A very cold first --
of August.
Here in Nairobi.
The day's determined,
it seems,
To end.
Just as it had begun.
Though without
morning's persistent
Drizzle.
Time to clipse
de day.
E'en [if]
As de moon does.
Tomorrow's,
as they say,
Another.
Storey. Piled
Upon one.
One
Uncertain
End.
Friday, August 01, 2008
Top 30 Varsities (July 2008): Who's Number One Now, Who's Number One Then?
The latest (July 2008) Webometrics web-presence ranking of over 16,000 universities around the world ranks Massachusetts Institute of Technology (in the US) first in the world, and of course in the US. The world ranking places the University of Cape Town (in South Africa) number one position in Africa -- and a respectable 385th in the world. The University of Dar Es Salaam (in Tanzania), ranks first in both Tanzania and East Africa, 24th in Africa and 4,334th in the world. The University of Nairobi -- "the mother and father" of public universities, indeed all universities, in Kenya -- ranks first in Kenya, second in East Africa, 25th in Africa and 4,338th in the world. UoN was not Kenya's number one six months ago, Egerton University was. Shortly after Egerton University was declared number one, Kenyatta University (KU) was, in turn, declared Kenya's number one public university in terms of the match between its declared performance targets and actual performance attainments; but KU has fared badly in terms of global web-presence. So, who's really number one in Kenya, and how long will the cheers last? It is as though a version of the theory of relativity is at play here -- in Kenya and in Africa. If so, what about around the world?
For a full list of Africa's Top 100 universities, click on this link >>> Top 100 Universities in Africa . The list (first reported in the Sunday Standard edition of July 27, 2008) shows that all but one of the Top ten of those 100 universities are to be found in South Africa. The other is in Egypt.
Indeed, as the list below shows, among the Top 30 in Africa, 11 are in South Africa, 5 in Egypt, 3 in Morocco, 2 in Kenya, 2 in Namibia, and 1 in each of the following: Algeria, Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. Rounding off Africa's Top 30 list is National University of Rwanda, which is ranked 5, 002 in the world. Conspicuously absent from the list are universities in Nigeria, Africa's political and economic powerhouse -- with, moreover, a long tradition of university education. Ghana's absence is likewise conspicuous and surprising. But just as surprising are the inclusion of one Rwandese and two Namibian institutions, given the two countries' relatively shorter "post-independence" history. Namibian institutions are in fact ranked 21st and 22nd in Africa, and 4,270 and 4,275, respectively, in the world. In either case, Namibian institutions are ahead of their counterparts throughout East Africa. University of Zimbabwe (17 in Africa and 4,001 in the world) is also placed higher than any of its counterparts in East Africa, despite Zimbabwe's terrible economic and political circumstances.
List of Top 30 Universities in Africa:
(Country and World Ranking in Brackets)
1. University of Cape Town (South Africa: 385)
2. Stellenbosch University (South Africa: 654)
3. Rhodes University (South Africa: 722)
4. University of Pretoria (South Africa: 734)
5. University of the Witwatersrand (South Africa: 831)
6. University of the Western Cape (South Africa: 1,218)
7. University of Kwazulu Natal (South Africa: 1,313)
8. University of South Africa (South Africa: 1,499)
9. American University in Cairo (Egypt: 1,654)
10. Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University (South Africa: 2,145)
11. Cairo University (Egypt: 2,934)
12. University of the Free State (South Africa: 2,946)
13. Université Cheikh Anta Diop de Dakar (Senegal: 2,962)
14. University of Johannesburg (South Africa: 3,704)
15. University of Mauritius (Mauritius: 3,756)
16. Université Cadi Ayyad (Morocco: 3,961)
17. University of Zimbabwe (Zimbabwe: 4,001)
18. Mansoura University (Egypt: 4,002)
19. Ain Shams University (Egypt: 4,112)
20. University of Namibia (Namibia: 4,223)
21. Polytechnic of Namibia (Namibia: 4,270)
22. Al Akhawayn University Ifrane (Morocco: 4,275)
23. Université Abdelmalek Essadi (Morocco: 4,309)
24. University of Dar Es Salaam (Tanzania: 4,334)
25. University of Nairobi (Kenya: 4,338)
26. Université Abou Bekr Belkaid Tlemcen (Algeria: 4,452)
27. Arab Academy for Science & Technology and Maritime Transport (Egypt: 4,552)
28. Universidade Eduardo Mondlane (Mozambique: 4,689)
29. Strathmore University Nairobi (Kenya: 4,780)
30. National University of Rwanda (Rwanda: 5,002)
How was the global ranking carried out? We are told, first of all, that:
"The unit for analysis is the institutional domain, so only universities and research centres with an independent web domain are considered. If an institution has more than one main domain, two or more entries are used with the different addresses. About 5-10% of the institutions have no independent web presence, most of them located in developing countries. Our catalogue of institutions includes not only universities but also other Higher Education institutions following the recommendations of UNESCO. Names and addresses were collected from both national and international sources..."
