Showing posts with label Kisumu. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Kisumu. Show all posts

Friday, July 17, 2015

Zahara's Loliwe

[Loliwe = 'train' in Xhoza/Xhosa (that is, KiKosa, EkeKosa, DhoKosa, if you like)]

A couple of months ago I posted three tweets about Zahara's truly moving and memory-evoking song, Loliwe.


Click here to watch the Loliwe video


Certainly, the memories relived in Loliwe are not just of the South African 'condition', in the heyday and latter years of apartheid (which we others, far from Southern Africa, knew little if anything about), but also of our own distinct ontologies; we, particularly, who were Children of the Railways in East Africa -- Children of EAR -- many of whose fathers all too often took the train to elsewhere and lived like bachelors, plunging the children into deep longing. What the mothers felt was of course much beyond their children's innocent imaginations.

Let me share with you, in a partially rewritten form, the main point I wanted to make in the main tweet:

We can clearly see in Loliwe that Zahara is great as a guitarist and great as a vocalist. Loliwe is for me a silky, silky mix. It ranks Zahara among Africa's top balladeers of our time

Loliwe reignites a past that many will remember in different sorts of ways, a past interwoven with childhood itself, a childhood that's woefully incomplete without the railways -- and that's at the same time as varied as the terrains traversed by the Iron Snake for over a century now.

In some sense, it was simply, historically, our fate. Just as it was the fate across the Atlantic of those in America raised in the smoky and sentimental shadows of Chattanooga ChooChoo. It was our 'networked' fate to be the Children of the Railways.

As a mode of transport, the railways came into history only in 1825-30, in Britain. Just seventy years or so later, in 1896, the construction of Uganda Railways (later Kenya-Uganda Railways, and later still EAR) began in Mombasa, in a country 'named' Kenya, after its majestic and snow-caped mountain, which was not to become officially a British colony until 1920. The rail-head reached Nairobi in 1899-1900, and in 1901 Port Florence, now Kisumu City, farther to the west, on the shores of Nam Lolwe, the great Lake Victoria. 

My own father, still a bachelor, joined the railways in Nairobi in the decade before WWII. How he got himself there is a story in itself. I think the railways did keep him from serving in the Carrier Corps in Abyssinia or places, such as Burma, far farther to the east.

Read this History of the Kenya Railways

Yes, Loliwe evokes deep memories, but it has its critics (read this piece, for example)

I conclude this piece by sharing with you another of Zahara's songs, which I like very much as well.

Here it is ~ Ndiza



Tuesday, June 30, 2009

First Case of Swine Flu Confirmed in Kenya

[Read updates at bottom of the page]

Nairobi was abuzz last Saturday with rumours that the first case of swine flu (H1N1) had been detected or confirmed at the AAR clinic, based at Sarit Centre, which is one of the country's leadng shopping malls. The event behind the buzz was quickly dismissed by the authorities as either a "hoax", or a premature newsbreak concerning a case that in the end tested negative at the CDC-Kemri Labs, located in Nairobi's western suburbs.

Keyans seem generally to have accepted the government's explanation late last Saturday. Little did they know that that was the lull before the storm; that the government would get back to them in about 48 hours with a confirmed case -- not in Nairobi but in Kisumu City, far to the west of the country.

A 20-year old British student from the University of Nottingham College of Medicine, who, it turned out, was already in the country when the "hoax" broke -- having arrived in Nairobi on Sunday, June 21st, and having then travelled some 350 kilometers by bus to Kisumu -- ended up testing positive for swine flu last Sunday, June 28th. The government did not go public with the confirmed case until yesterday, Monday. The story hit the newspaper headlines today. Read more from:

(1) The Standard and,

(2) Daily Nation.

I do not detect any palpable panic in the general public: I was at the sarit Centre this morning. I walked some of the streets, downtown, this afternoon.

I think the Mexican experience in this matter strongly suggests that this absence of panic in Nairobi is not without reason -- or recent precedent. Perhaps, too, in a quaint sort of way, the Saturday "scare" numbed some of what might have been nerves today.

