"The Dialectic of Size and Structure: The Case of Kenya's State Bureaucracy"

By Mauri Yambo

Abstract

While interest in the correlation between the size and structure of social institutions traces back at least to the days of Herbert Spencer, not all social scientists have subscribed to the view that significant changes in size lead to changes in structure, and vice versa. Most of the available literature on Kenya, for example, suggests that the state bureaucracy has undergone little or no structural change since formal independence in December 1963.

This paper re-evaluates that view, both deductively and empirically. It is concluded that while many prominent and prestigious positions in the Kenyan state hierarchy carry the same titles as they did during the colonial era, thereby creating an imposing facade of bureaucratic- structural continuity, the truth is that important changes have been taking place, and the bureaucratic structure we see now is significantly more extensive and more complex than what was inherited seventeen short years ago. And not because of any revolutionary re-orientation in the dominant ideology.

[Paper published in African Journal of Sociology, Vol. I, Nos. 1 and 2, April 1981, pp. 72-100]

Television Broadcasting in East Africa: Airtime Allocation to Local and Foreign Programmes, January-March 2002 (Selected Findings From Kenya)

By Prof. MauriYambo (Consultant to DTM) [Nairobi: February 12, 2003]

Introduction

To mark to-day's occasion -- a February 12, 2003 meeting of film stakeholders and the Minister for Information and Tourism -- and on behalf of Development Through Media, the author presents in this brief paper selected findings of a soon-to-be released final report of the first phase of a DTM[1] project titled Re‑shaping Television Broadcasting in East Africa. The first phase was a qualitative-cum-quantitative study[2] designed to establish the amount of airtime allocated to foreign and local programmes by East African television stations, and in the process to delineate the existing linkages between broadcasting policy and practice in East Africa. One television quarter in each station was covered, during the months of January to March in the year 2002. The study paid particular attention to matters pertaining to content -- that is to say, factors which influence the choice or production of television broadcasting material, and the reasons for the apparent across-the-board preference for foreign material.

Study Objective

The study had one specific objective, namely: to establish the amount of airtime currently being dedicated to foreign vis‑à‑vis local content in television broadcasting in East Africa within a three‑month television quarter.

Rationale for the Study

We know of no prior study with this specific objective that has ever been conducted in East Africa. In pursuing the objective, we were motivated by the knowledge that most of the programmes shown on local television channels were sourced from outside the region; and by the premise that intervention at the level of content was probably the most promising way to ensure the optimal utilization of the region's film and television practitioners' film-making skills, and consequently the sustained development of a locally-based audio-visual industry.

Inferring from often-stated stakeholder (including audience) perceptions, we hypothesized that although the East African region has in the recent past recorded a rapid increase in the number of operational television stations following the liberalisation of the airwaves, this increase has not benefited the local film industry. It was DTM's hope that, in achieving its phase one objective, the study would form the basis for a deeper understanding of the impact of television programming on the development of the region's local film and television production industry. Such understanding, in turn, would be a crucially important basis for lobbying and advocacy endeavours in favour of more local content in the broadcasting media.

LESSONS LEARNT FROM A REVIEW OF TELEVISION BROADCASTING PRACTICES AND OF THE ROLES PLAYED BY FILM COMMISSIONS/FESTIVALS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES OUTSIDE EAST AFRICA

As part of the activities carried out in this first phase of the project, we were able to survey the television broadcasting policies and practices of selected television channels, and/or the roles played by film commissions/festivals, in eight countries: Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Germany, USA (New York and California), Britain, Australia, France and Austria. In particular, we sought to find out how other countries have dealt with the issue of local vis‑à‑vis foreign content in television programming, and what we could learn from that.

Many lessons can be learnt from the experiences, as we were able to determine, of the countries surveyed. However, seven main lessons stand out:

First, that the Australia Film Commission's (AFC) endeavour to support and develop the country's Screen Culture and Screen Industry is certainly a lesson to draw inspiration from. AFC carries out its mandate in a comprehensive way, through measures which include: project development through script and other pre‑production assistance; post‑production grants and low‑budget production funding; grants in support of a vigorous and diverse screen culture; international promotion of Australian productions and marketing advice; creative interactive media development, production and exhibition; the development of indigenous film and television programme makers; monitoring film, television and multimedia industry performance; and information services.