So, what are the criteria? Four ranks -- V, S, R and Sc -- were developed, as we will see presently. These were then combined "according to a formula where each one has a different weight". The formula is presented as follows:
Webometrics Rank (position)=4*RankV+2*RankS+1*RankR+1*RankSc
The principle underlying this formula was that:
"University activity is multi-dimensional and this is reflected in its web presence. So the best way to build the ranking is combining a group of indicators that measures these different aspects."
This provided the rationale for identifying indicators for the respective ranks. In this respect, we are told that:
"Almind & Ingwersen proposed the first Web indicator, Web Impact Factor (WIF), based on link analysis that combines the number of external inlinks and the number of pages of the website, a ratio of 1:1 between visibility and size. This ratio is used for the ranking but adding two new indicators to the size component: Number of documents, measured from the number of rich files in a web domain, and number of publications being collected by Google Scholar database."
The four indicators in the Webometrics formula are further elaborated as follows:
1. Web Visibility (V): This refers to the number of external inlinks. "total number of unique external links received (inlinks) by a site" as recorded via Yahoo Search, Live Search and Exalead. For each engine, it is stated, "results are log-normalised to 1 for the highest value and then combined to generate the rank."
2. Web Size (S): the number of pages in an institution's website, captured by four search engines: Google, Yahoo, Live Search and Exalead. Here, too, it is stated that "For each engine, results are log-normalised to 1 for the highest value. Then for each domain, maximum and minimum results are excluded and every institution is assigned a rank according to the combined sum."
3. Number of documents -- that is, Rich Files (R) -- hosted by the website: These were counted using Google, as long as they were in any of the following file formats (which were deemed most relevant to "academic and publication activities", as well as being accommodative of different volumes of text): Adobe Acrobat (.pdf), Adobe PostScript (.ps), Microsoft Word (.doc) and Microsoft Powerpoint (.ppt). The Google results for each file type were merged "after log-normalising in the same way as described before."
4. Number of publications in the website's database, as verified through Google Scholar search -- Scholar (Sc): "Google Scholar provides the number of papers and citations for each academic domain." This "publications" indicator is quite liberally defined, seeing that it includes all "papers, reports and other academic items" captured in the search.
Three related rationales or considerations, broader in their sweep than the indicators per se, informed the ranking process -- a process which the publishers admit is a work in progress, useful (and defensible) as it is in its present form. There will of course be spirited debate.
The three rationales were, to use the publisher's words:
1. Relevance and validity of the indicators: "The choice of the indicators was done according to several criteria (see note), some of them trying to catch quality and academic and institutional strengths but others intending to promote web publication and Open Access initiatives. The inclusion of the total number of pages is based on the recognition of a new global market for academic information, so the web is the adequate platform for the internationalization of the institutions. A strong and detailed web presence providing exact descriptions of the structure and activities of the university can attract new students and scholars worldwide . The number of external inlinks received by a domain is a measure that represents visibility and impact of the published material, and although there is a great diversity of motivations for linking, a significant fraction works in a similar way as bibliographic citation. The success of self-archiving and other repositories related initiatives can be roughly represented from rich file and Scholar data. The huge numbers involved with the pdf and doc formats means that not only administrative reports and bureaucratic forms are involved. PostScript and Powerpoint files are clearly related to academic activities."