Still, it is reasonable to say that the Kenyan government has handled the case quite clumsily, since the student was a member of a visiting party from a part of the UK [East Midlands]well known to be a sort of swine flu "hot zone" right now, with at least 63 confirmed cases. The visiting party of medical students should have been quarantined (and should have themselves asked to be quarantined, on ethical grounds)as soon as they arrived at the Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (JKIA) more than a week ago.

There is another culprit here, let it be said. The British government was derelict here; it SHOULD HAVE ALERTED Kenya. Better still, it should have quarantined its own citizens before allowing them to travel to an obviously more vulnerable country -- both economically and in matters of preventive, and curative, medicine.

The British government will owe Kenyans one big one, should things get out of hand; and even now is obliged to join Kenya in a substantial way in preventing things from getting out of hand.

UPDATE:
1. July 1, 2009 story in The Standard: Click here
2. July 3, 2009: It is reported that confirmed cases of H1N1 in Kenya has risen to nine. Read: The Standard

Sunday, December 14, 2008

Independence Day

The people deserve the leaders they get, so the saying goes. Then the leaders get the respect they deserve from the people, who deserve them, or so it seems these days.

Kenya's Independence Day celebrations of 12th December 2008, the 45th since 1963, were the most chaotic ever. We prefer to call it Jamhuri Day – Republic Day – for on December 12th 1964, exactly a year after independence, Kenya became a republic – finally putting an end to the Queen of England’s constitutional role as Kenya’s residual Head of State. That same Elizabeth II who, once upon a time in Kenya, went up a tree a princess and came down a queen the very following morning! We still love her!

A DIGRESSION: Don’t get me wrong: chaos, Santayana teaches, is any order that causes confusion in our minds. The confusion is not in the order, not in the extant state of affairs, but in our minds, says he. It’s the mind that the order, ordered as the order might be, confuses. Yet Santayana does not say whose mind’s eye sees the order when our minds are, as he sees it, confused. DIGRESSION ENDS.

For the first time ever, unthinkable (funny?) but it’s true, the President could not finish his address to the nation – historically the centerpiece of the day’s events. The speech is in fact supposed to cascade throughout the country. Not only is it aired live by the electronic media, but the text is also read out, though not simultaneously, in all of Kenya’s Provinces by the Provincial Commissioners (PCs), in all the Districts by the DC’s, and in all the Divisions by the District Officers (DOs). In the Districts and Divisions, the occasion offers an opportunity to local dignitaries to address the gatherings before the President’s speech is read and the proceedings closed.

Incidentally, on this same occasion last year, near Holo, the Kisumu West DC would not let me talk, though he was aware of my presence and allowed others conected to the incumbent MP, who was himself not there. I belonged to the wrong party, I suppose; but I also thought he was trying to stay on the right side of an incumbent several aspirants were trying to dislodge. I was of course disgusted, and I could see that other people were too. I felt the kind of discust which I imagine all gagging engenders, and which the President must have felt this December 12th.

But some eight Kilometers away at Kombewa, last year, I had caught up with the on-going events at the Divisional level, and the DO, a lady, had let me speak without a fuss and even with the respect befitting a parliamentary aspirant. I was pleased and, let me confess, offered crates of soda to the 150 or so raia in attendance. Others drank too. It was a hot day, but talk about cocacolonization! I also knew that the President entertains plenty at State House on this day, after the public gathering, but he does not use his own money!

Back to this year: It is not Yambo who cannot speak at the District gathering, I was happily at my computer “on” Gandhi Wing this time, but the President who cannot complete his speech, and so continue a tradition, at the national event! It is not Yambo whom some District “arm of government” with no civic virtue stops, but the President (and I suspect the Prime Minister) whom the people give the respect they think he deserves (both deserve) these days – just about two weeks from the first anniversary of his ECK-declared ”victory”, and the latter's "defeat”!

Exactly what happened this December 12th, and why, is all over Saturday's newspapers. Let me summarize as follows: There were demonstrations and heckling in Nairobi and certain other parts of Kenya at venues where the day’s celebrations were held. The crowd was simply not its usual cheering self – something which had been noticed with less buzz at Raila’s home-coming party in the Kibera slums about two weeks ago. It had reason, reasons, to be glum. And serious security lapse was witnessed, at the VIP section of Nyayo Stadium, the venue. An un-vetted man with an agenda, a Mr. Frederick Odhiambo – a known member of Bunge la Wananchi (Parliament of the People, or The People’s Parliament) – deliberately found his way to a seat just ten meters away from the President. He did not sit quietly throughout, nor did make noise till close to the end (which is when his presence was noticed by the President’s security detail, and his unscripted noise caused a helter-skelter of action) – which is when the Nyayo Stadium show came to a sudden stop!

