government must address", the respondents mentioned the following (the figures in parenthesis represent the percentage of all respondents who mentioned a given problem):
Poverty (17%)
Inflation (17%)
Creating Jobs (11%)
Constitutional Reform (9%)
Unemployment (7%)
Resettlement of Internally Displaced Persons (7%)
Land Reform (7%)
Food Shortage (6%)
Education (3%)
Tax Reduction (2%)
Violence (2%)
Insecurity (2%)
Prosecution of Those Implicated in Post-Election Violence (1%)
Health Care (1%)
Road System (1%)
Water (1%)
Electricity (1%)
Other (1%)
Don't Know or No Response (2%).
[The percentages do not add up to 100]
Nominally, then, the top ten problems are: poverty, inflation, an insufficiency of jobs, constitutional reform, unemployment, IDPs, land reform, food shortage, education and taxation. But we need some aggregation here. That is to say, certain problems can be "collapsed" to give us a shorter list.
The need to create jobs arises only because there is unemployment, and when the two problems are combined into one (say, unemployment) we get to (18%). Poverty and unemployment are twins, and these two give us a "super problem" (even before we include food shortage)accounting for 35% of all responses. In a similar vein, the IDP problem is directly intertwined with the land reform problem, violence and insecurity (which are not in the nominal top ten) and the problem of dealing with perpetrators of post-election violence. Taken together, these five problems account for 19% of the responses.
Based on this re-aggregation, we get the following top 5 problems, which account for 86% of all responses:
1. Unemployment and Poverty (35%)
2. Land Reform, IDPs and related Insecurity and Violence (19%)
3. Inflation (17%)
4. Constitutional Reform (9%)
5. Food Insecurity (6%).
It is surprising that the water problem ranks so low. It would likewise be surprising that constitutional reform is among the top five problems, except that, in the eyes of Kenyans, a successfully concluded constitutional reform agenda would provide a consequential answer to two other problems in the top five: Land Reform... (19%) and Food Insecurity (6%). Inflation compounds unemployment and poverty, as well as food insecurity. It is an ever-present challenge to those who must govern -- and to those who struggle the most, daily, against hand-to-mouth existence.
On top of the list of Kenyan's problems "right now", unquestionably and expectedly, are the twin problems of unemployment and poverty (35%). It would have been surprising if the Gallup poll had found otherwise. But, in that case, did the Gallup poll set out to establish the obvious? Far from it. What is important in the poll result is the relative magnitudes of the problems, as seen by Kenyans at this time. So, we now have a kind of baseline, from which we will track future trends. Who knows: the water problem may begin to rise in subsequent polls, and likewise the health problem. On the other hand, the IDP and land reform problems might decline -- but hopefully only in step with their proper resolution, rather than due to official neglect and a diversion of public attention.
President Kibaki's approval rating stands at only 63%, while Prime Minister Raila Odinga has a rating of 85%. This large, 22 percentage-point, advantage for the PM is surprising only in its magnitude and not in its skew. It reflects the general perception that the PM has been more visibly active in public affairs than the President, since March. The President's laid-back approach to things (all things considered) is well known, if not legendary. Has it not often been claimed that he never found a fence he didn't (wouldn't?) sit on? In the end, though, he seems to always have it (have things go) his way, doesn't he?
In contrast, Raila thrives on media attention, and is patently indefatigable. Moreover, while the President's role is clearly defined in the constitution, so that Kibaki does not have to endeavour to carve a niche for himself, or to prove himself, the PM's role continues to lack clear definition, and one suspects that Raila seeks to define it, in the public's eye, by word and deed -- on a day-to-day basis -- if those (including him!) who should do so constitutionally are dragging their feet.
In the process, though he is supposed to coordinate, he ends up seeming, or falling to the temptation, to take over the roles he was supposed merely to coordinate. He has been learning on-the-job, without much of local experience to draw on. Jomo Kenyatta's 12-month stint in the PM's seat so long ago (from December 12, 1963 to December 12, 1964) has not been much of a help in the absence of written memoirs and in view of the dramatically different or changed circumstances.
He has, in other words, been learning by doing -- and ruffling some feathers in the process. But the public sees all this as hard work. At least two ministers (Uhuru and Mwakwere) and/or their supporters have publicly complained that the PM is encroaching on their ministerial turf. I suspect that several other ministers have had their feathers just as ruffled -- though the public sees all this as whining, and the whining as not being in the public interest. That's just one step away (isn't it?) from being reshuffled, if it were not for the "letter" of the Grand Coalition agreement.
The truth of the matter, however, is that the PM has a habit of appropriating ministers' shine and basking in their limelight -- and he sucks out all the oxygen from the room. And the point is that he should give ministers a chance to get some credit for work well done, for that is a major component of what motivated public servants thrive on. It would be worrisome, long-term, if, in the structure of our politics, the PM should be the only minister who should shine. It would be worrisome because it would distort our politics and the structure of our public administration.
Let us now turn to other issues covered in the poll. When asked to identify "the most pressing problem that the coalition Government must address", the respondents mentioned the following (the figures in parenthesis represent the percentage of all respondents who mentioned a given problem):
Poverty (17%)
Inflation (17%)
Creating Jobs (11%)
Constitutional Reform (9%)
Unemployment (7%)
Resettlement of Internally Displaced Persons (7%)
Land Reform (7%)
Food Shortage (6%)
Education (3%)
Tax Reduction (2%)
Violence (2%)
Insecurity (2%)
Prosecution of Those Implicated in Post-Election Violence (1%)
Health Care (1%)
Road System (1%)
Water (1%)
Electricity (1%)
Other (1%)
Don't Know or No Response (2%).
[The percentages do not add up to 100]
Nominally, then, the top ten problems are: poverty, inflation, an insufficiency of jobs, constitutional reform, unemployment, IDPs, land reform, food shortage, education and taxation. But we need some aggregation here. That is to say, certain problems can be "collapsed" to give us a shorter list.
The need to create jobs arises only because there is unemployment, and when the two problems are combined into one (say, unemployment) we get to (18%). Poverty and unemployment are twins, and these two give us a "super problem" (even before we include food shortage)accounting for 35% of all responses. In a similar vein, the IDP problem is directly intertwined with the land reform problem, violence and insecurity (which are not in the nominal top ten) and the problem of dealing with perpetrators of post-election violence. Taken together, these five problems account for 19% of the responses.
Based on this re-aggregation, we get the following top 5 problems, which account for 86% of all responses:
1. Unemployment and Poverty (35%)
2. Land Reform, IDPs and related Insecurity and Violence (19%)
3. Inflation (17%)
4. Constitutional Reform (9%)
5. Food Insecurity (6%).
It is surprising that the water problem ranks so low. It would likewise be surprising that constitutional reform is among the top five problems, except that, in the eyes of Kenyans, a successfully concluded constitutional reform agenda would provide a consequential answer to two other problems in the top five: Land Reform... (19%) and Food Insecurity (6%). Inflation compounds unemployment and poverty, as well as food insecurity. It is an ever-present challenge to those who must govern -- and to those who struggle the most, daily, against hand-to-mouth existence.
On top of the list of Kenyan's problems "right now", unquestionably and expectedly, are the twin problems of unemployment and poverty (35%). It would have been surprising if the Gallup poll had found otherwise. But, in that case, did the Gallup poll set out to establish the obvious? Far from it. What is important in the poll result is the relative magnitudes of the problems, as seen by Kenyans at this time. So, we now have a kind of baseline, from which we will track future trends. Who knows: the water problem may begin to rise in subsequent polls, and likewise the health problem. On the other hand, the IDP and land reform problems might decline -- but hopefully only in step with their proper resolution, rather than due to official neglect and a diversion of public attention.
Wednesday, July 30, 2008
The Mau Water Tower
Much has been written in Kenya’s print media about the Mau Forest Complex in the last four weeks or so, and particularly the last seven days. However, the Mau Question has been part of the national discourse, on and off, since the second half of the 1980s, in the heyday of Moi’s presidency (and when UNEP was patently asleep on the job), when grabbers, “settlers” and squatters alike, who -- unlike the Ogiek, otherwise called the Dorobo -- did not have any traditional/historical claim to any part of that expansive, fertile, and amply rain-fed terrain, began to encroach into it, with state support. Gakuu Mathenge suggests, however, that this Mau Question became part of the national discourse only in 2004, when President Kibaki burnt his fingers attempting to intervene. He paid unforgettably more for the effort a year later, during a Referendum in which his “yes” (or Banana) camp decisively lost.
Be that as it may, we can see that much of the recently publicized information, firmly anchored on texts and pictures provided mainly by UNEP, is the kind that politically aware citizens (or plainly well-read ones) must have, and constantly bear in mind, in order to form the sustained and hopefully vocal opinion that shapes policy. In this case, what is on the agenda is the crucial matter of securing the country’s water resources, which are increasingly in jeopardy, and working toward a sustainable environmental and socio-economic future for all.