2. Measures of outcomes rather than inputs, as far as possible: "Data on inputs are relevant as they reflect the general condition of a given establishment and are more frequently available. Measures of outcomes provide a more accurate assessment of the standing and/or quality of a given institution or program. We expect to offer a better balance in the future, but [the] current edition intend[s] to call...attention to incomplete strategies, inadequate policies and bad practices in web publication before attempting a more complete scenario."
3. Weighting of different indicators: "The current rules for ranking indicators including the described weighting model has (sic) been tested and published in scientific papers. More research is still [to be] done on this topic, but the final aim is to develop a model that includes additional quantitative data, especially bibliometric and scientometric indicators."
It is clear that universities which want to improve their global and continental ranking will have to work on the criteria set by this ranking entity, even as those criteria evolve. Developing-country institutions should be actively involved in that evolution, and in the attendant debate.
To my mind, the criteria, as so far developed, are surprisingly empathetic to the general circumstances of Third World universities; and in particular are quite accommodative of those with a strong research-and-publications record, plus a sense of the esteem-value of a dynamic web presence. They are far less subjective (or otherwise biased), and avail a significantly more level playing-field, compared to the rule of thumb which has usually guided the rankings not just of institutions but also of the academics, who make such institutions possible at all. That rule of thumb has been designed largely to capture and highlight institutions' relative funded-research record and volumes of refereed publications in "international" journals and books -- and partly to reflect institutions' relative reputations as judged by prominent scholars (usually/historically based in the West). If "egalitarian" never endorsed the absence of effort, these criteria are, in a word, quite egalitarian.
Of course, money still talks in other ways; and explains the concentration of world scholars in US universities, which (let's not forget) have the remuneration packages and "working environments" to attract and retain them. However, the Webometric rankings are a pointer to the possibility that money does not entirely talk -- and to the greater possibility that academic institutions and academics, with a joint passion for excellence, can excel in this world, recardless of the part of the world in which they happen to be.As I conclude, let us consider for a moment the latest list of the Top 30 universities in the world:
Rank Name of University (Country)
1. Massachusetts Institute of Technology (USA)
2. Harvard University (USA)
3. Stanford University (USA)
4. University of California Berkeley (USA)
5. Pennsylvania State University (USA)
6. University of Michigan (USA)
7. Cornell University (USA)
8. University of Minnesota (USA)
9. University of Wisconsin Madison (USA)
10. University of Texas Austin (USA)
11. University of Illinois Urbana Champaign (USA)
12. University of Pennsylvania (USA)
13. University of Washington (USA)
14. Carnegie Mellon University (USA)
15. Columbia University New York (USA)
16. Purdue University (USA)
17. University of California Los Angeles (USA)
18. University of Florida (USA)
19. University of Chicago (USA)
20. University of Maryland (USA)
21. University of Arizona (USA)
22. Texas A&M University (USA)
23. Georgia Institute of Technology (USA)
24. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (USA)
25. Princeton University (USA)
26. University of Cambridge (UK)
27. Michigan State University (USA)
28. University of Toronto (Canada)
29. University of North Carolina Chapel Hill (USA)
30. Rutgers University (USA).
All but two of the world's Top 30 universities are based in the United States. The two are University of Cambridge (ranked 26th) and University of Toronto (ranked 28th). But that's a long way from when Al-Azhar was the one and only university in the ("known"?) world. Let me then, in view of all this, frame differently the question I posed earlier: If vesion of the theory of relativity is at play in the world ranking that we have looked at, what and how long is it going to take for a non-US university to become the world's number one? Will that be in our lifetime?
Wednesday, July 30, 2008
The Mau Water Tower
Much has been written in Kenya’s print media about the Mau Forest Complex in the last four weeks or so, and particularly the last seven days. However, the Mau Question has been part of the national discourse, on and off, since the second half of the 1980s, in the heyday of Moi’s presidency (and when UNEP was patently asleep on the job), when grabbers, “settlers” and squatters alike, who -- unlike the Ogiek, otherwise called the Dorobo -- did not have any traditional/historical claim to any part of that expansive, fertile, and amply rain-fed terrain, began to encroach into it, with state support. Gakuu Mathenge suggests, however, that this Mau Question became part of the national discourse only in 2004, when President Kibaki burnt his fingers attempting to intervene. He paid unforgettably more for the effort a year later, during a Referendum in which his “yes” (or Banana) camp decisively lost.