Second, that although government regulation of the Nigerian broadcasting sector has been practised in a slightly ad hoc manner, it has nevertheless greatly assisted in the development of the local film industry. It may be argued, however, that the requirement for a specified level of local programme content -- though in principle an absolute necessity -- may turn out to be unfair to local channels compared to channels which beam signals directly from outside Nigeria, and those which transmit or re-transmit international signals[3]. The challenge is how not to throw out the baby with the bathwater.

Third, that the popularity in Nigeria of home movies on video (which has turned many of Nigeria's film producers into video makers) may, if replicated in East Africa, create a whole new paradigm for "moviemaking" in East Africa -- and indeed Africa. Incidentally, TV Africa has lately begun to provide a nearly continent-wide outlet for these video-movies. The video-movie sub-sector is likely to prove a major on-the-job (or Jua Kali) training ground for independent producers of the future, and a major challenge to big-screen producers.

Fourth, that as far as the legal framework for a film industry goes, Germany's state media laws provide an adaptable regulatory model for the licensing, supervision and development of private television broadcasting. In Germany, the responsibilities specified in the law are implemented by committees. These committees should be representative of relevant groups in society -- that is to say, the stakeholders; and should serve as watchdogs which ensure that obligations that attach to granted licenses are met.

Fifth, that the California Film Commission's (CFC) endeavours underscore the challenges attendant upon being "host" to Hollywood, easily the world's capital for movie and television production, or to its imitations. Among CFC's obvious attractions is that it is a full-fledged one‑stop shop for filmmakers. It maintains Cinema Scout, a fully interactive website with details of California's filming locations. CFC works with communities and all levels of government to remove barriers to filming within the state. It also provides a 24‑hour emergency production assistance hotline, and runs incentive programmes[4] to encourage filming in California[5].

Sixth, the New York Mayor's office (more specifically the MOFTB production unit[6]) provides a very promising model for a public (civic or governmental) office determined to build and sustain a mutually beneficial relationship with private or independent filmmakers. Such a synergy is viable only in an environment in which the role and enormous potential of the film industry in the wider economy is fully appreciated by public officials.

Seventh, the French approach to the development of the film industry, through the Film Fund, is another lesson learnt -- that is, another example worth emulating here. In France, a tax levied on each ticket sold in a movie theatre, and generated from a portion of the broadcaster's total income, is collected under the Film Fund and distributed in some agreed proportions to the purchasing, respectively, of French independent productions, French productions in general, and productions of European origin (see www.cnc.fr). Certainly this gives assurance of sustainability to producers with a measure of market share.

LESSONS LEARNT FROM A QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE TELEVISION BROADCASTING INDUSTRY IN EAST AFRICA

Five main lessons can be learnt from the qualitative survey of the East African scene, and the survey of experiences outside East Africa. First, that the practice of in-house production of television programmes in state-owned stations appears to be a key factor stunting the development of the film industry in East Africa. Why do we make this claim? Our answer is that whereas state funding has not meant in-house production in such countries as Australia, France and Germany, it has become synonymous with in-house production on East Africa's state-owned television channels, in particular KBC. But whereas it can be said that independent film production is vibrant in Australia, France, Germany and USA, the same cannot be said of East Africa.

Second, that a significant amount of public and private resources already exist for laying the groundwork for a vibrant, independent film industry in East Africa. Why do we make this claim? Our answer is that state-owned television stations are regularly funded from the exchequer, and therefore have assured funds at their disposal to commission independent productions if they wanted to, but they prefer to produce a large percentage of their local content in‑house -- and this has prompted them to, probably wastefully, maintain a large in-house staff. Funds that would have been used to enhance independent local production, and thus to create competitive variety and depth, are used to maintain a large payroll as well as routine in a public-sector monopoly[7].

Third, that a sustainable film industry must be one that walks on two feet: big-screen production side by side with small-screen production, public-funding side by side with privately-sourced funding, established (big budget) film producers side by side with fledgling (or up-and-coming, or upstart) producers working at the margin on small-budget movies or video productions. This is what the Nigerian, Australian and French experiences (and other experiences) point to.

Fourth, that sustained and ethically (as well as politically) correct state support of the film industry is predicated upon there being good governance in a country, accountable and predictable management of state resources, and a medium- to long-term national vision for the industry. As the Nigerian experience seems to suggest, if this cannot always be assured, then independent film producers must learn to go it mostly on their own -- perhaps using revenue from low-risk, low-budget productions (video productions of shorts, including cartoons, and features) to fund big-budget ones (feature films), and linking up with private channels such as STV/TV Africa.