So, exactly what concrete information would the informed reader have gleaned by now, from all the public narratives, about the essential features of the Mau Water Tower, and about its significance to the future of Kenya and the region as a whole? It would have been largely as follows:
The Physical Characteristics and Importance of the Complex: The Mau Forest Complex is a 400,000-hectacre area located toward the western wall of the Rift Valley. This forest cover, “is the largest closed canopy forest ecosystem in Kenya” (UNEP, Steiner, Mbaria), and Indeed East Africa, being equal in size to that of Mt Kenya and the Aberdares combined.
The Complex comprises: South Western Mau Forest, Eastern Mau Forest, Likia Forest, Tinet Forest, Sigotik Forest, Nesuit Forest and Marioshoni Forest (Odenda Lumumba). Transmara and Mau Narok Forests are in the same general area, though they are under the jurisdiction of local authorities, as are Kapsita Forest (Molo) and Londiani Forest. The Mau Complex “is the single most important water catchment for” Rift Valley and Western Provinces (W. Kabukuru). The Mau Complex comprises five main gazetted forest reserves: Eastern Mau (66,000 hectares), South-Western Mau (22,700 hectares), Trans-Mara (34,400 hectares), and Ol Pusimoru (17,200 hectares) (see Patrick Wachira). The Maasai Mau (46,000 hectares), which is not part of the gazetted complex, would have been the sixth component (P. Wachira).
It has been repeatedly stated that twelve rivers drain the Mau Complex, but the full list of this “Glorious Dozen” has not been widely publicized or known; and if incidentally known or had as part of lay knowledge, neither “organically” connected in the mind with the Mau Complex nor, which is the same thing, perceived as any kind of dozen. This is clearly a problem to the detail-conscious reader who must be enrolled in the war against environmental degradation and the related political backlash. The twelve rivers are:
Nzoia, Yala, Nyando, Sondu,
Njoro, Naishi, Makalia, Nderit,
Molo, Kerio, Mara, and Ewaso Nyiro
Rivers Nzoia, Yala, Nyando and Sondu, all entirely within Kenya, flow broadly westward into Lake Victoria; while Njoro, Naishi, Makalia and Nderit (Enderit?), also entirely Kenyan, flow eastward into Lake Nakuru, from the Eastern Mau. Ewaso Nyiro River, in its turn, flows southward, emptying its water into Lake Natron; unlike Mara River which first flows southward but eventually turns westward and then northward, inside Tanzania, toward Lake Victoria. Molo River drains into Lake Baringo, and Kerio River ends way way up north in Lake Turkana.
Mara River, it should be underscored, is a 13,750-kilometer “international river” shared by Kenya and Tanzania. Kenya owns the first 65% of its length, which traverses the world-famous Maasai Mara Game Reserve. Tanzania owns the other 35%, which crosses the equally or more famous (as some would argue) Serengeti National Park (Wanjohi Kabukuru).
Viewed another way, the Mau Water Tower represents the upper catchment “of all but one of the main rivers west of the Rift Valley, which are the source of over 60 per cent of the water flowing into Lake Victoria” (Steiner, Mbaria, Wachira).
The Lakes into Which the Rivers Drain are, as already pointed out: Lake Victoria (shared by Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania), Nakuru (entirely within Kenya), Baringo (also entirely within Kenya), Natron (shared by Kenya and Tanzania) and Turkana (shared by Kenya and Ethiopia).
The degradation of Mau Forest affects, to varying degrees, a total of six countries, namely: Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia and Egypt. What is the nature and magnitude of the destruction, which is ongoing even as we speak? First, logging, which has been going on “for decades” (Steiner); and, one may add, charcoal burning and fuel-wood gathering. Second, illegal excision and settlement: some 25,000 people (or is it 15,000?) are currently settled there. Compare this, however, to the livelihoods, which are at risk, of some 600,000 people engaged in the tea sector alone; not to mention perhaps thousands in the region and elsewhere who depend on tourism for their daily bread, and the millions of small holders who eke out a living in the Lake Victoria basin (Steiner).
Third, due to deforestation, there is a reduction in rainfall levels in the catchment area. Fourth, (as P. Ngunjiri notes) reduced rainfall levels have a negative effect on water supply to urban and other areas such as: Bomet, Egerton University, Elburgon, Eldama Ravine, Kericho, Molo, Nakuru, Narok, Njoro and the Lake Victoria basin. In the past ten years, some 104,000 hectares (24% of the Mau Complex forest cover) have been destroyed. Moreover, the “estimated potential hydro-power generation in the Mau Complex catchments is about 535 MW, representing 57 per cent of the current total hydro-power generation capacity in Kenya” (Wachira). At present, Masinga Dam provides over 50% of Kenya’s electricity, according to KenGen, but it is silting fast (Kabukuru). Illegal logging is most extensive in the south western zone of the Mau Complex (Wachira).
All told, if the destruction of the Mau Complex is not stopped, Kenya stands to lose $300 million in GDP (Steiner). Perhaps seeing this amount as a gross under-estimate, certain commentators have preferred to present it as an annual rather than a “one-off” loss to the country. The difference is not the same.
So, what is one to do? Do we evict the squatters and illegal settlers from the full stretch of the Mau Complex, as a pre-requisite to regenerating Kenya’s and East Africa’s largest water tower, or must those presently in government cut unsustainable political deals with the well-connected owners/settlers, while resettling probably tens of thousands of squatters with a voting card? (go to page 23 of the UNEP et al link shown under Disaster Management elsewhere on this blog page for a picture of the 937.7-hectare Kiptagich Tea Estate, which will give some idea of what such a deal would cost in cash terms)
Despite the cost, we as a country have no choice but to evict and regenerate; but we must also resettle legitimate claimants to a compensation. We must find alternative land in which to resettle them, and pay for it. There will be certain political risks and costs in doing so, to be sure, but leaders offer to lead fully aware that leadership is not all about perks; and fully cognizant of the fact that “there comes a time” when leadership involves making tough, thankless, and even cheerless, decisions – often in the face of populist agitation, by the very same co-leaders who would supplant one at the first opportunity. But there is a place in heaven!
NOTE: This post is based on the following recent reports and commentaries. From the July 27, 2008 issue of Sunday Standard, articles by Gakuu Mathenge (titled “The complex: Peasants, propaganda and fraud”), Patrick Wachira (titled “The facts about Mau forest: East Africa’s largest block of indigenous forest is also home to 45 bird species”), and Vitalis Kimutai (titled “Political intrigues that plague the forest’s conservation efforts”).
From the July 27-August 3, 2008 issue of The East African (a weekly newspaper), John Mbaria’s interview with Achim Steiner (UNEP’s Executive Director), three articles by John Mbaria (titled, “Mau Forest Controversy”, “Why Moi govt is to blame for excisions” and “Destruction of Forest Killing Tea Industry”), Odenda Lumumba (titled “Land excisions were illegal, against the public interest”), Philip Ngunjiri (titled “Kenya may lose $300m revenue unless forest is restored”) and Wanjohi Kabukuru (titled “Why Dar and Cairo are asking tough questions”).
However, the anchor source for this post, and indeed for the said reports and commentaries, is Mara Complex Under Siege: Values and Threats (May 2008). That key source was collaboratively prepared by UNEP, Kenya Wildlife Service, Kenya Forests Working Group and Ewaso Nyiro South Development Authority.
For an updated version, click on a link with the same title as this post, which you will find to the right of this page.
References:
1. Links to Additional Readings: Click here
Be that as it may, we can see that much of the recently publicized information, firmly anchored on texts and pictures provided mainly by UNEP, is the kind that politically aware citizens (or plainly well-read ones) must have, and constantly bear in mind, in order to form the sustained and hopefully vocal opinion that shapes policy. In this case, what is on the agenda is the crucial matter of securing the country’s water resources, which are increasingly in jeopardy, and working toward a sustainable environmental and socio-economic future for all.
So, exactly what concrete information would the informed reader have gleaned by now, from all the public narratives, about the essential features of the Mau Water Tower, and about its significance to the future of Kenya and the region as a whole? It would have been largely as follows:
The Physical Characteristics and Importance of the Complex: The Mau Forest Complex is a 400,000-hectacre area located toward the western wall of the Rift Valley. This forest cover, “is the largest closed canopy forest ecosystem in Kenya” (UNEP, Steiner, Mbaria), and Indeed East Africa, being equal in size to that of Mt Kenya and the Aberdares combined.
The Complex comprises: South Western Mau Forest, Eastern Mau Forest, Likia Forest, Tinet Forest, Sigotik Forest, Nesuit Forest and Marioshoni Forest (Odenda Lumumba). Transmara and Mau Narok Forests are in the same general area, though they are under the jurisdiction of local authorities, as are Kapsita Forest (Molo) and Londiani Forest. The Mau Complex “is the single most important water catchment for” Rift Valley and Western Provinces (W. Kabukuru). The Mau Complex comprises five main gazetted forest reserves: Eastern Mau (66,000 hectares), South-Western Mau (22,700 hectares), Trans-Mara (34,400 hectares), and Ol Pusimoru (17,200 hectares) (see Patrick Wachira). The Maasai Mau (46,000 hectares), which is not part of the gazetted complex, would have been the sixth component (P. Wachira).
