Showing posts with label Nakuru. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Nakuru. Show all posts

Tuesday, February 03, 2009

IS KENYA DISASTER-PREPARED?

Two disasters have recently hit Kenya. On Wednesday, January 21st, the iconic Nakumatt Downtown Supermarket, located in the centre of Nairobi city, was gutted by a deadly mid-afternoon fire, which left some 29 people dead (as of today's count). Then, on Saturday evening (January 24), an oil tanker overturned at Sachang'wan -- somewhere past Nakuru (where, incidentally, Nakumatt has its Kenyan roots), in the vicinity of Molo -- in the expansive Rift Valley. Ordinary folk rushed to loot its deadly cargo. The tanker, and the contents that had spilled, burst into flames, killing some 100 people on the spot, and over 120 people as of today's count.

All this has prompted people of all walks of life to ask: Is Kenya prepared to cope effectively with the disasters such as we have recently endured? It is a rhetorical question, for the consensus seems to be that Kenya is far from prepared, though we should be. What remains at issue is whom to blame, but there is much agreement on even that; neither of which will stop me from expressing the following opinion. The government, it is argued by nearly all, is to blame.

Kenya (by which I mean the Kenyan government) is, in my view, far from being well equipped to respond to the variety of emergencies and disasters that are likely to occur in this country -- and that have indeed occurred in the past, and even the very recent past. What is more, its top leadership is patently far from being sufficiently sensitize and alive to the natural and human-caused dangers that are essentially waiting to happen.

The government should be both the first-order mitigator of disasters and first-order responder when disaster strikes, but its top leadership is apathetic and, in effect, disinterested -- except, it seems, in the opportunities for media attention which come in the wake of such events, and which they are driven to hog. Moreover, the National Disaster Operations Centre (NDOC) remains technically asleep. This has left the Kenya Red Cross Society as the de facto and much-respected "government" in disaster-response situations all across the country.

There is much public educating to do to elevate the average Kenyan's disaster literacy to functional levels as far as emergencies and disasters go, but if there is no strong political will at top levels of government, this is not going to happen. NGOs can help in this, of course, but the government must provide the enabling environment and indeed lead from the front. It must not abdicate its constitutional responsibility to the governed.

One irony that many have commented upon is that, at the household level, the widespread practice of burglar-proofing our homes is itself a source of danger. It usually leaves no margin of safety should other kinds of disaster (such as gas-cylinder explosions or electrical fires) strike. The ever-present and much-felt need to protect our homes against burglary and the need to have a quick exit in the event, for example, of a fire within the home work at cross-purposes -- leaving us damned if we do and damned if we don't. That is to say, damned if we are not protected from burglars who come in the dead of the night, when we are most vulnerable; and damned if we have no quick escape route from in-house danger -- a route which the burglar might well exploit long before the other danger strikes. In fact, cross-purpose prevention is all too common in real life, if you think about it. We will probably never eliminate all the contradictions inherent in the urge to simultaneously deal with danger from all known, let alone unknown, sources.

Let me give nine other examples of these cross-purposes:

(1) The deep-seated urge to use our eyes to see the commotion that’s suddenly around us (indeed, the explosion that has just gone off nearby), if only in order to “see what to do” in the name of safety, works at cross-purposes with the need to protect our eyes (the organ of our “sovereign sense”, as Foucault saw it) from danger. It is as though we instinctively ask: what is the point of this sovereignty if, at the most critical moment, we must not exercise it?

(2) The drive to escape from poverty works at cross-purposes with the need for safe shelter, the consequence being that millions end up in dwellings highly prone to fire hazards, the only ones they can afford.

(3) Inhabitants of flood-prone river- and lake-basins constantly plead for safety against floods, but will not abandon their ancestral lands to grabbers whom they fear will surely arrive the moment they leave (and how foolish would that make them look in the eyes of the grabbers, let alone their own forebears and heirs?).

(4) The desire to buy medicine which cures clashes with the inclination to buy medicine one can afford.

(5) The instinct to live a long and healthy life clashes – among the young and unmarried, driven by their own raging hormones and by culture – with the instinct to marry, even at the risk of contracting HIV/AIDS at marriage or soon after.

(6) The urge to stay safe at home (and how safe is that?) clashes with the human compulsion to be “around” -- to interact with others, doing what people normally do when in town, or the countryside -- even if it means ending up under a collapsing building or beside a suicide bomber.

(7) The urge to be sober clashes, in the minds of many, with the desire to be social; the need to say no, with the desire to keep friends.

(8) The urge to follow established rules of the game clashes with the drive to win and prosper.

(9) The call for safe building standards clashes with the goal of affordable (or even cheap) construction, which too often means economizing on safety.

Such cross-purposes, together with government’s failure to lead, are the principal root-causes of Kenya’s failure to manage disasters effectively. They are the reasons we are ill-prepared to respond to large-scale danger. We must remember, however, that disasters are, by definition, catastrophic or traumatic events that occur because we have not prevented or adequately mitigated them, or could not. Typically, major disasters are contingent events which, as Kohler notes, “have a low probability of occurring, but when they do they have devastating consequences.” He adds, importantly:


“Designing response structures for such events is a difficult task, particularly when public resources are low. Generally, a disaster occurs when the local emergency system’s means for managing and coordinating a response are overwhelmed and require outside intervention to succeed.”