Fifth, that, following from the fourth lesson, prosperity for the African film industry (including the feature film sub-sector) will probably more assuredly come via quality video production. For every full-length feature film completed in any given period, there are likely to be dozens of video productions competing for the same small screen.

TELEVISION BROADCASTING IN EAST AFRICA: A COMPARATIVE QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

The discussion under this heading is the centrepiece of the entire study. In this brief paper, we comment only on Kenyan data, given the nature of today's audience -- and only a small portion of the data.

Percent Share of Total Broadcast Time Allocated to Local and Foreign Programmes by Respective TV Channels

Arranging the Kenya-based channels in ascending order, we find the following hierarchy in terms of the percentage of total airtime allocated to foreign programmes[8]:

TV Channel Percent of Total Broadcast Time Country

Allocated to Foreign Programmes

STV 100.0% Kenya

Family TV 94.4% Kenya

KTN 84.7% Kenya

Nation TV 84.0% Kenya

Metro TV 82.3% Kenya

KBC 64.4% Kenya

The flip-side of these figures is that STV did not give any amount of airtime to local content during the period covered in the study, while Family TV gave only 5.6% of its airtime. KTN gave 15.3%, Nation TV 16%, Metro TV 17.7% and KBC TV 35.6%. At this rate, clearly, the day when local content will account for at least half of TV programming on most channels, in terms of total broadcast minutes, seems to be far off -- based, for example, on a 50% benchmark as a starting point. A follow-up study, one year later, would help to show how far off still. DTM plans to undertake that study in 2003.

Percent Share of Prime Time Allocated to Local and Foreign Programmes by Respective TV Channels

Having looked at total airtime, our attention turned to allocations during prime time -- defined as the TV broadcast period running from 6.30 p.m. to 10.00 p.m. every evening. Our assumption at the start of data analysis had been that looking at the percentage of total airtime allocated to local and foreign programmes might yield a more favourable trend for local programming, while camouflaging the continued preference for foreign programmes during prime time. What we found is listed below:

TV Channel Percent of Prime Time Allocated

to Foreign Programmes

STV 100.0%

Metro TV 92.4%

Family TV 78.1%

KTN 63.6%

KBC 54.8%.

Nation TV 46.3%.

Consistent with the fact that STV devoted 100% of its airtime to foreign news, it also devoted 100% of its prime time minutes to foreign programmes. In fact, only Nation TV (53.7% local, 46.3% foreign) devoted half or more of its airtime to local programmes during prime time.

A comparison of total airtime allocations with prime-time allocations showed that, contrary to our expectations, there was only one case (Metro TV) in which the percent of airtime allocated to foreign programming increased (by 10.1 percentage points) during prime time. In all the other cases the time allocated to foreign programmes decreased, in some of the cases quite significantly. In the case of Nation TV, for example, it decreased by 37.7 percentage points -- easily the largest margin. On KTN TV, the decrease was 21.1 percentage points.

Percent Share of Airtime Minutes Allocated to Local Content by Programme-Category

We undertook a top-ten ranking of programmes per channel based on local content, with the programme-category with the highest local content being ranked first. We found that, during the period of study (January 2002 to March 2002), local content on Kenyan channels was highest in three programme-categories:

1. Talk shows, where it reached 100% of airtime on Nation TV, KBC TV and KTN TV.

2. Game shows, where it also reached 100% of airtime on each of the three channels.

3. Cookery, where it accounted for 100% of broadcast time on KBC TV and KTN TV.

In addition, only KBC TV offered 100% local content in children's programmes, while Metro TV was the only channel with 100% local content in "features" and music programmes, respectively.

As for programme-categories with local content accounting for at least 50% of broadcast time, Nation TV had one (besides the two categories already mentioned above) with local content of 50% or more, namely: Features (72.9%). KBC TV had two, besides the four already mentioned, with local content of 50% or more. These were: Music (86.8%) and Religious Programmes (69.3%). KTN TV had features (68.9% local content) as a third category. Family TV did not have any programme with 50% or more local content during the material period.

All in all, KBC TV had the greatest variety of programmes (6 categories) with local content at 50% or higher. Based on that criterion, KTN TV was in second position with four programme-categories, Nation TV was third with three, while Metro TV was fourth with two. In general, the five leading programme-categories in terms of local content were: talk shows, game shows, cookery, "religious" and music.