It has been repeatedly stated that twelve rivers drain the Mau Complex, but the full list of this “Glorious Dozen” has not been widely publicized or known; and if incidentally known or had as part of lay knowledge, neither “organically” connected in the mind with the Mau Complex nor, which is the same thing, perceived as any kind of dozen. This is clearly a problem to the detail-conscious reader who must be enrolled in the war against environmental degradation and the related political backlash. The twelve rivers are:
Nzoia, Yala, Nyando, Sondu,
Njoro, Naishi, Makalia, Nderit,
Molo, Kerio, Mara, and Ewaso Nyiro
Rivers Nzoia, Yala, Nyando and Sondu, all entirely within Kenya, flow broadly westward into Lake Victoria; while Njoro, Naishi, Makalia and Nderit (Enderit?), also entirely Kenyan, flow eastward into Lake Nakuru, from the Eastern Mau. Ewaso Nyiro River, in its turn, flows southward, emptying its water into Lake Natron; unlike Mara River which first flows southward but eventually turns westward and then northward, inside Tanzania, toward Lake Victoria. Molo River drains into Lake Baringo, and Kerio River ends way way up north in Lake Turkana.
Mara River, it should be underscored, is a 13,750-kilometer “international river” shared by Kenya and Tanzania. Kenya owns the first 65% of its length, which traverses the world-famous Maasai Mara Game Reserve. Tanzania owns the other 35%, which crosses the equally or more famous (as some would argue) Serengeti National Park (Wanjohi Kabukuru).
Viewed another way, the Mau Water Tower represents the upper catchment “of all but one of the main rivers west of the Rift Valley, which are the source of over 60 per cent of the water flowing into Lake Victoria” (Steiner, Mbaria, Wachira).
The Lakes into Which the Rivers Drain are, as already pointed out: Lake Victoria (shared by Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania), Nakuru (entirely within Kenya), Baringo (also entirely within Kenya), Natron (shared by Kenya and Tanzania) and Turkana (shared by Kenya and Ethiopia).
The degradation of Mau Forest affects, to varying degrees, a total of six countries, namely: Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia and Egypt. What is the nature and magnitude of the destruction, which is ongoing even as we speak? First, logging, which has been going on “for decades” (Steiner); and, one may add, charcoal burning and fuel-wood gathering. Second, illegal excision and settlement: some 25,000 people (or is it 15,000?) are currently settled there. Compare this, however, to the livelihoods, which are at risk, of some 600,000 people engaged in the tea sector alone; not to mention perhaps thousands in the region and elsewhere who depend on tourism for their daily bread, and the millions of small holders who eke out a living in the Lake Victoria basin (Steiner).
Third, due to deforestation, there is a reduction in rainfall levels in the catchment area. Fourth, (as P. Ngunjiri notes) reduced rainfall levels have a negative effect on water supply to urban and other areas such as: Bomet, Egerton University, Elburgon, Eldama Ravine, Kericho, Molo, Nakuru, Narok, Njoro and the Lake Victoria basin. In the past ten years, some 104,000 hectares (24% of the Mau Complex forest cover) have been destroyed. Moreover, the “estimated potential hydro-power generation in the Mau Complex catchments is about 535 MW, representing 57 per cent of the current total hydro-power generation capacity in Kenya” (Wachira). At present, Masinga Dam provides over 50% of Kenya’s electricity, according to KenGen, but it is silting fast (Kabukuru). Illegal logging is most extensive in the south western zone of the Mau Complex (Wachira).
All told, if the destruction of the Mau Complex is not stopped, Kenya stands to lose $300 million in GDP (Steiner). Perhaps seeing this amount as a gross under-estimate, certain commentators have preferred to present it as an annual rather than a “one-off” loss to the country. The difference is not the same.
So, what is one to do? Do we evict the squatters and illegal settlers from the full stretch of the Mau Complex, as a pre-requisite to regenerating Kenya’s and East Africa’s largest water tower, or must those presently in government cut unsustainable political deals with the well-connected owners/settlers, while resettling probably tens of thousands of squatters with a voting card? (go to page 23 of the UNEP et al link shown under Disaster Management elsewhere on this blog page for a picture of the 937.7-hectare Kiptagich Tea Estate, which will give some idea of what such a deal would cost in cash terms)
Despite the cost, we as a country have no choice but to evict and regenerate; but we must also resettle legitimate claimants to a compensation. We must find alternative land in which to resettle them, and pay for it. There will be certain political risks and costs in doing so, to be sure, but leaders offer to lead fully aware that leadership is not all about perks; and fully cognizant of the fact that “there comes a time” when leadership involves making tough, thankless, and even cheerless, decisions – often in the face of populist agitation, by the very same co-leaders who would supplant one at the first opportunity. But there is a place in heaven!
NOTE: This post is based on the following recent reports and commentaries. From the July 27, 2008 issue of Sunday Standard, articles by Gakuu Mathenge (titled “The complex: Peasants, propaganda and fraud”), Patrick Wachira (titled “The facts about Mau forest: East Africa’s largest block of indigenous forest is also home to 45 bird species”), and Vitalis Kimutai (titled “Political intrigues that plague the forest’s conservation efforts”).
From the July 27-August 3, 2008 issue of The East African (a weekly newspaper), John Mbaria’s interview with Achim Steiner (UNEP’s Executive Director), three articles by John Mbaria (titled, “Mau Forest Controversy”, “Why Moi govt is to blame for excisions” and “Destruction of Forest Killing Tea Industry”), Odenda Lumumba (titled “Land excisions were illegal, against the public interest”), Philip Ngunjiri (titled “Kenya may lose $300m revenue unless forest is restored”) and Wanjohi Kabukuru (titled “Why Dar and Cairo are asking tough questions”).
However, the anchor source for this post, and indeed for the said reports and commentaries, is Mara Complex Under Siege: Values and Threats (May 2008). That key source was collaboratively prepared by UNEP, Kenya Wildlife Service, Kenya Forests Working Group and Ewaso Nyiro South Development Authority.
For an updated version, click on a link with the same title as this post, which you will find to the right of this page.
References:
1. Links to Additional Readings: Click here
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Wednesday, July 09, 2008
Kimunya's Departure From Treasury
There is little to cheer in Amos Kimunya's departure, as Amos Kimunya, from the cabinet and Ministry of Finance last Tuesday. He was merely "stepping aside," he reasoned himself into a certain anti-frenzy, avoiding thus a not-at-all-certain death. And that's good for him and his family -- and us. There is little to cheer about; instead, there is much to reflect upon. Cheers, nonetheless, to President Kibaki for displaying a rare firm hand -- for re-affirming what was hitherto only tell-tale and all-too-sporadic -- in the name of accountable governance.
Departures of such high-profile public figures -- who are so easily caught up in a self-created air of untouchability, and numbed by our cheering and all the opportunity for self-aggrandizement that's still theirs for the taking -- are going to have to be routine, if ordinary Kenyans are to have a fighting chance against hard life.
There is little to cheer because impunity and the temptation to pull a fast one and to hide the truth -- even truth which cannot be hidden in broad daylight and even in the dark (truth which cannot escape the knowing rumour) -- still stalk the land.
There is much to reflect upon because (and I'll make only four points for now): One, Libya, with its relatively large sovereign wealth fund, is, it seems to me, making willing prostitutes of certain of our revered politicians; politicians who think (or hope) we don't really think (when we really do), and who would like to believe that we cannot work our thoughts into believing all that we're hearing (when we can) -- though they so cleverly endeavour to scorch it (and with it our very thoughts and ascendant beliefs).
How else does one explain the sudden "ever-presence" (effervescence) of Tamoil and Oilibya -- and the unprompted but subliminally incriminating declarations that no leader is indispensable? Is Parliament's Finance Committee or the Cockar Commission really going to reveal the flesh-and-blood identities of the Kenyan interests associated with these outfits, and to tell us if they had anything to do with the Grand Regency saga as it has unfolded? Will they, too, face the music -- or will we be, once again, put in our place and silenced by threats of raw blood?
Two, with Kimunya's departure, and assuming that he will not be returning to Treasury even if he were to return to the cabinet, all eyes are back on President Kibaki: will he this time escape bad routine (indeed bad karma) -- and the perception that he cannot bring himself to appoint anyone from outside "Mount Kenya" to the top post at Treasury? Will he go against the grain and appoint someone from elsewhere in Kenya to succeed Kimunya, and not in an acting capacity? There is sufficient talent in Parliament for that -- for what would be a healthy dose of realism and 21st century nationalism. That would be reason to cheer -- even if mutedly -- and not at Kimunya's expense. Rather, at the expense of narrow-mindedness and parochialism.
What would be disastrous -- utterly disastrous to true meritocracy -- would be to elevate Oburu Oginga, the present Assistant Minister at Treasury, to Kimunya's post. There would simply be no rhyme or reason for that, as I think very many Kenyans believe. Not only do they believe that, they dread the prospect and implications of such appointment.