Be that as it may, we can see that much of the recently publicized information, firmly anchored on texts and pictures provided mainly by UNEP, is the kind that politically aware citizens (or plainly well-read ones) must have, and constantly bear in mind, in order to form the sustained and hopefully vocal opinion that shapes policy. In this case, what is on the agenda is the crucial matter of securing the country’s water resources, which are increasingly in jeopardy, and working toward a sustainable environmental and socio-economic future for all.
So, exactly what concrete information would the informed reader have gleaned by now, from all the public narratives, about the essential features of the Mau Water Tower, and about its significance to the future of Kenya and the region as a whole? It would have been largely as follows:
The Physical Characteristics and Importance of the Complex: The Mau Forest Complex is a 400,000-hectacre area located toward the western wall of the Rift Valley. This forest cover, “is the largest closed canopy forest ecosystem in Kenya” (UNEP, Steiner, Mbaria), and Indeed East Africa, being equal in size to that of Mt Kenya and the Aberdares combined.
The Complex comprises: South Western Mau Forest, Eastern Mau Forest, Likia Forest, Tinet Forest, Sigotik Forest, Nesuit Forest and Marioshoni Forest (Odenda Lumumba). Transmara and Mau Narok Forests are in the same general area, though they are under the jurisdiction of local authorities, as are Kapsita Forest (Molo) and Londiani Forest. The Mau Complex “is the single most important water catchment for” Rift Valley and Western Provinces (W. Kabukuru). The Mau Complex comprises five main gazetted forest reserves: Eastern Mau (66,000 hectares), South-Western Mau (22,700 hectares), Trans-Mara (34,400 hectares), and Ol Pusimoru (17,200 hectares) (see Patrick Wachira). The Maasai Mau (46,000 hectares), which is not part of the gazetted complex, would have been the sixth component (P. Wachira).
It has been repeatedly stated that twelve rivers drain the Mau Complex, but the full list of this “Glorious Dozen” has not been widely publicized or known; and if incidentally known or had as part of lay knowledge, neither “organically” connected in the mind with the Mau Complex nor, which is the same thing, perceived as any kind of dozen. This is clearly a problem to the detail-conscious reader who must be enrolled in the war against environmental degradation and the related political backlash. The twelve rivers are:
Nzoia, Yala, Nyando, Sondu,
Njoro, Naishi, Makalia, Nderit,
Molo, Kerio, Mara, and Ewaso Nyiro
Rivers Nzoia, Yala, Nyando and Sondu, all entirely within Kenya, flow broadly westward into Lake Victoria; while Njoro, Naishi, Makalia and Nderit (Enderit?), also entirely Kenyan, flow eastward into Lake Nakuru, from the Eastern Mau. Ewaso Nyiro River, in its turn, flows southward, emptying its water into Lake Natron; unlike Mara River which first flows southward but eventually turns westward and then northward, inside Tanzania, toward Lake Victoria. Molo River drains into Lake Baringo, and Kerio River ends way way up north in Lake Turkana.
Mara River, it should be underscored, is a 13,750-kilometer “international river” shared by Kenya and Tanzania. Kenya owns the first 65% of its length, which traverses the world-famous Maasai Mara Game Reserve. Tanzania owns the other 35%, which crosses the equally or more famous (as some would argue) Serengeti National Park (Wanjohi Kabukuru).
Viewed another way, the Mau Water Tower represents the upper catchment “of all but one of the main rivers west of the Rift Valley, which are the source of over 60 per cent of the water flowing into Lake Victoria” (Steiner, Mbaria, Wachira).
The Lakes into Which the Rivers Drain are, as already pointed out: Lake Victoria (shared by Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania), Nakuru (entirely within Kenya), Baringo (also entirely within Kenya), Natron (shared by Kenya and Tanzania) and Turkana (shared by Kenya and Ethiopia).