Percentage of Total Airtime Allocated to Different Programmes

More detail is provided here to enable different film producers to determine where opportunity, threat, may lie -- in terms of the programme-categories in which they have an interest.

Only STV devoted 50% or more of total broadcast time to any one programme-category. It devoted 60.6% of the time to news (Sky News, predominantly). Indeed, news was the preferred programme-category in Kenya, as indicated below:


TV Channel Percent of Broadcast Time Devoted to News

STV 60.6%

KTN TV 41.5%

KBC TV 29.3%

Nation TV 22.1%

Family TV 2.0%

Metro TV 0.0%

It is quite noteworthy that, despite being owned by probably the largest news media group in Kenya, Nation TV devoted only 22.1% of broadcast time to news (thereby ranking news second), compared to the 32.6% it devoted to movies and 20.0% to cartoons. Movies ranked first on Metro TV as well, with 26.1% of airtime, but eighth on KTN (2.6% of airtime).

Features ranked second on STV (with 11.9% of the channel's airtime) and on Family TV(23.7% of the channel's airtime). KBC TV (6.3% of airtime) and Metro TV (1.8% of airtime) had features ranked sixth and eighth, respectively. Features ranked seventh on Nation TV (1.9% of airtime), but did not rank at all on KTN (0.0% of airtime).

KBC TV devoted 8.5% of airtime to drama, while KTN devoted 7.5%, Nation TV 6.6% and Metro TV 1.8%. STV devoted 4.5% of airtime to it, while Family TV devoted 2.7%.

Children's programmes ranked among the top ten on Family TV (where they took fifth position). In fact, only Family TV (3.9% of its total airtime) and KBC TV (0.9% of its total airtime) had children's programmes at the time.

The highest ranking for cartoons was observed on Nation TV, where the category was in third position (with 20% of airtime). Cartoons took seventh position on Metro TV(4.5% of airtime); eighth on Family TV (1.5%); and ninth on KBC TV(5.3%) and KTN (1.8%). STV did not have cartoons.

Soap operas ranked second on Metro TV (21.2% of total airtime) and KBC TV (11.1%); third on KTN (8.9%), and sixth on Nation TV (5.0%) and STV (3.6%). Family TV did not show any.

The best ranking for music programmes was observed on KTN TV, where this category placed second with 23.4% of airtime. Music ranked fourth on Family TV (5.4% of airtime) and STV (6.1% of airtime), and fifth on Nation TV (5.2%) and Metro TV (9.0%). Music programmes did not feature prominently on KBC TV (4.4%), being ranked tenth there.

The best ranking for comedy was on KTN TV, where it was fifth with 3.7% of airtime. However, though comedy ranked eighth on KBC TV, it had a 6% share of total airtime on that channel -- which was bigger than observed on KTN TV. Comedy ranked eighth on Nation TV as well, with 1.6% of total airtime. But comedy was not among the top ten programmes on Family TV, which devoted to it only 0.3% of total airtime. Metro TV did not offer any comedy.

Some 13.5% of airtime was devoted to sports on Metro TV (ranking sports third there), while 10.6% of airtime was so devoted on KBC TV (also ranking sports third). STV (via TV Africa) devoted 9.4% of airtime to sports (also ranked third). On the other hand, KTN TV devoted only 1.2% of its airtime to sports (ranked tenth), which Nation TV gave only 0.7% of its time (not enough for the top ten there). Family TV allocated 1.2% of its airtime to sports (ranked ninth).

CONCLUSION

Experience from other countries suggest that it is indeed possible to develop a vibrant film industry in Kenya, or East Africa more generally. We in Kenya seem to be shy about pushing for greater local content -- as though this and quality are mutually contradictory by definition. They are not. What is amazing is how local content has single-mindedly been pushed -- now overtly and now covertly -- in several countries. Content is king. The potential of the film industry to boost the national economy, in terms both of forward and backward linkages, is simply too great to be ignored any longer by government. But it is an industry which will have to learn to walk on two legs.