Three, many Kenyans still believe that Libya played an important part in the bombing of Norfolk Hotel, in Nairobi, at the end of 1980. Some twenty eight years later, Kenyans in high places are trying to outdo each other to deliver the iconic Grand Regency Hotel to that same Gaddafi. They are crazy enough! Americans are being "handsomely" compensated for Lockerbie. Did Kenya receive a cent (or a dime)specifically for the deaths and other damage at Norfolk -- or did the compensation quietly go into certain of our politicians' palms and pockets?
Four, I think Kimunya's background in "pure" accountancy denied him the political sensibilities and social skills to navigate the treacherous waters in which a Minister for Finance, or any politician we should emulate, must swim. Often, this glaring lack presented as arrogance and ethnic chauvinism -- but it was at root fatally flawed incapacity to lead a public-life attuned maximally to the cross-currents of a multi-cultural society; and to the need for broad-based equity, in a nation that remains highly unequal and polarized. Before his tendency toward spectacularly bad judgement showed itself in Grand Regency, we had seen it most tellingly in the Safaricom IPO saga, and in the key appointments that he made as Minister.
Yet, I fear, there remains a handful of Kimunyas in both PNU and ODM! On this matter, indeed, there is not an iota of difference between ODM and PNU. Our unease, as Kenyans, remains acute.
[This post was first drafted and saved on Wednesday, July 9, 2008. It was updated and published on Friday, July 11]
Departures of such high-profile public figures -- who are so easily caught up in a self-created air of untouchability, and numbed by our cheering and all the opportunity for self-aggrandizement that's still theirs for the taking -- are going to have to be routine, if ordinary Kenyans are to have a fighting chance against hard life.
There is little to cheer because impunity and the temptation to pull a fast one and to hide the truth -- even truth which cannot be hidden in broad daylight and even in the dark (truth which cannot escape the knowing rumour) -- still stalk the land.
There is much to reflect upon because (and I'll make only four points for now): One, Libya, with its relatively large sovereign wealth fund, is, it seems to me, making willing prostitutes of certain of our revered politicians; politicians who think (or hope) we don't really think (when we really do), and who would like to believe that we cannot work our thoughts into believing all that we're hearing (when we can) -- though they so cleverly endeavour to scorch it (and with it our very thoughts and ascendant beliefs).
How else does one explain the sudden "ever-presence" (effervescence) of Tamoil and Oilibya -- and the unprompted but subliminally incriminating declarations that no leader is indispensable? Is Parliament's Finance Committee or the Cockar Commission really going to reveal the flesh-and-blood identities of the Kenyan interests associated with these outfits, and to tell us if they had anything to do with the Grand Regency saga as it has unfolded? Will they, too, face the music -- or will we be, once again, put in our place and silenced by threats of raw blood?
Two, with Kimunya's departure, and assuming that he will not be returning to Treasury even if he were to return to the cabinet, all eyes are back on President Kibaki: will he this time escape bad routine (indeed bad karma) -- and the perception that he cannot bring himself to appoint anyone from outside "Mount Kenya" to the top post at Treasury? Will he go against the grain and appoint someone from elsewhere in Kenya to succeed Kimunya, and not in an acting capacity? There is sufficient talent in Parliament for that -- for what would be a healthy dose of realism and 21st century nationalism. That would be reason to cheer -- even if mutedly -- and not at Kimunya's expense. Rather, at the expense of narrow-mindedness and parochialism.
What would be disastrous -- utterly disastrous to true meritocracy -- would be to elevate Oburu Oginga, the present Assistant Minister at Treasury, to Kimunya's post. There would simply be no rhyme or reason for that, as I think very many Kenyans believe. Not only do they believe that, they dread the prospect and implications of such appointment.
Three, many Kenyans still believe that Libya played an important part in the bombing of Norfolk Hotel, in Nairobi, at the end of 1980. Some twenty eight years later, Kenyans in high places are trying to outdo each other to deliver the iconic Grand Regency Hotel to that same Gaddafi. They are crazy enough! Americans are being "handsomely" compensated for Lockerbie. Did Kenya receive a cent (or a dime)specifically for the deaths and other damage at Norfolk -- or did the compensation quietly go into certain of our politicians' palms and pockets?
Four, I think Kimunya's background in "pure" accountancy denied him the political sensibilities and social skills to navigate the treacherous waters in which a Minister for Finance, or any politician we should emulate, must swim. Often, this glaring lack presented as arrogance and ethnic chauvinism -- but it was at root fatally flawed incapacity to lead a public-life attuned maximally to the cross-currents of a multi-cultural society; and to the need for broad-based equity, in a nation that remains highly unequal and polarized. Before his tendency toward spectacularly bad judgement showed itself in Grand Regency, we had seen it most tellingly in the Safaricom IPO saga, and in the key appointments that he made as Minister.
Yet, I fear, there remains a handful of Kimunyas in both PNU and ODM! On this matter, indeed, there is not an iota of difference between ODM and PNU. Our unease, as Kenyans, remains acute.
[This post was first drafted and saved on Wednesday, July 9, 2008. It was updated and published on Friday, July 11]
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Wednesday, May 28, 2008
On the Importance of Being Namwamba
Just three months ago, as I have exclaimed elsewhere, who would have imagined that Kenya's talking heads would be as embroiled in the Grand Opposition debate as they are? I didn't. Still, I am certainly enjoying this enthralling phase of our political evolution. Enthralling, that is, if Namwamba and his team don't betray the cause.
It's all been very dialectical. First, the general election of December 2007. Then the disputed presidential election results. Then the chaos and the blood-letting. "Den cometh Koffi, den de peace -- which only a true peacemaker bringeth." Then Kibaki and Raila negotiate an unbelievably skewed distribution of cabinet slots. Then the fallout of disappointment at Raila's performance, left alone with Kibaki. In Kisumu, that disappointment exploded a few weeks ago into what must be the first true expression of proletarian (and semi-proletarian) disenchantment with the dominant power structure in those parts! The rest, as one might say, is this unfolding -- this current -- history that we are very much a part of.
On the night Kenya's parliament elected the new speaker, my impression of Namwamba was of someone who needed to grow up a just little more. Less than three months later, he has become the symbol, the robust new face, of Kenya's never-say-die politics. In a way, he is the new Orengo (and perhaps Raila, if he can secure a solid political base).
How did things change so fast that Raila, the doyen of opposition politics, is now seen as the apologist for an established political order of which he is only tenuously a part; the defender of a status quo which seeks to concentrate political power (and then economic power) in the hands of the very wenyewe whom the Second Liberation was supposed to "drive out of town"? Whichever way it happened, it is the very reason for the rise of Namwamba and his team -- motley as it is, and flawed as some of its members are.
"We are now in government," Raila reminds the team (in an earlier day they would have been the vinyangalika) -- who must be shown and kept in their place. If they want to form a Grand Opposition, then they must resign from parliament and seek fresh mandate from the people under the banner of parties of their choice. Certainly not ODM or PNU, without which they (with the exception of Jirongo and only a fistful more) would not be in parliament now.
Since ODM and PNU are in government, he reasons, and their members cannot be both in government and opposition. That, in his view, is an irreconcilable contradiction. The cabinet even convinced itself that it had the power to veto the Grand Coalition. Veto it as what? As an insolent thought? As a piece of legislation yet to be tabled? Then ODM called a meeting at Safari Park Hotel to thrash out this apparent confusion of memes. According to reports, however, only some 40 out of 96 ODM MPs (including Namwamba and "the little Ruto") attended. There was a stalemate.
I don't know what Namwamba's career path is going to be in the years and decades to come, but right now he has a very important role to play -- a role so dramatically abandoned by Raila at potentially the moment of his greatest triumph yet. Right now, Ababu (Don't-abandon-the-cause) Namwamba is the symbol of hope for a system of governance with proper checks and balances -- a system disdainful of private interest masquerading as public interest.
The idea of the Grand Opposition is borne of necessity. With almost everybody in government now, it is something of a deception, and politically fraudulent, to insist that Namwamba and his team seek to establish what could equally be achieved by the back bench -- achieved, that is, without in the process ruffling the feathers of the mighty. In the present circumstances, clearly, the back bench would be a divide-and-rule device, a smokescreen for grand mischief. As a solution, it is highly unsatisfactory vis-a-vis the right of the people to express and realize their will, unfettered, through their elected representatives. It is indeed a corrosion and even a negation of that right. And it displays a basic and hidden fear, on the part of those who would use the parliamentary system to ascend to power, of the principle of advice-and-consent -- in the true meaning of the term -- which ought to govern all democratic discourse.
So such negations must in turn, or preemptively, be negated. It is all very dialectical, as I said. But our history is peopled by individuals who rose on the back of the people's aspirations for a good life, only to succumb to the lure of personal aggrandizement, or the fear (in the face of unrelenting intimidation and assault) of unbearable personal loss. I don't know how Namwamba will deal with such pressure, which will surely come. But let him run the good race. As long as he can, let him carry the baton -- in this race whose length, in time and space, no one can tell. Someone will surely be there when it is time to pass the baton. Namwamba's historic significance is that he was there when it needed to be passed.