The degradation of Mau Forest affects, to varying degrees, a total of six countries, namely: Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia and Egypt. What is the nature and magnitude of the destruction, which is ongoing even as we speak? First, logging, which has been going on “for decades” (Steiner); and, one may add, charcoal burning and fuel-wood gathering. Second, illegal excision and settlement: some 25,000 people (or is it 15,000?) are currently settled there. Compare this, however, to the livelihoods, which are at risk, of some 600,000 people engaged in the tea sector alone; not to mention perhaps thousands in the region and elsewhere who depend on tourism for their daily bread, and the millions of small holders who eke out a living in the Lake Victoria basin (Steiner).
Third, due to deforestation, there is a reduction in rainfall levels in the catchment area. Fourth, (as P. Ngunjiri notes) reduced rainfall levels have a negative effect on water supply to urban and other areas such as: Bomet, Egerton University, Elburgon, Eldama Ravine, Kericho, Molo, Nakuru, Narok, Njoro and the Lake Victoria basin. In the past ten years, some 104,000 hectares (24% of the Mau Complex forest cover) have been destroyed. Moreover, the “estimated potential hydro-power generation in the Mau Complex catchments is about 535 MW, representing 57 per cent of the current total hydro-power generation capacity in Kenya” (Wachira). At present, Masinga Dam provides over 50% of Kenya’s electricity, according to KenGen, but it is silting fast (Kabukuru). Illegal logging is most extensive in the south western zone of the Mau Complex (Wachira).
All told, if the destruction of the Mau Complex is not stopped, Kenya stands to lose $300 million in GDP (Steiner). Perhaps seeing this amount as a gross under-estimate, certain commentators have preferred to present it as an annual rather than a “one-off” loss to the country. The difference is not the same.
So, what is one to do? Do we evict the squatters and illegal settlers from the full stretch of the Mau Complex, as a pre-requisite to regenerating Kenya’s and East Africa’s largest water tower, or must those presently in government cut unsustainable political deals with the well-connected owners/settlers, while resettling probably tens of thousands of squatters with a voting card? (go to page 23 of the UNEP et al link shown under Disaster Management elsewhere on this blog page for a picture of the 937.7-hectare Kiptagich Tea Estate, which will give some idea of what such a deal would cost in cash terms)
Despite the cost, we as a country have no choice but to evict and regenerate; but we must also resettle legitimate claimants to a compensation. We must find alternative land in which to resettle them, and pay for it. There will be certain political risks and costs in doing so, to be sure, but leaders offer to lead fully aware that leadership is not all about perks; and fully cognizant of the fact that “there comes a time” when leadership involves making tough, thankless, and even cheerless, decisions – often in the face of populist agitation, by the very same co-leaders who would supplant one at the first opportunity. But there is a place in heaven!
NOTE: This post is based on the following recent reports and commentaries. From the July 27, 2008 issue of Sunday Standard, articles by Gakuu Mathenge (titled “The complex: Peasants, propaganda and fraud”), Patrick Wachira (titled “The facts about Mau forest: East Africa’s largest block of indigenous forest is also home to 45 bird species”), and Vitalis Kimutai (titled “Political intrigues that plague the forest’s conservation efforts”).
From the July 27-August 3, 2008 issue of The East African (a weekly newspaper), John Mbaria’s interview with Achim Steiner (UNEP’s Executive Director), three articles by John Mbaria (titled, “Mau Forest Controversy”, “Why Moi govt is to blame for excisions” and “Destruction of Forest Killing Tea Industry”), Odenda Lumumba (titled “Land excisions were illegal, against the public interest”), Philip Ngunjiri (titled “Kenya may lose $300m revenue unless forest is restored”) and Wanjohi Kabukuru (titled “Why Dar and Cairo are asking tough questions”).
However, the anchor source for this post, and indeed for the said reports and commentaries, is Mara Complex Under Siege: Values and Threats (May 2008). That key source was collaboratively prepared by UNEP, Kenya Wildlife Service, Kenya Forests Working Group and Ewaso Nyiro South Development Authority.