The embarrassment for us here in Kenya is that, more than ten years since the August 7th 1998 bomb blast, we have not genuinely tried to establish (and have not in fact established) a response structure that would be seen to work within our means, and which external responders would appreciate whenever they had to be called in to help.

There is need for a strong emergency management authority in this country. It should probably be fashioned after the original FEMA in the US, before it was emasculated and buried somewhere within in the Department of Homeland Security, following 911. The Kenya Red Cross Society operates largely along the same lines as FEMA was originally intended to operate. This means that the Kenyan government has a home-grown example which it should not be shy to emulate and even to better.

If the Kenya Red Cross Society has been able to do so much with more limited resources, an authority reporting directly to the President and adequately funded by the government could do much more still – if led with passion and commitment, and with high standards of professionalism in its recruitment, planning and operations. NDOC, the official emergency operations coordination outfit seems to be preoccupied with futile paperwork and donor-funded consultancies. That will not do.


P.S: The second installment of "Is Kenya-Disaster Prepared?" will follow.

Wednesday, July 30, 2008

The Mau Water Tower

Much has been written in Kenya’s print media about the Mau Forest Complex in the last four weeks or so, and particularly the last seven days. However, the Mau Question has been part of the national discourse, on and off, since the second half of the 1980s, in the heyday of Moi’s presidency (and when UNEP was patently asleep on the job), when grabbers, “settlers” and squatters alike, who -- unlike the Ogiek, otherwise called the Dorobo -- did not have any traditional/historical claim to any part of that expansive, fertile, and amply rain-fed terrain, began to encroach into it, with state support. Gakuu Mathenge suggests, however, that this Mau Question became part of the national discourse only in 2004, when President Kibaki burnt his fingers attempting to intervene. He paid unforgettably more for the effort a year later, during a Referendum in which his “yes” (or Banana) camp decisively lost.

Be that as it may, we can see that much of the recently publicized information, firmly anchored on texts and pictures provided mainly by UNEP, is the kind that politically aware citizens (or plainly well-read ones) must have, and constantly bear in mind, in order to form the sustained and hopefully vocal opinion that shapes policy. In this case, what is on the agenda is the crucial matter of securing the country’s water resources, which are increasingly in jeopardy, and working toward a sustainable environmental and socio-economic future for all.

So, exactly what concrete information would the informed reader have gleaned by now, from all the public narratives, about the essential features of the Mau Water Tower, and about its significance to the future of Kenya and the region as a whole? It would have been largely as follows:

The Physical Characteristics and Importance of the Complex: The Mau Forest Complex is a 400,000-hectacre area located toward the western wall of the Rift Valley. This forest cover, “is the largest closed canopy forest ecosystem in Kenya” (UNEP, Steiner, Mbaria), and Indeed East Africa, being equal in size to that of Mt Kenya and the Aberdares combined.

The Complex comprises: South Western Mau Forest, Eastern Mau Forest, Likia Forest, Tinet Forest, Sigotik Forest, Nesuit Forest and Marioshoni Forest (Odenda Lumumba). Transmara and Mau Narok Forests are in the same general area, though they are under the jurisdiction of local authorities, as are Kapsita Forest (Molo) and Londiani Forest. The Mau Complex “is the single most important water catchment for” Rift Valley and Western Provinces (W. Kabukuru). The Mau Complex comprises five main gazetted forest reserves: Eastern Mau (66,000 hectares), South-Western Mau (22,700 hectares), Trans-Mara (34,400 hectares), and Ol Pusimoru (17,200 hectares) (see Patrick Wachira). The Maasai Mau (46,000 hectares), which is not part of the gazetted complex, would have been the sixth component (P. Wachira).

It has been repeatedly stated that twelve rivers drain the Mau Complex, but the full list of this “Glorious Dozen” has not been widely publicized or known; and if incidentally known or had as part of lay knowledge, neither “organically” connected in the mind with the Mau Complex nor, which is the same thing, perceived as any kind of dozen. This is clearly a problem to the detail-conscious reader who must be enrolled in the war against environmental degradation and the related political backlash. The twelve rivers are:

Nzoia, Yala, Nyando, Sondu,

Njoro, Naishi, Makalia, Nderit,

Molo, Kerio, Mara, and Ewaso Nyiro


Rivers Nzoia, Yala, Nyando and Sondu, all entirely within Kenya, flow broadly westward into Lake Victoria; while Njoro, Naishi, Makalia and Nderit (Enderit?), also entirely Kenyan, flow eastward into Lake Nakuru, from the Eastern Mau. Ewaso Nyiro River, in its turn, flows southward, emptying its water into Lake Natron; unlike Mara River which first flows southward but eventually turns westward and then northward, inside Tanzania, toward Lake Victoria. Molo River drains into Lake Baringo, and Kerio River ends way way up north in Lake Turkana.