And his team should take solace in the fact that those opposed to the Grand Opposition will soon ask for its support to pass in parliament whatever version of the new constitution the Grand Coalition will craft for the people's approval. The time for a quid pro quo awaits in the near distance -- near, yes, but out of view for the near-sighted who want to eat their cake and have it.
It's all been very dialectical. First, the general election of December 2007. Then the disputed presidential election results. Then the chaos and the blood-letting. "Den cometh Koffi, den de peace -- which only a true peacemaker bringeth." Then Kibaki and Raila negotiate an unbelievably skewed distribution of cabinet slots. Then the fallout of disappointment at Raila's performance, left alone with Kibaki. In Kisumu, that disappointment exploded a few weeks ago into what must be the first true expression of proletarian (and semi-proletarian) disenchantment with the dominant power structure in those parts! The rest, as one might say, is this unfolding -- this current -- history that we are very much a part of.
On the night Kenya's parliament elected the new speaker, my impression of Namwamba was of someone who needed to grow up a just little more. Less than three months later, he has become the symbol, the robust new face, of Kenya's never-say-die politics. In a way, he is the new Orengo (and perhaps Raila, if he can secure a solid political base).
How did things change so fast that Raila, the doyen of opposition politics, is now seen as the apologist for an established political order of which he is only tenuously a part; the defender of a status quo which seeks to concentrate political power (and then economic power) in the hands of the very wenyewe whom the Second Liberation was supposed to "drive out of town"? Whichever way it happened, it is the very reason for the rise of Namwamba and his team -- motley as it is, and flawed as some of its members are.
"We are now in government," Raila reminds the team (in an earlier day they would have been the vinyangalika) -- who must be shown and kept in their place. If they want to form a Grand Opposition, then they must resign from parliament and seek fresh mandate from the people under the banner of parties of their choice. Certainly not ODM or PNU, without which they (with the exception of Jirongo and only a fistful more) would not be in parliament now.
Since ODM and PNU are in government, he reasons, and their members cannot be both in government and opposition. That, in his view, is an irreconcilable contradiction. The cabinet even convinced itself that it had the power to veto the Grand Coalition. Veto it as what? As an insolent thought? As a piece of legislation yet to be tabled? Then ODM called a meeting at Safari Park Hotel to thrash out this apparent confusion of memes. According to reports, however, only some 40 out of 96 ODM MPs (including Namwamba and "the little Ruto") attended. There was a stalemate.
I don't know what Namwamba's career path is going to be in the years and decades to come, but right now he has a very important role to play -- a role so dramatically abandoned by Raila at potentially the moment of his greatest triumph yet. Right now, Ababu (Don't-abandon-the-cause) Namwamba is the symbol of hope for a system of governance with proper checks and balances -- a system disdainful of private interest masquerading as public interest.
The idea of the Grand Opposition is borne of necessity. With almost everybody in government now, it is something of a deception, and politically fraudulent, to insist that Namwamba and his team seek to establish what could equally be achieved by the back bench -- achieved, that is, without in the process ruffling the feathers of the mighty. In the present circumstances, clearly, the back bench would be a divide-and-rule device, a smokescreen for grand mischief. As a solution, it is highly unsatisfactory vis-a-vis the right of the people to express and realize their will, unfettered, through their elected representatives. It is indeed a corrosion and even a negation of that right. And it displays a basic and hidden fear, on the part of those who would use the parliamentary system to ascend to power, of the principle of advice-and-consent -- in the true meaning of the term -- which ought to govern all democratic discourse.
So such negations must in turn, or preemptively, be negated. It is all very dialectical, as I said. But our history is peopled by individuals who rose on the back of the people's aspirations for a good life, only to succumb to the lure of personal aggrandizement, or the fear (in the face of unrelenting intimidation and assault) of unbearable personal loss. I don't know how Namwamba will deal with such pressure, which will surely come. But let him run the good race. As long as he can, let him carry the baton -- in this race whose length, in time and space, no one can tell. Someone will surely be there when it is time to pass the baton. Namwamba's historic significance is that he was there when it needed to be passed.
And his team should take solace in the fact that those opposed to the Grand Opposition will soon ask for its support to pass in parliament whatever version of the new constitution the Grand Coalition will craft for the people's approval. The time for a quid pro quo awaits in the near distance -- near, yes, but out of view for the near-sighted who want to eat their cake and have it.
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Tuesday, May 13, 2008
The Price of Liberty in Kenya: Grand Coalition versus Grand Opposition
The overwhelming majority of Kenyans agreed, it seems to me, that a Grand Coalition Government was necessary on two purely pragmatic grounds. First, it was the only sure way to prevent the country from falling apart in an orgy of violence following last December's general elections. Second, it was not really possible to determine which candidate had actually won the Presidential race -- much as ODM had claimed, using its own inconclusive and even flawed evidence, that Raila had won without question. And yet, it was clear to nearly everyone, Kibaki and PNU had stolen the Presidential vote -- with a lot of help from Kivuitu and others at ECK.
What was not in dispute was that ODM was the single largest party in the new parliament. Its leader was Raila Amolo Odinga. So when Koffi Annan eventually brokered a compromise at the end of last February, it was clear that power-sharing would have to be spearheaded by Kibaki and Raila. Since Kibaki was not going to give up the President's seat -- being, inter alia, the incumbent -- and nobody, not even Raila, had the wherewithall or wits to ease him out, the only viable option was to create the Executive Prime Minister's seat for Raila, and to work out a formula for equal power-sharing at the cabinet and other levels (in particular, at the level of Assistant Ministers, Permanent Secretaries, Ambassadors and High Commissioners, and top positions in the parastatals). Surrogates were to negotiate details of the deal, with the two principals having the final say regarding issues on which the negotiators failed to agree. Eventually, there was no real agreement between the negotiating teams, and the two principals decided to take the bull by the horn at Sagana.
The size and composition of the cabinet, and the apportioning of ministries between PNU and ODM, as agreed at Sagana, clearly signalled to most Kenyans that ODM had been seriously, if not cynically, short-changed. Kibaki, long dismissed as indecisive and incapable of standing toe-to-toe with Raila (Agwambo), had not only outwitted Raila but also proved to be a savvier negotiator. In the process, he had exposed to the wider public a character flaw in Raila which some close observers of Raila's public life have for some time now quietly worried and/or grumbled about -- not without a large dose of despair and even exasperation.
The flaw is, simply, that when left alone with "the other side," he is more likely than not to end up siding/agreeing with that side -- to his side's chagrin. Some observers believe that they have figured him out even more finely, arguing that what drives Raila is not any malice toward any friend or ally -- but purely and simply self-interest (regardless of the consequences).
Raila argues that the power-sharing was more than numerically equitable, if you look at it all with a fine tooth-comb. But no one believes him. Not even his thousands of fanatical, long suffering, followers in Kisumu City and its environs -- as the events of last Saturday suggest. He argues, moreover, that the ministries that he negotiated with Kibaki for ODM were fairly distributed among the ODM fraternity. But no one believes that either -- with the possible exception of the actual beneficiaries of that rather skewed distribution. There is considerable disquiet about that skewness in Rift Valley and Nyanza, and even parts of Western Province -- all bedrock of ODM support. And there is exasperation that he did not get the ministries of foreign affairs and finance.
Now, as I see it, it is this disquiet that is driving the call for a Grand Opposition in parliament -- to be underpinned by an act of parliament for additional political cover. And Raila is, of course, vehemently opposed to the idea. Is there any merit -- is there a compelling reason -- for the Grand Opposition?
In principle, Raila is right. There should be no grounds whatsoever for members of a party, elected to parliament under its banner, to technically decamp to another grouping of whatever kind -- for this has the very real potential of taking away, extra-democratically, their party's legitimately won parliamentary/legislative power. Parliamentary majority represents any party's understanding of the very basis of parliamentary/legislative power in a multi-party democracy. It is what drives all inter-party contests during and between general elections. It is why party discipline is taken so seriously. A party's parliamentary voting block is its only armament.
Proponents of a legislated Grand Opposition, on the other hand, argue that they are driven by an equally, if not loftier, principle: keeping the country from sliding back into a de facto one-party state. That is, creating a circuit-breaker against those who might be tempted to revive the Moi-era type of dictatorship. They imagine that only a Grand Opposition can resonate with the public as the people's voice, quite distinct from the government's voice. Moreover, only such a legislated Grand Opposition would qualify as an official opposition -- and an official opposition is provided for in the constitution. In their view, the Grand Coalition violates this important constitutional provision.
Yet it can equally or more persuasively be argued that what gives potency to the call for a Grand Coalition is a set of very pragmatic considerations -- not quite considerations of principle. One, ODM is controlled by a hard-core of self-centred individuals who, unless kept constantly on their toes, will simply use party and governmental structures to favour themselves and reward their cronies, while using party discipline to put rebellious backbenchers themselves on a short leash. The backbenchers seek to avoid the danger of being "whipped" at will to support all programmes and motions, even of questionable value, tabled in parliament by their colleagues "in government". They do not want to be denied by the party hierarchy the opportunity to participate meaningfully in setting parliament's agenda and running its committees. They do not want to be compelled to look the other way when bad governance rears its head.