For an updated version, click on a link with the same title as this post, which you will find to the right of this page.
References:
1. Links to Additional Readings: Click here
Be that as it may, we can see that much of the recently publicized information, firmly anchored on texts and pictures provided mainly by UNEP, is the kind that politically aware citizens (or plainly well-read ones) must have, and constantly bear in mind, in order to form the sustained and hopefully vocal opinion that shapes policy. In this case, what is on the agenda is the crucial matter of securing the country’s water resources, which are increasingly in jeopardy, and working toward a sustainable environmental and socio-economic future for all.
So, exactly what concrete information would the informed reader have gleaned by now, from all the public narratives, about the essential features of the Mau Water Tower, and about its significance to the future of Kenya and the region as a whole? It would have been largely as follows:
The Physical Characteristics and Importance of the Complex: The Mau Forest Complex is a 400,000-hectacre area located toward the western wall of the Rift Valley. This forest cover, “is the largest closed canopy forest ecosystem in Kenya” (UNEP, Steiner, Mbaria), and Indeed East Africa, being equal in size to that of Mt Kenya and the Aberdares combined.
The Complex comprises: South Western Mau Forest, Eastern Mau Forest, Likia Forest, Tinet Forest, Sigotik Forest, Nesuit Forest and Marioshoni Forest (Odenda Lumumba). Transmara and Mau Narok Forests are in the same general area, though they are under the jurisdiction of local authorities, as are Kapsita Forest (Molo) and Londiani Forest. The Mau Complex “is the single most important water catchment for” Rift Valley and Western Provinces (W. Kabukuru). The Mau Complex comprises five main gazetted forest reserves: Eastern Mau (66,000 hectares), South-Western Mau (22,700 hectares), Trans-Mara (34,400 hectares), and Ol Pusimoru (17,200 hectares) (see Patrick Wachira). The Maasai Mau (46,000 hectares), which is not part of the gazetted complex, would have been the sixth component (P. Wachira).
It has been repeatedly stated that twelve rivers drain the Mau Complex, but the full list of this “Glorious Dozen” has not been widely publicized or known; and if incidentally known or had as part of lay knowledge, neither “organically” connected in the mind with the Mau Complex nor, which is the same thing, perceived as any kind of dozen. This is clearly a problem to the detail-conscious reader who must be enrolled in the war against environmental degradation and the related political backlash. The twelve rivers are:
Nzoia, Yala, Nyando, Sondu,
Njoro, Naishi, Makalia, Nderit,
Molo, Kerio, Mara, and Ewaso Nyiro
Rivers Nzoia, Yala, Nyando and Sondu, all entirely within Kenya, flow broadly westward into Lake Victoria; while Njoro, Naishi, Makalia and Nderit (Enderit?), also entirely Kenyan, flow eastward into Lake Nakuru, from the Eastern Mau. Ewaso Nyiro River, in its turn, flows southward, emptying its water into Lake Natron; unlike Mara River which first flows southward but eventually turns westward and then northward, inside Tanzania, toward Lake Victoria. Molo River drains into Lake Baringo, and Kerio River ends way way up north in Lake Turkana.
Mara River, it should be underscored, is a 13,750-kilometer “international river” shared by Kenya and Tanzania. Kenya owns the first 65% of its length, which traverses the world-famous Maasai Mara Game Reserve. Tanzania owns the other 35%, which crosses the equally or more famous (as some would argue) Serengeti National Park (Wanjohi Kabukuru).
Viewed another way, the Mau Water Tower represents the upper catchment “of all but one of the main rivers west of the Rift Valley, which are the source of over 60 per cent of the water flowing into Lake Victoria” (Steiner, Mbaria, Wachira).
The Lakes into Which the Rivers Drain are, as already pointed out: Lake Victoria (shared by Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania), Nakuru (entirely within Kenya), Baringo (also entirely within Kenya), Natron (shared by Kenya and Tanzania) and Turkana (shared by Kenya and Ethiopia).