REFERENCES

Australian Film Commission. 2002. "Services Offered by the AFC." www.afc.gov.au

Bankole Sodipo. 1998. "An Expert's View on Decree 31." The Nigeria Media Monitor of Monday 5th January 1998[This is a weekly publication of the Lagos-based Independent Journalism Centre] http://www.derechos.net/ijc/monitor/0301.html

California Technology Trade and Commerce Agency. 2002. "About California Film Commission: Incentives Offered by the California Film Commission." www.commerce.ca.gov

Commonwealth of Australia. 1999. "Australian Content in Advertising Standard, 1999."

www.aba.gov.au

Commonwealth od Australia. 999. "Broadcasting Services (Australian Content) Standard of 1999." www.aba.gov.au

Commonwealth of Australia. 2001. "Australian Content in Advertising, 2001: Compliance Report." www.aba.gov.au

Dalton, Kim. 2002. "Local Content Standard a Must for Local Production Industry." Paper Presented at a Seminar on Changing Standards for Australian Content on TV.

www.afc.gov.au/about/corpora/speeches/index.html

Geretschlaeger, Erich. 1998. Mass Media in Austria. Vienna: Federal Press Service. Vienna.

Honeyman, Russell (ed). 2001. African Film and TV. Harare: Z Promotions PVT Ltd.

Igbinedion, Joseph. 1985. "Audience Attitudes Towards Films on Nigerian Television" (pp.121- 137), in Nwuneli Onuora (ed.), Mass Communication in Nigeria: A Book of Readings. Lagos: 1st Dimension Publishers.

Meyn, Hermann. 1994. Mass media in the Federal Republic of Germany. Hamburg: Interpress Verlag GmbH.

National Broadcasting Commission (NBC). 2002 NBC News: Journal of the National Broadcasting Commission, Volume 4, No. 2, April-June 2002. www.nbc-nig.org

National Broaadcasting Commission, "Applying for a Television Licence".

www.nbc-nig.org/how-to-apply-4-licence.asp

National Centre for Cinema (CNC) - France. www.cnc.fr

Yambo, Mauri. 2003. Television Broadcasting in East Africa: Airtime Allocation to Local and Foreign Programmes, January-March 2002. Nairobi: Development Through Media (DTM).

[Paper Presented at a Meeting of Film Stakeholders and Kenya’s Minister For Information and Tourism, Nairobi, Kenya. For more information, contact: Development Through Media, 1st Floor, Four Ways Tower Moktar Daddah Street, P.O. Box 34696-00100 GPO, Nairobi, Kenya. Tel: +(254‑2) 28459/ 331414. Fax: +(254‑2) 228464. E‑mail: dtm@nbnet.co.ke .]

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[1]Development Through Media (DTM) is an audio‑visual media organisation based in Nairobi.

[2]The study itself is authored by Prof. Mauri Yambo, and titled Television
Broadcasting in East Africa: Airtime Allocation to Local and Foreign
Programmes, January-March 2002.

[3] see www.nbc-nig.org/how-to-apply-4-licence.asp

[4]Such as the Film California First Programme and the STAR (State Theatre Arts Resources) Partnership.

[5]See http://commerce.ca.gov/state/hca-navigation.jsp

[6]Note that New York boasts of a Police Movie and TV Unit which ensures security for both the crew and the general public during production.

[7] Indeed, independent local producers have had to pay exorbitant charges to have their work aired. These high fees presumably underwrite the cost of maintaining the stations' in-house staff and related operations -- even as the stations continue to buy foreign programmes.

[8]A foreign programme was defined as any programme produced by an individual or individuals, a production organization or television station based in any country other than the one under study.

Broken Light

By Mauri Yambo

These sparks!

Sprinkle, broken

Light,

Upon a hard night.

The sizzling cuts

Both ways. But,

Mostly, windward.

Dark Ness

Flickers into breaking

View. Tugs & Disco

(N)nects.

And eyes

Elongate in the wild

Shadows.

In animal viva

City.

Midnight explodes in red

And throbbing yellow and

Noise. And how,

As we disappear,

Shall we remember this

Dark Ness?

Toward a Theory of the Memetic Sphere

By Prof. Mauri Yambo

Abstract

This paper proposes a new theory, a theory of the memetic sphere; and outlines its main features, based on library research. In Dawkinsian parlance, memes are ideas, phrases and sentences with a gene-like capacity to replicate. The theory maps the chain-reaction in the form of which this replication becomes what we know as the information explosion, and attempts to show what lies beyond the explosion. No known study has highlighted the similitudes between the memetic sphere and the physical universe. The theory is summarized in an Einsteinian equation, K = nc², to highlight the fact that the memetic sphere is underpinned by certain ‘regularities,’ velocities and ‘laws’. A brief sociological narrative of the evolution of the memetic sphere is included to underscore the wide Space-Time scatter of its origins and milestones. Though the memetic sphere transcends the biosphere, its alphabet mimics the genetic alphabet – with which it shares some regularities. ‘Unlike’ the universe, it is an open system. Like it, it will be increasingly harder to navigate with ‘arithmetical’ innovations; and will have more and more hidden and unreachable ‘places’ – places to reach for.