Let’s put it this other way: The public’s foul mood was already much in evidence when that happened. And so was the President’s. Both President Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga had already been openly heckled. The manhandling earlier in the day, in full view of the crowd, of a protesting Mong’are (aka Nyambane), one of Kenya’s most famous comedians, had not helped matters. It was all so contagious, as Christakis might have noted were he there. Still, the belated discovery of Odhiambo’s presence was the proximate catalyst for that abrupt end.

Three wedge issues were the reason for all this unbecoming turn of events on a great ceremonial day. First, the continuing shortage and escalating price of unga (maize flour) and other consumables across the country. This is partly the consequence of widespread post-election violence which the country suffered early this year, and partly the result of mafia-like scheming in certain high places broadly in the docket of the Minister for Agriculture. Talk on the street is that YK92 is regrouping at the Ministry. Lack of access to unga of course means njaa (hunger), which sections of the crowd periodically reminded the leaders of.

Second, the disquieting continuation of tax-free emoluments to Parliamentarians and other holders of constitutional offices. Third, the passage by Parliament of the much-resented Media Bill -- the Kenya Communications (Amendment ) Bill, 2008, known in certain quarters as the ICT Bill – whose effect will be, inter alia, to vigorously gag the media, and which now awaits only the President’s assent before it becomes law.

It is of course hypocritical for certain circles in ODM to declare belatedly that they will take government to court, a government in which they are coalition partners, if the President signs the Media Bill into law. Where were they when Parliament, in which they control nearly 50% of the votes, was voting in the bill? Yet that is not the only reason for the public’s gripe, and it is hypocritical to make pronouncements and act as though it is. Why have they not mobilized their voting block to get Parliamentarians to pay taxes like other law-abiding citizens? In fact, to demonstrate seriousness of purpose and unequivocal empathy with the people, ODM MPs should voluntarily ask for their pay to be taxed as they wait for Parliament to act. Anything less than that is just so much hot air.

Wednesday, May 28, 2008

On the Importance of Being Namwamba

Just three months ago, as I have exclaimed elsewhere, who would have imagined that Kenya's talking heads would be as embroiled in the Grand Opposition debate as they are? I didn't. Still, I am certainly enjoying this enthralling phase of our political evolution. Enthralling, that is, if Namwamba and his team don't betray the cause.

It's all been very dialectical. First, the general election of December 2007. Then the disputed presidential election results. Then the chaos and the blood-letting. "Den cometh Koffi, den de peace -- which only a true peacemaker bringeth." Then Kibaki and Raila negotiate an unbelievably skewed distribution of cabinet slots. Then the fallout of disappointment at Raila's performance, left alone with Kibaki. In Kisumu, that disappointment exploded a few weeks ago into what must be the first true expression of proletarian (and semi-proletarian) disenchantment with the dominant power structure in those parts! The rest, as one might say, is this unfolding -- this current -- history that we are very much a part of.

On the night Kenya's parliament elected the new speaker, my impression of Namwamba was of someone who needed to grow up a just little more. Less than three months later, he has become the symbol, the robust new face, of Kenya's never-say-die politics. In a way, he is the new Orengo (and perhaps Raila, if he can secure a solid political base).

How did things change so fast that Raila, the doyen of opposition politics, is now seen as the apologist for an established political order of which he is only tenuously a part; the defender of a status quo which seeks to concentrate political power (and then economic power) in the hands of the very wenyewe whom the Second Liberation was supposed to "drive out of town"? Whichever way it happened, it is the very reason for the rise of Namwamba and his team -- motley as it is, and flawed as some of its members are.