Mara River, it should be underscored, is a 13,750-kilometer “international river” shared by Kenya and Tanzania. Kenya owns the first 65% of its length, which traverses the world-famous Maasai Mara Game Reserve. Tanzania owns the other 35%, which crosses the equally or more famous (as some would argue) Serengeti National Park (Wanjohi Kabukuru).

Viewed another way, the Mau Water Tower represents the upper catchment “of all but one of the main rivers west of the Rift Valley, which are the source of over 60 per cent of the water flowing into Lake Victoria” (Steiner, Mbaria, Wachira).

The Lakes into Which the Rivers Drain are, as already pointed out: Lake Victoria (shared by Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania), Nakuru (entirely within Kenya), Baringo (also entirely within Kenya), Natron (shared by Kenya and Tanzania) and Turkana (shared by Kenya and Ethiopia).

The degradation of Mau Forest affects, to varying degrees, a total of six countries, namely: Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia and Egypt. What is the nature and magnitude of the destruction, which is ongoing even as we speak? First, logging, which has been going on “for decades” (Steiner); and, one may add, charcoal burning and fuel-wood gathering. Second, illegal excision and settlement: some 25,000 people (or is it 15,000?) are currently settled there. Compare this, however, to the livelihoods, which are at risk, of some 600,000 people engaged in the tea sector alone; not to mention perhaps thousands in the region and elsewhere who depend on tourism for their daily bread, and the millions of small holders who eke out a living in the Lake Victoria basin (Steiner).

Third, due to deforestation, there is a reduction in rainfall levels in the catchment area. Fourth, (as P. Ngunjiri notes) reduced rainfall levels have a negative effect on water supply to urban and other areas such as: Bomet, Egerton University, Elburgon, Eldama Ravine, Kericho, Molo, Nakuru, Narok, Njoro and the Lake Victoria basin. In the past ten years, some 104,000 hectares (24% of the Mau Complex forest cover) have been destroyed. Moreover, the “estimated potential hydro-power generation in the Mau Complex catchments is about 535 MW, representing 57 per cent of the current total hydro-power generation capacity in Kenya” (Wachira). At present, Masinga Dam provides over 50% of Kenya’s electricity, according to KenGen, but it is silting fast (Kabukuru). Illegal logging is most extensive in the south western zone of the Mau Complex (Wachira).

All told, if the destruction of the Mau Complex is not stopped, Kenya stands to lose $300 million in GDP (Steiner). Perhaps seeing this amount as a gross under-estimate, certain commentators have preferred to present it as an annual rather than a “one-off” loss to the country. The difference is not the same.

So, what is one to do? Do we evict the squatters and illegal settlers from the full stretch of the Mau Complex, as a pre-requisite to regenerating Kenya’s and East Africa’s largest water tower, or must those presently in government cut unsustainable political deals with the well-connected owners/settlers, while resettling probably tens of thousands of squatters with a voting card? (go to page 23 of the UNEP et al link shown under Disaster Management elsewhere on this blog page for a picture of the 937.7-hectare Kiptagich Tea Estate, which will give some idea of what such a deal would cost in cash terms)

Despite the cost, we as a country have no choice but to evict and regenerate; but we must also resettle legitimate claimants to a compensation. We must find alternative land in which to resettle them, and pay for it. There will be certain political risks and costs in doing so, to be sure, but leaders offer to lead fully aware that leadership is not all about perks; and fully cognizant of the fact that “there comes a time” when leadership involves making tough, thankless, and even cheerless, decisions – often in the face of populist agitation, by the very same co-leaders who would supplant one at the first opportunity. But there is a place in heaven!

NOTE: This post is based on the following recent reports and commentaries. From the July 27, 2008 issue of Sunday Standard, articles by Gakuu Mathenge (titled “The complex: Peasants, propaganda and fraud”), Patrick Wachira (titled “The facts about Mau forest: East Africa’s largest block of indigenous forest is also home to 45 bird species”), and Vitalis Kimutai (titled “Political intrigues that plague the forest’s conservation efforts”).

From the July 27-August 3, 2008 issue of The East African (a weekly newspaper), John Mbaria’s interview with Achim Steiner (UNEP’s Executive Director), three articles by John Mbaria (titled, “Mau Forest Controversy”, “Why Moi govt is to blame for excisions” and “Destruction of Forest Killing Tea Industry”), Odenda Lumumba (titled “Land excisions were illegal, against the public interest”), Philip Ngunjiri (titled “Kenya may lose $300m revenue unless forest is restored”) and Wanjohi Kabukuru (titled “Why Dar and Cairo are asking tough questions”).

However, the anchor source for this post, and indeed for the said reports and commentaries, is Mara Complex Under Siege: Values and Threats (May 2008). That key source was collaboratively prepared by UNEP, Kenya Wildlife Service, Kenya Forests Working Group and Ewaso Nyiro South Development Authority.

For an updated version, click on a link with the same title as this post, which you will find to the right of this page.


References:
1. Links to Additional Readings: Click here