Two, ODM backbenchers, in particular, have seen how dismally their "principal" performed during his final negotiations with Kibaki for cabinet and Permanent Secretary slots. They are bound to wonder how many more skewed deals between the President and the Prime Minister they can endure in silence till the next general elections. More specifically, they fear that the government agenda for the next five years will be PNU-driven, at the expense of broad-based ODM interests. They fear, moreover, that the Prime Minister does not see the danger, given his poor one-on-one negotiating skills. They can point to how the IDP issue is being handled as another clear evidence of this. In their view, it has been mandled hurriedly, one-sidedly, without due regard to history, and with Raila's acquiescence.
Since the 1980s, Raila has cultivated the political persona of a fearless, unstoppable representative of the people's will -- and a fearsome adversary with a fanatical power-base. The political brand he has created is next to none in Kenya and the region. He has rightfully earned the nickname Agwambo. So it was in amazement that the massive rally in Kisumu last Saturday, and the millions who tuned to their TVs or radio, heard him characterize ODM's entry into the Coalition Government as a surrender. "He who surrenders lives to fight another day," he argued. It might have been a slip of the tongue. The saying is,correctly, "He who retreats lives to..." He seemed to have realized the misspeak, as he immediately added the Maoist phrase "Two steps forward, one step backward" -- which captures the notion of inexorable forward-motion, despite short-term reverses. But what the audience heard was "surrender!" The live audience did not seem to like much of what he had to say that day, and was very loud about it -- and that must be a worry.
In Kisumu, and at Bondo, he was particularly worked up about the idea of a Grand Opposition. He argued that it was unnecessary and intended to undermine the government -- of which ODM was now, belatedly to be sure, a part. He asked its proponents, whom he labelled frustrated self-seekers, to resign and seek a fresh mandate from the voters.
But the proponents are already accusing him and others opposed to the move(such as ODM-K's Kalonzo Musyoka) of "dictatorial and draconian" tendencies, and of personalizing the issue. They insist that they will carry on, and will not resign their parliamentary seats. It is not known, however, wnat would happen to the Grand Opposition if its proponents -- particularly Isaac Ruto, Ababu Namwamba and Julius Kones -- were to be offered Assistant Minister positions tomorrow; or if they were to be thrown out of their political parties, forcing them to stand for re-election.
Having written the bulk of the foregoing yesterday, I now read in today's (Wednesday's) local daily that the Speaker of the National Assembly, Mr. Kenneth Marende, yesterday threw a spanner in the works. He announced that backbench MPs were free to form a Grand Opposition without having to stand for re-election. There was, indeed, as he pointed out, a provision for an opposition in parliament, although parliament could expunge the provision if it deemed it detrimental. Clearly, however, expunging it would require the concurrence of the 85 or so MPs who already support the Grand Opposition, and whose support would be required to deliver the new constitution promised by ODM by April 2009.
On largely pragmatic grounds, I think the Grand Coalition is a good idea whose time has suddenly, surprisingly, emphatically, come. It is an idea which was hardly conceivable even two months ago. It is intended to undermine the Prime Minister. Rather, it underscores the old adage that the price of liberty is eternal vigilance. The Prime Minister should support it for the good of the country, and for his own good. Do I think that we will have a new constitution by April 2009? We may have a new constitution, but not the kind of comprehensive constitution which ODM has been promising. Far from it, given the twists and turns we have witnessed since January 2008.
What was not in dispute was that ODM was the single largest party in the new parliament. Its leader was Raila Amolo Odinga. So when Koffi Annan eventually brokered a compromise at the end of last February, it was clear that power-sharing would have to be spearheaded by Kibaki and Raila. Since Kibaki was not going to give up the President's seat -- being, inter alia, the incumbent -- and nobody, not even Raila, had the wherewithall or wits to ease him out, the only viable option was to create the Executive Prime Minister's seat for Raila, and to work out a formula for equal power-sharing at the cabinet and other levels (in particular, at the level of Assistant Ministers, Permanent Secretaries, Ambassadors and High Commissioners, and top positions in the parastatals). Surrogates were to negotiate details of the deal, with the two principals having the final say regarding issues on which the negotiators failed to agree. Eventually, there was no real agreement between the negotiating teams, and the two principals decided to take the bull by the horn at Sagana.
The size and composition of the cabinet, and the apportioning of ministries between PNU and ODM, as agreed at Sagana, clearly signalled to most Kenyans that ODM had been seriously, if not cynically, short-changed. Kibaki, long dismissed as indecisive and incapable of standing toe-to-toe with Raila (Agwambo), had not only outwitted Raila but also proved to be a savvier negotiator. In the process, he had exposed to the wider public a character flaw in Raila which some close observers of Raila's public life have for some time now quietly worried and/or grumbled about -- not without a large dose of despair and even exasperation.
The flaw is, simply, that when left alone with "the other side," he is more likely than not to end up siding/agreeing with that side -- to his side's chagrin. Some observers believe that they have figured him out even more finely, arguing that what drives Raila is not any malice toward any friend or ally -- but purely and simply self-interest (regardless of the consequences).
Raila argues that the power-sharing was more than numerically equitable, if you look at it all with a fine tooth-comb. But no one believes him. Not even his thousands of fanatical, long suffering, followers in Kisumu City and its environs -- as the events of last Saturday suggest. He argues, moreover, that the ministries that he negotiated with Kibaki for ODM were fairly distributed among the ODM fraternity. But no one believes that either -- with the possible exception of the actual beneficiaries of that rather skewed distribution. There is considerable disquiet about that skewness in Rift Valley and Nyanza, and even parts of Western Province -- all bedrock of ODM support. And there is exasperation that he did not get the ministries of foreign affairs and finance.
Now, as I see it, it is this disquiet that is driving the call for a Grand Opposition in parliament -- to be underpinned by an act of parliament for additional political cover. And Raila is, of course, vehemently opposed to the idea. Is there any merit -- is there a compelling reason -- for the Grand Opposition?
In principle, Raila is right. There should be no grounds whatsoever for members of a party, elected to parliament under its banner, to technically decamp to another grouping of whatever kind -- for this has the very real potential of taking away, extra-democratically, their party's legitimately won parliamentary/legislative power. Parliamentary majority represents any party's understanding of the very basis of parliamentary/legislative power in a multi-party democracy. It is what drives all inter-party contests during and between general elections. It is why party discipline is taken so seriously. A party's parliamentary voting block is its only armament.
Proponents of a legislated Grand Opposition, on the other hand, argue that they are driven by an equally, if not loftier, principle: keeping the country from sliding back into a de facto one-party state. That is, creating a circuit-breaker against those who might be tempted to revive the Moi-era type of dictatorship. They imagine that only a Grand Opposition can resonate with the public as the people's voice, quite distinct from the government's voice. Moreover, only such a legislated Grand Opposition would qualify as an official opposition -- and an official opposition is provided for in the constitution. In their view, the Grand Coalition violates this important constitutional provision.
Yet it can equally or more persuasively be argued that what gives potency to the call for a Grand Coalition is a set of very pragmatic considerations -- not quite considerations of principle. One, ODM is controlled by a hard-core of self-centred individuals who, unless kept constantly on their toes, will simply use party and governmental structures to favour themselves and reward their cronies, while using party discipline to put rebellious backbenchers themselves on a short leash. The backbenchers seek to avoid the danger of being "whipped" at will to support all programmes and motions, even of questionable value, tabled in parliament by their colleagues "in government". They do not want to be denied by the party hierarchy the opportunity to participate meaningfully in setting parliament's agenda and running its committees. They do not want to be compelled to look the other way when bad governance rears its head.
Two, ODM backbenchers, in particular, have seen how dismally their "principal" performed during his final negotiations with Kibaki for cabinet and Permanent Secretary slots. They are bound to wonder how many more skewed deals between the President and the Prime Minister they can endure in silence till the next general elections. More specifically, they fear that the government agenda for the next five years will be PNU-driven, at the expense of broad-based ODM interests. They fear, moreover, that the Prime Minister does not see the danger, given his poor one-on-one negotiating skills. They can point to how the IDP issue is being handled as another clear evidence of this. In their view, it has been mandled hurriedly, one-sidedly, without due regard to history, and with Raila's acquiescence.
Since the 1980s, Raila has cultivated the political persona of a fearless, unstoppable representative of the people's will -- and a fearsome adversary with a fanatical power-base. The political brand he has created is next to none in Kenya and the region. He has rightfully earned the nickname Agwambo. So it was in amazement that the massive rally in Kisumu last Saturday, and the millions who tuned to their TVs or radio, heard him characterize ODM's entry into the Coalition Government as a surrender. "He who surrenders lives to fight another day," he argued. It might have been a slip of the tongue. The saying is,correctly, "He who retreats lives to..." He seemed to have realized the misspeak, as he immediately added the Maoist phrase "Two steps forward, one step backward" -- which captures the notion of inexorable forward-motion, despite short-term reverses. But what the audience heard was "surrender!" The live audience did not seem to like much of what he had to say that day, and was very loud about it -- and that must be a worry.