[This is the abstract of an article published in Hekima Journal, at the University of Nairobi]

Click here for an earlier version of the paper

Yebo!

By Mauri Yambo

Am I not som-ba...?
I shall not lick no boot den.
Dere's none clea-nn-ough!

Tuareg Lass

By Mauri Yambo

Tho my eyes shall not hear,
Yet they shall follow,
Thy body's alien words.

An ancient tale we learnt
In the Congo.

Broke love has no end,
Has many bones.
Music has ten borders.

Has many porters.

Nine-Point Road Map to a More Inclusive Constitution By Jamhuri Day, 2005.

By

Prof. Mauri Yambo

[Nairobi: September 22, 2005]

INTRODUCTION: In the afternoon of September 22, 2005, UASU Nairobi Chapter hosted a panel-forum in Taifa Hall, University of Nairobi. The panel was chaired by Dr. Winnie Mitula (Chairperson of UASU Nairobi Chapter). The panellists included Prof. V. Simiyu (History), Prof. P. Wanyande (Political Science), myself (Sociology) and several others. The following nine points constituted my initial submission. This post is published purely for the record, as it has clearly been overtaken by events. Or has it, entirely?

1. Do not postpone the referendum scheduled for November 21, 2005. Instead, deal with the contentious issues and table the necessary amendments to the Wako Bill in Parliament. It can be done. It must be done.

2. Adopt the Bomas provisions for the appointment of a Prime Minister. In the interest of Multi-party and Parliamentary democracy, the PM should be “the member of the Assembly who is the leader of the of the largest political party, or coalition of parties, represented in the Assembly.” If he/she is “unable to command the confidence of the Assembly,” then the Bomas Plan B should come into force. However, if within sixty days Parliament is still unable to agree on a Prime Minister, then, instead of dissolving the Assembly at this juncture, the President should have the power to appoint a Prime Minister from among the members of Parliament who will immediately assume his/her duties and proceed to establish a “Government of National Unity” or a “Grand Coalition.” Should this effort fail in the next thirty days, then the President should dissolve Parliament and call fresh general elections.

3. In order to secure our multi-party democracy, no MP should be appointed Minister or Deputy Minister without the written consent of his/her political party; and, in any case, no MP who is not a member of the ruling or grand coalition should be appointed Minister or Deputy Minister[1].

4. Our political history suggests that if we are to secure party loyalty and discipline, strengthen the Assembly’s watchdog role and reinforce the principle of “separation of powers,”then we must entrench in the Constitution the requirement that all party coalitions be concluded and formalized in writing, and be signed by persons competent to do so and representing the respective parties in the coalition. Each party must attach to the coalition document a supporting resolution adopted by its executive body. Copies of the coalition agreement, and the supporting resolutions, must be deposited with the Speaker of the Assembly.

5. Members of the National Assembly appointed Minister or Deputy Minister should retain their seats in the Assembly, and no person who is not a member of the National Assembly should be appointed Minister or Deputy Minister.

6. A specific formula should be inserted in the constitution to entrench the principle that not less than one third of all seats in the National Assembly shall be occupied by women. The formula should establish “Supra Constituencies,” whose boundaries should coincide with those of a district or a combination of contiguous districts, as the Electoral and Boundaries Commission may determine from time to time, in such a way as to ensure that one third of all National Assembly seats shall always be available for contest by women at a general election.

7. While the President shall be both the Head of State and Head of Government, the Prime Minister shall be the Leader of Government Business both within and outside Parliament. As proposed in the Bomas draft, the President shall appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister shall nominate, and the President shall appoint, the two Deputy Prime Ministers and “not less than fifteen or more than twenty ministers and deputy ministers,”subject to approval by Parliament. Contrary to Bomas, however, Cabinet meetings shall be chaired by the President, and in his/her absence (or upon written delegation by the President) by the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister “shall co-ordinate the work of the ministries and the preparation of legislation, and is responsible to [both the President and] Parliament.”

8. Consistent with the foregoing, the President should have all the other functions stipulated in the Bomas draft.

9. Parliament must retain the power to pass a vote of no confidence in the President, the Deputy President, the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Ministers, the Ministers and Deputy Ministers.