The degradation of Mau Forest affects, to varying degrees, a total of six countries, namely: Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia and Egypt. What is the nature and magnitude of the destruction, which is ongoing even as we speak? First, logging, which has been going on “for decades” (Steiner); and, one may add, charcoal burning and fuel-wood gathering. Second, illegal excision and settlement: some 25,000 people (or is it 15,000?) are currently settled there. Compare this, however, to the livelihoods, which are at risk, of some 600,000 people engaged in the tea sector alone; not to mention perhaps thousands in the region and elsewhere who depend on tourism for their daily bread, and the millions of small holders who eke out a living in the Lake Victoria basin (Steiner).
Third, due to deforestation, there is a reduction in rainfall levels in the catchment area. Fourth, (as P. Ngunjiri notes) reduced rainfall levels have a negative effect on water supply to urban and other areas such as: Bomet, Egerton University, Elburgon, Eldama Ravine, Kericho, Molo, Nakuru, Narok, Njoro and the Lake Victoria basin. In the past ten years, some 104,000 hectares (24% of the Mau Complex forest cover) have been destroyed. Moreover, the “estimated potential hydro-power generation in the Mau Complex catchments is about 535 MW, representing 57 per cent of the current total hydro-power generation capacity in Kenya” (Wachira). At present, Masinga Dam provides over 50% of Kenya’s electricity, according to KenGen, but it is silting fast (Kabukuru). Illegal logging is most extensive in the south western zone of the Mau Complex (Wachira).
All told, if the destruction of the Mau Complex is not stopped, Kenya stands to lose $300 million in GDP (Steiner). Perhaps seeing this amount as a gross under-estimate, certain commentators have preferred to present it as an annual rather than a “one-off” loss to the country. The difference is not the same.
So, what is one to do? Do we evict the squatters and illegal settlers from the full stretch of the Mau Complex, as a pre-requisite to regenerating Kenya’s and East Africa’s largest water tower, or must those presently in government cut unsustainable political deals with the well-connected owners/settlers, while resettling probably tens of thousands of squatters with a voting card? (go to page 23 of the UNEP et al link shown under Disaster Management elsewhere on this blog page for a picture of the 937.7-hectare Kiptagich Tea Estate, which will give some idea of what such a deal would cost in cash terms)
Despite the cost, we as a country have no choice but to evict and regenerate; but we must also resettle legitimate claimants to a compensation. We must find alternative land in which to resettle them, and pay for it. There will be certain political risks and costs in doing so, to be sure, but leaders offer to lead fully aware that leadership is not all about perks; and fully cognizant of the fact that “there comes a time” when leadership involves making tough, thankless, and even cheerless, decisions – often in the face of populist agitation, by the very same co-leaders who would supplant one at the first opportunity. But there is a place in heaven!
NOTE: This post is based on the following recent reports and commentaries. From the July 27, 2008 issue of Sunday Standard, articles by Gakuu Mathenge (titled “The complex: Peasants, propaganda and fraud”), Patrick Wachira (titled “The facts about Mau forest: East Africa’s largest block of indigenous forest is also home to 45 bird species”), and Vitalis Kimutai (titled “Political intrigues that plague the forest’s conservation efforts”).
From the July 27-August 3, 2008 issue of The East African (a weekly newspaper), John Mbaria’s interview with Achim Steiner (UNEP’s Executive Director), three articles by John Mbaria (titled, “Mau Forest Controversy”, “Why Moi govt is to blame for excisions” and “Destruction of Forest Killing Tea Industry”), Odenda Lumumba (titled “Land excisions were illegal, against the public interest”), Philip Ngunjiri (titled “Kenya may lose $300m revenue unless forest is restored”) and Wanjohi Kabukuru (titled “Why Dar and Cairo are asking tough questions”).
However, the anchor source for this post, and indeed for the said reports and commentaries, is Mara Complex Under Siege: Values and Threats (May 2008). That key source was collaboratively prepared by UNEP, Kenya Wildlife Service, Kenya Forests Working Group and Ewaso Nyiro South Development Authority.
For an updated version, click on a link with the same title as this post, which you will find to the right of this page.
References:
1. Links to Additional Readings: Click here
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