In Kisumu, and at Bondo, he was particularly worked up about the idea of a Grand Opposition. He argued that it was unnecessary and intended to undermine the government -- of which ODM was now, belatedly to be sure, a part. He asked its proponents, whom he labelled frustrated self-seekers, to resign and seek a fresh mandate from the voters.
But the proponents are already accusing him and others opposed to the move(such as ODM-K's Kalonzo Musyoka) of "dictatorial and draconian" tendencies, and of personalizing the issue. They insist that they will carry on, and will not resign their parliamentary seats. It is not known, however, wnat would happen to the Grand Opposition if its proponents -- particularly Isaac Ruto, Ababu Namwamba and Julius Kones -- were to be offered Assistant Minister positions tomorrow; or if they were to be thrown out of their political parties, forcing them to stand for re-election.
Having written the bulk of the foregoing yesterday, I now read in today's (Wednesday's) local daily that the Speaker of the National Assembly, Mr. Kenneth Marende, yesterday threw a spanner in the works. He announced that backbench MPs were free to form a Grand Opposition without having to stand for re-election. There was, indeed, as he pointed out, a provision for an opposition in parliament, although parliament could expunge the provision if it deemed it detrimental. Clearly, however, expunging it would require the concurrence of the 85 or so MPs who already support the Grand Opposition, and whose support would be required to deliver the new constitution promised by ODM by April 2009.
On largely pragmatic grounds, I think the Grand Coalition is a good idea whose time has suddenly, surprisingly, emphatically, come. It is an idea which was hardly conceivable even two months ago. It is intended to undermine the Prime Minister. Rather, it underscores the old adage that the price of liberty is eternal vigilance. The Prime Minister should support it for the good of the country, and for his own good. Do I think that we will have a new constitution by April 2009? We may have a new constitution, but not the kind of comprehensive constitution which ODM has been promising. Far from it, given the twists and turns we have witnessed since January 2008.
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Sunday, January 28, 2007
Democracy Eventually Catches Up With The Leaders
By Prof. Mauri Yambo
Kenya’s political climate in the 21st century is quite different from what it was when Jomo Kenyatta was president, and during most of Moi’s 24-year presidency. The year 2002 was a dramatic watershed. Kenya’s experience suggests that in countries steeped in years of one-man rule, the “democratic bug” – some would now call it the democratic meme (a sort of “mind virus”) – is first genuinely, and even innocently, caught by the people (the voters). Eventually, it must catch up with the leaders too – both those in power and in opposition.
Through many sacrifices, shifting coalitions and unforgettable cliff-hangers, Kenya’s democratic space has in the last decade and a half evolved to be, now, much wider, deeper and more vibrant. In the post-2002 period, it continues to evolve. But not fast enough. In particular, the democratic space within political parties remains scandalously under-evolved – and the membership under-involved!
Party governance, even among opposition parties, remains steeped in the big-man mindset of yesteryear, no matter how many position papers are developed in the name of democracy. However, 2007 may be a landmark year, certainly for opposition parties, and particularly for ODM-K. The party must somehow choose a presidential candidate in the next six months, and rally behind that choice, without tearing itself apart. Obviously, the party of the incumbent (President Kibaki), whichever party it is, will not be under the same kind of pressure in 2007. Its choice is already in State House, and will run again – unopposed by any of the GNU parties.
So what is ODM-K going to do? How, exactly, is it going to choose its presidential, parliamentary and civic candidates? In the name of democracy, the answer should be obvious – and yet there is much beating about the bush. There is much lingering suspicion among the party luminaries, though they will publicly deny it. And MPs continue to hog party organs and functions as though no one else has a voice, a mind or an iota of legitimacy.
Consistent with basic democratic principles, party rank-and-file should be involved in choosing party candidates at various levels, through direct voting during primaries in respective constituencies, and/or a graduated delegate system. Such voting may be by secret ballot or some version of queuing (mlologo). The former is preferably, though the logistics and cost of doing so may be prohibitive, even at the constituency level, for a cash-strapped party.
If the 2002 experience is anything to go by, the direct-voting route favours incumbents, or aspirants who have the ears of those at headquarters – and who offer to foot the bill. Queuing is a public spectacle whose results, in an organized environment, are there for all to see. However, it disenfranchises those who arrive after the lining- up phase is closed and the counting begins, or who must leave before it is completed. And so it has too many flaws itself to be adopted during general elections proper.
Though there has been much debate and agonizing about how ODM-K should choose its Presidential candidate, some agreement seems at last to have been arrived at. What is unsettling many observers (members of the silent majority) is that, having agreed on the version of the delegate system to adopt for nominating its presidential candidate, and how the actual voting will broadly be conducted, some ODM-K luminaries seem to be developing cold feet even before the ink dries on the paper on which their agreement was presumably penned. We are back to the notion that, somehow, a consensus among the aspirants is the best way to choose the presidential candidate. Great danger lurks in this apparent change of mind.
In the first place, a consensus cannot by definition be imposed – particularly among forces of roughly equal power or influence. Consensus implies unanimity among those involved in trying to reach it. Consequently, no consensus can be reached which does not in fact anoint the aspirant who believes, rightly or wrongly, that the delegate system would deliver him or her the nomination which the consensus might, by subterfuge, deny him or her. To threaten such a candidate with ostracism and even expulsion from the party is to threaten the very existence of the very party whose presidential candidate every luminary wants to be. As I see it, and I want to be forthright here, consensus, as it is conceived of now, is just another word for Tosha! Because of 2002, and of what has transpired in Kenyan politics since, Tosha has become a dirty five-letter word. The sooner it is abandoned the better it with be for the social capital of those associated with it.
Secondly, attempts to broker a consensus among ODM-K luminaries and those close to them – away from the ordinary members’ prying eyes – are a very loud and clear message that the leaders (at least some of them) do not trust the people, who trust them. They do not trust the people’s judgement on this matter. But why on this matter, and why now, if the people’s judgement in 2002 and 2005 continues to be the subject of so much chest-thumping? Moreover, these attempts bring to mind a discredited practice exemplified by Mayor Daley’s Chicago of the 1950s and ’60s. Senator Obama, and ODM-K’s donors such as NDI and IRI, would caution us against this practice, if we chose to consult them or heed their advice.
I believe that the delegate system will choose for ODM-K not only the right candidate but more importantly the only presidential candidate it can legitimately and democratically choose – indeed, the winning candidate. The challenge for each aspirant is to network within genuine democratic parameters such as these to put together a winning combination. Power comes from the people. We should consistently preach this and show that we mean it by practicing it. And as Mwalimu Nyerere used to say, though he did not treat his own opponents kindly (but that was another era, which must not return), “It can be done!”
To suggest that voters registered in certain regions should by definition be disqualified from the ODM-K presidential nomination process – or that their votes should be less than equal (that is, a fraction) those of their counterparts in other regions – is to tell them to take or keep their support elsewhere. You cannot win by being associated with such a view, or by forgoing such large chunks of votes! It simply does not make sense – even in the name of enlightened self-interest.
Come to think of it, that is the same kind of “Siasa mbaya, maisha mbaya” attitude, in top government circles, which has denied an equitable share of development resources and state appointments to “opposition areas” from 1963 to 2007! The widespread rejection of this attitude across the country provides the basic explanation for the equally widespread support, reported in recent months by Steadman, which ODM-K continues to enjoy.
It should be expected that the eventual ODM-K candidate will campaign in all regions of the country during the actual presidential elections, and will not surrender any votes anywhere to anyone. This, one suspects, will also be President Kibaki’s strategy for victory.
The trouble with trying too hard to tilt the democratic process in one’s favour, to ensure one’s own victory, is that one’s opponents or co-contestants – if they are not to be presumed dumb – can see through this too clearly for one’s eventual comfort. This is particularly so in arenas where the goodwill of at least some of one’s peers is a prerequisite for the looked-for victory. They may for a time be silent or muted, or even confused, about what they see, but such seeing and such machinations are a lethal combination. The combination has easily predictable consequences. For our political leaders, this is the fundamental lesson of Kenya’s general elections of 2002, and the referendum of 2005. The end does not, should not, always justify the means.
What is my prognosis? Attempts to broker a consensus will fail. For the sake of Democracy, they should not and must not succeed! Democracy will catch up with ODM-K luminaries and MPs in 2007. For goodness’ sake, the D in the party’s name stands for Democratic – without quote unquote! ODM-K will choose its presidential candidate through the delegate system, which will perhaps have been amended more than once between now and June. The losing presidential aspirants will rally fairly forcefully behind the winner – perhaps on the uncertain promise of the Prime Minister’s job.