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[1] This would entrench Section 17, subsection 5, of The National Assembly and Presidential Elections Act (CAP 7), which states that: “No person who is elected or nominated as a member of the National Assembly with the support of or as a supporter of a political party (other than the party whose candidate has been elected President [change that to read “other than a party in the ruling coalition] at an election) shall be appointed Minister [or Deputy Minister] of the Government of Kenya under section 16 of the Constitution without the concurrence of the party which supported him for election or nominated him...”

Democracy Eventually Catches Up With The Leaders

By Prof. Mauri Yambo

Kenya’s political climate in the 21st century is quite different from what it was when Jomo Kenyatta was president, and during most of Moi’s 24-year presidency. The year 2002 was a dramatic watershed. Kenya’s experience suggests that in countries steeped in years of one-man rule, the “democratic bug” – some would now call it the democratic meme (a sort of “mind virus”) – is first genuinely, and even innocently, caught by the people (the voters). Eventually, it must catch up with the leaders too – both those in power and in opposition.

Through many sacrifices, shifting coalitions and unforgettable cliff-hangers, Kenya’s democratic space has in the last decade and a half evolved to be, now, much wider, deeper and more vibrant. In the post-2002 period, it continues to evolve. But not fast enough. In particular, the democratic space within political parties remains scandalously under-evolved – and the membership under-involved!

Party governance, even among opposition parties, remains steeped in the big-man mindset of yesteryear, no matter how many position papers are developed in the name of democracy. However, 2007 may be a landmark year, certainly for opposition parties, and particularly for ODM-K. The party must somehow choose a presidential candidate in the next six months, and rally behind that choice, without tearing itself apart. Obviously, the party of the incumbent (President Kibaki), whichever party it is, will not be under the same kind of pressure in 2007. Its choice is already in State House, and will run again – unopposed by any of the GNU parties.

So what is ODM-K going to do? How, exactly, is it going to choose its presidential, parliamentary and civic candidates? In the name of democracy, the answer should be obvious – and yet there is much beating about the bush. There is much lingering suspicion among the party luminaries, though they will publicly deny it. And MPs continue to hog party organs and functions as though no one else has a voice, a mind or an iota of legitimacy.

Consistent with basic democratic principles, party rank-and-file should be involved in choosing party candidates at various levels, through direct voting during primaries in respective constituencies, and/or a graduated delegate system. Such voting may be by secret ballot or some version of queuing (mlologo). The former is preferably, though the logistics and cost of doing so may be prohibitive, even at the constituency level, for a cash-strapped party.

If the 2002 experience is anything to go by, the direct-voting route favours incumbents, or aspirants who have the ears of those at headquarters – and who offer to foot the bill. Queuing is a public spectacle whose results, in an organized environment, are there for all to see. However, it disenfranchises those who arrive after the lining- up phase is closed and the counting begins, or who must leave before it is completed. And so it has too many flaws itself to be adopted during general elections proper.

Though there has been much debate and agonizing about how ODM-K should choose its Presidential candidate, some agreement seems at last to have been arrived at. What is unsettling many observers (members of the silent majority) is that, having agreed on the version of the delegate system to adopt for nominating its presidential candidate, and how the actual voting will broadly be conducted, some ODM-K luminaries seem to be developing cold feet even before the ink dries on the paper on which their agreement was presumably penned. We are back to the notion that, somehow, a consensus among the aspirants is the best way to choose the presidential candidate. Great danger lurks in this apparent change of mind.

In the first place, a consensus cannot by definition be imposed – particularly among forces of roughly equal power or influence. Consensus implies unanimity among those involved in trying to reach it. Consequently, no consensus can be reached which does not in fact anoint the aspirant who believes, rightly or wrongly, that the delegate system would deliver him or her the nomination which the consensus might, by subterfuge, deny him or her. To threaten such a candidate with ostracism and even expulsion from the party is to threaten the very existence of the very party whose presidential candidate every luminary wants to be. As I see it, and I want to be forthright here, consensus, as it is conceived of now, is just another word for Tosha! Because of 2002, and of what has transpired in Kenyan politics since, Tosha has become a dirty five-letter word. The sooner it is abandoned the better it with be for the social capital of those associated with it.