Abandoning the party after a well-organized leadership selection exercise via the delegate system would spell doom to the political future, nationally, of those who do so. And, it seems mathematically clear to me at this point, the chosen candidate will have a better that 50-50 chance of winning the actual presidential elections in 2007. However, should ODM-K formally break up before its candidate is officially nominated, into pro-consensus and anti-consensus camps, then – from that moment of split and long before the elections are actually held – the country will know the winner of the 2007 presidential elections, and that the winner will be the incumbent, President Mwai Kibaki.
Can the country live with that? Sure. We have done so since 2003. Can the losing luminaries do so? Yes, at a terrible price. The inevitable consequence of a second Kibaki victory would be a passionate scramble for new leadership in various areas across the country, as Democracy finally catches up with the remaining diehards – reluctant democrats. Democracy should be a quality of mind inscribed in our routine practice, not merely something we occasionally preach.
Only one eventuality can radically change much of the above scenario, while still delivering victory to President Kibaki in 2007. It is the push particularly by LDP, unlikely to succeed this year, to make ODM-K strictly a party of regional parties allowing only for corporate membership and run on the basis of a coalition of “like-minded” parties. While it has become too late to choose the ODM-K flag-bearer this way this year, this scenario is entirely possible in 2012.
Nairobi: Sunday, January 28, 2007.
Kenya’s political climate in the 21st century is quite different from what it was when Jomo Kenyatta was president, and during most of Moi’s 24-year presidency. The year 2002 was a dramatic watershed. Kenya’s experience suggests that in countries steeped in years of one-man rule, the “democratic bug” – some would now call it the democratic meme (a sort of “mind virus”) – is first genuinely, and even innocently, caught by the people (the voters). Eventually, it must catch up with the leaders too – both those in power and in opposition.
Through many sacrifices, shifting coalitions and unforgettable cliff-hangers, Kenya’s democratic space has in the last decade and a half evolved to be, now, much wider, deeper and more vibrant. In the post-2002 period, it continues to evolve. But not fast enough. In particular, the democratic space within political parties remains scandalously under-evolved – and the membership under-involved!
Party governance, even among opposition parties, remains steeped in the big-man mindset of yesteryear, no matter how many position papers are developed in the name of democracy. However, 2007 may be a landmark year, certainly for opposition parties, and particularly for ODM-K. The party must somehow choose a presidential candidate in the next six months, and rally behind that choice, without tearing itself apart. Obviously, the party of the incumbent (President Kibaki), whichever party it is, will not be under the same kind of pressure in 2007. Its choice is already in State House, and will run again – unopposed by any of the GNU parties.
So what is ODM-K going to do? How, exactly, is it going to choose its presidential, parliamentary and civic candidates? In the name of democracy, the answer should be obvious – and yet there is much beating about the bush. There is much lingering suspicion among the party luminaries, though they will publicly deny it. And MPs continue to hog party organs and functions as though no one else has a voice, a mind or an iota of legitimacy.
Consistent with basic democratic principles, party rank-and-file should be involved in choosing party candidates at various levels, through direct voting during primaries in respective constituencies, and/or a graduated delegate system. Such voting may be by secret ballot or some version of queuing (mlologo). The former is preferably, though the logistics and cost of doing so may be prohibitive, even at the constituency level, for a cash-strapped party.
If the 2002 experience is anything to go by, the direct-voting route favours incumbents, or aspirants who have the ears of those at headquarters – and who offer to foot the bill. Queuing is a public spectacle whose results, in an organized environment, are there for all to see. However, it disenfranchises those who arrive after the lining- up phase is closed and the counting begins, or who must leave before it is completed. And so it has too many flaws itself to be adopted during general elections proper.
Though there has been much debate and agonizing about how ODM-K should choose its Presidential candidate, some agreement seems at last to have been arrived at. What is unsettling many observers (members of the silent majority) is that, having agreed on the version of the delegate system to adopt for nominating its presidential candidate, and how the actual voting will broadly be conducted, some ODM-K luminaries seem to be developing cold feet even before the ink dries on the paper on which their agreement was presumably penned. We are back to the notion that, somehow, a consensus among the aspirants is the best way to choose the presidential candidate. Great danger lurks in this apparent change of mind.
In the first place, a consensus cannot by definition be imposed – particularly among forces of roughly equal power or influence. Consensus implies unanimity among those involved in trying to reach it. Consequently, no consensus can be reached which does not in fact anoint the aspirant who believes, rightly or wrongly, that the delegate system would deliver him or her the nomination which the consensus might, by subterfuge, deny him or her. To threaten such a candidate with ostracism and even expulsion from the party is to threaten the very existence of the very party whose presidential candidate every luminary wants to be. As I see it, and I want to be forthright here, consensus, as it is conceived of now, is just another word for Tosha! Because of 2002, and of what has transpired in Kenyan politics since, Tosha has become a dirty five-letter word. The sooner it is abandoned the better it with be for the social capital of those associated with it.
Secondly, attempts to broker a consensus among ODM-K luminaries and those close to them – away from the ordinary members’ prying eyes – are a very loud and clear message that the leaders (at least some of them) do not trust the people, who trust them. They do not trust the people’s judgement on this matter. But why on this matter, and why now, if the people’s judgement in 2002 and 2005 continues to be the subject of so much chest-thumping? Moreover, these attempts bring to mind a discredited practice exemplified by Mayor Daley’s Chicago of the 1950s and ’60s. Senator Obama, and ODM-K’s donors such as NDI and IRI, would caution us against this practice, if we chose to consult them or heed their advice.
I believe that the delegate system will choose for ODM-K not only the right candidate but more importantly the only presidential candidate it can legitimately and democratically choose – indeed, the winning candidate. The challenge for each aspirant is to network within genuine democratic parameters such as these to put together a winning combination. Power comes from the people. We should consistently preach this and show that we mean it by practicing it. And as Mwalimu Nyerere used to say, though he did not treat his own opponents kindly (but that was another era, which must not return), “It can be done!”
To suggest that voters registered in certain regions should by definition be disqualified from the ODM-K presidential nomination process – or that their votes should be less than equal (that is, a fraction) those of their counterparts in other regions – is to tell them to take or keep their support elsewhere. You cannot win by being associated with such a view, or by forgoing such large chunks of votes! It simply does not make sense – even in the name of enlightened self-interest.
Come to think of it, that is the same kind of “Siasa mbaya, maisha mbaya” attitude, in top government circles, which has denied an equitable share of development resources and state appointments to “opposition areas” from 1963 to 2007! The widespread rejection of this attitude across the country provides the basic explanation for the equally widespread support, reported in recent months by Steadman, which ODM-K continues to enjoy.
It should be expected that the eventual ODM-K candidate will campaign in all regions of the country during the actual presidential elections, and will not surrender any votes anywhere to anyone. This, one suspects, will also be President Kibaki’s strategy for victory.
The trouble with trying too hard to tilt the democratic process in one’s favour, to ensure one’s own victory, is that one’s opponents or co-contestants – if they are not to be presumed dumb – can see through this too clearly for one’s eventual comfort. This is particularly so in arenas where the goodwill of at least some of one’s peers is a prerequisite for the looked-for victory. They may for a time be silent or muted, or even confused, about what they see, but such seeing and such machinations are a lethal combination. The combination has easily predictable consequences. For our political leaders, this is the fundamental lesson of Kenya’s general elections of 2002, and the referendum of 2005. The end does not, should not, always justify the means.
What is my prognosis? Attempts to broker a consensus will fail. For the sake of Democracy, they should not and must not succeed! Democracy will catch up with ODM-K luminaries and MPs in 2007. For goodness’ sake, the D in the party’s name stands for Democratic – without quote unquote! ODM-K will choose its presidential candidate through the delegate system, which will perhaps have been amended more than once between now and June. The losing presidential aspirants will rally fairly forcefully behind the winner – perhaps on the uncertain promise of the Prime Minister’s job.
Abandoning the party after a well-organized leadership selection exercise via the delegate system would spell doom to the political future, nationally, of those who do so. And, it seems mathematically clear to me at this point, the chosen candidate will have a better that 50-50 chance of winning the actual presidential elections in 2007. However, should ODM-K formally break up before its candidate is officially nominated, into pro-consensus and anti-consensus camps, then – from that moment of split and long before the elections are actually held – the country will know the winner of the 2007 presidential elections, and that the winner will be the incumbent, President Mwai Kibaki.
Can the country live with that? Sure. We have done so since 2003. Can the losing luminaries do so? Yes, at a terrible price. The inevitable consequence of a second Kibaki victory would be a passionate scramble for new leadership in various areas across the country, as Democracy finally catches up with the remaining diehards – reluctant democrats. Democracy should be a quality of mind inscribed in our routine practice, not merely something we occasionally preach.
Only one eventuality can radically change much of the above scenario, while still delivering victory to President Kibaki in 2007. It is the push particularly by LDP, unlikely to succeed this year, to make ODM-K strictly a party of regional parties allowing only for corporate membership and run on the basis of a coalition of “like-minded” parties. While it has become too late to choose the ODM-K flag-bearer this way this year, this scenario is entirely possible in 2012.
Nairobi: Sunday, January 28, 2007.
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