Secondly, attempts to broker a consensus among ODM-K luminaries and those close to them – away from the ordinary members’ prying eyes – are a very loud and clear message that the leaders (at least some of them) do not trust the people, who trust them. They do not trust the people’s judgement on this matter. But why on this matter, and why now, if the people’s judgement in 2002 and 2005 continues to be the subject of so much chest-thumping? Moreover, these attempts bring to mind a discredited practice exemplified by Mayor Daley’s Chicago of the 1950s and ’60s. Senator Obama, and ODM-K’s donors such as NDI and IRI, would caution us against this practice, if we chose to consult them or heed their advice.

I believe that the delegate system will choose for ODM-K not only the right candidate but more importantly the only presidential candidate it can legitimately and democratically choose – indeed, the winning candidate. The challenge for each aspirant is to network within genuine democratic parameters such as these to put together a winning combination. Power comes from the people. We should consistently preach this and show that we mean it by practicing it. And as Mwalimu Nyerere used to say, though he did not treat his own opponents kindly (but that was another era, which must not return), “It can be done!”

To suggest that voters registered in certain regions should by definition be disqualified from the ODM-K presidential nomination process – or that their votes should be less than equal (that is, a fraction) those of their counterparts in other regions – is to tell them to take or keep their support elsewhere. You cannot win by being associated with such a view, or by forgoing such large chunks of votes! It simply does not make sense – even in the name of enlightened self-interest.

Come to think of it, that is the same kind of “Siasa mbaya, maisha mbaya” attitude, in top government circles, which has denied an equitable share of development resources and state appointments to “opposition areas” from 1963 to 2007! The widespread rejection of this attitude across the country provides the basic explanation for the equally widespread support, reported in recent months by Steadman, which ODM-K continues to enjoy.

It should be expected that the eventual ODM-K candidate will campaign in all regions of the country during the actual presidential elections, and will not surrender any votes anywhere to anyone. This, one suspects, will also be President Kibaki’s strategy for victory.

The trouble with trying too hard to tilt the democratic process in one’s favour, to ensure one’s own victory, is that one’s opponents or co-contestants – if they are not to be presumed dumb – can see through this too clearly for one’s eventual comfort. This is particularly so in arenas where the goodwill of at least some of one’s peers is a prerequisite for the looked-for victory. They may for a time be silent or muted, or even confused, about what they see, but such seeing and such machinations are a lethal combination. The combination has easily predictable consequences. For our political leaders, this is the fundamental lesson of Kenya’s general elections of 2002, and the referendum of 2005. The end does not, should not, always justify the means.

What is my prognosis? Attempts to broker a consensus will fail. For the sake of Democracy, they should not and must not succeed! Democracy will catch up with ODM-K luminaries and MPs in 2007. For goodness’ sake, the D in the party’s name stands for Democratic – without quote unquote! ODM-K will choose its presidential candidate through the delegate system, which will perhaps have been amended more than once between now and June. The losing presidential aspirants will rally fairly forcefully behind the winner – perhaps on the uncertain promise of the Prime Minister’s job.

Abandoning the party after a well-organized leadership selection exercise via the delegate system would spell doom to the political future, nationally, of those who do so. And, it seems mathematically clear to me at this point, the chosen candidate will have a better that 50-50 chance of winning the actual presidential elections in 2007. However, should ODM-K formally break up before its candidate is officially nominated, into pro-consensus and anti-consensus camps, then – from that moment of split and long before the elections are actually held – the country will know the winner of the 2007 presidential elections, and that the winner will be the incumbent, President Mwai Kibaki.

Can the country live with that? Sure. We have done so since 2003. Can the losing luminaries do so? Yes, at a terrible price. The inevitable consequence of a second Kibaki victory would be a passionate scramble for new leadership in various areas across the country, as Democracy finally catches up with the remaining diehards – reluctant democrats. Democracy should be a quality of mind inscribed in our routine practice, not merely something we occasionally preach.

Only one eventuality can radically change much of the above scenario, while still delivering victory to President Kibaki in 2007. It is the push particularly by LDP, unlikely to succeed this year, to make ODM-K strictly a party of regional parties allowing only for corporate membership and run on the basis of a coalition of “like-minded” parties. While it has become too late to choose the ODM-K flag-bearer this way this year, this scenario is entirely possible in 2012.

Nairobi: Sunday, January 28, 2007.

What's Wrong's Wrong

By Mauri Yambo

There is nothing that is ever wrong
Just because others do it to us,
But right when we do it to others.

There is nothing that is ever right
Just because we do it,
But wrong when others do it.