"We are now in government," Raila reminds the team (in an earlier day they would have been the vinyangalika) -- who must be shown and kept in their place. If they want to form a Grand Opposition, then they must resign from parliament and seek fresh mandate from the people under the banner of parties of their choice. Certainly not ODM or PNU, without which they (with the exception of Jirongo and only a fistful more) would not be in parliament now.

Since ODM and PNU are in government, he reasons, and their members cannot be both in government and opposition. That, in his view, is an irreconcilable contradiction. The cabinet even convinced itself that it had the power to veto the Grand Coalition. Veto it as what? As an insolent thought? As a piece of legislation yet to be tabled? Then ODM called a meeting at Safari Park Hotel to thrash out this apparent confusion of memes. According to reports, however, only some 40 out of 96 ODM MPs (including Namwamba and "the little Ruto") attended. There was a stalemate.

I don't know what Namwamba's career path is going to be in the years and decades to come, but right now he has a very important role to play -- a role so dramatically abandoned by Raila at potentially the moment of his greatest triumph yet. Right now, Ababu (Don't-abandon-the-cause) Namwamba is the symbol of hope for a system of governance with proper checks and balances -- a system disdainful of private interest masquerading as public interest.

The idea of the Grand Opposition is borne of necessity. With almost everybody in government now, it is something of a deception, and politically fraudulent, to insist that Namwamba and his team seek to establish what could equally be achieved by the back bench -- achieved, that is, without in the process ruffling the feathers of the mighty. In the present circumstances, clearly, the back bench would be a divide-and-rule device, a smokescreen for grand mischief. As a solution, it is highly unsatisfactory vis-a-vis the right of the people to express and realize their will, unfettered, through their elected representatives. It is indeed a corrosion and even a negation of that right. And it displays a basic and hidden fear, on the part of those who would use the parliamentary system to ascend to power, of the principle of advice-and-consent -- in the true meaning of the term -- which ought to govern all democratic discourse.

So such negations must in turn, or preemptively, be negated. It is all very dialectical, as I said. But our history is peopled by individuals who rose on the back of the people's aspirations for a good life, only to succumb to the lure of personal aggrandizement, or the fear (in the face of unrelenting intimidation and assault) of unbearable personal loss. I don't know how Namwamba will deal with such pressure, which will surely come. But let him run the good race. As long as he can, let him carry the baton -- in this race whose length, in time and space, no one can tell. Someone will surely be there when it is time to pass the baton. Namwamba's historic significance is that he was there when it needed to be passed.

And his team should take solace in the fact that those opposed to the Grand Opposition will soon ask for its support to pass in parliament whatever version of the new constitution the Grand Coalition will craft for the people's approval. The time for a quid pro quo awaits in the near distance -- near, yes, but out of view for the near-sighted who want to eat their cake and have it.

Wednesday, May 21, 2008

Mauri Yambo: Political Biosheet, 2008

In 1968, I was the elected President of the Student Union at Strathmore College. I was also the elected Secretary of Foreign Affairs, National Union of Kenya Students (NUKS). Chibule wa Tsuma was the NUKS President. As Secretary of Foreign Affairs, I visited Holland and Finland. And I led an orderly student protest in Nairobi against the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia – you should have heard how many pronounced it! Uniformed policemen closely followed us throughout, ostensibly to maintain law and order. There were more policemen than demonstrators, and they appeared to onlookers and on TV to be part of the protest!

In 1969, I was the elected NUKS President. My Vice President was Peter Anyang’-Nyongo. As NUKS President, I visited the UK and Uganda as a guest of the national students’ unions. I also started my undergraduate studies at Dar Es Salaam – though I had preferred UoN. While in Uganda, I engaged in a well-received TV debate; and attended a dinner hosted for student leaders at State House by Milton Obote and the First Lady. Other guests included Kenneth Kaunda and Idi Amin Dada. Amin sat at a table behind me, and I heard him say quite audibly at one point that he did not believe in military coups!

The NUKS Patron was T.J. Mboya, whom I met once, and whose funeral I attended on Rusinga Island in July 1969. The evening of the funeral, many sailed back to Kisumu on a vessel apparently provided by the government for the occasion. I vividly remember that one of the passengers was Jaramogi Oginga Odinga. Even as we sailed, he held court with people more prominent than I. While I caught a free train ride back to Nairobi, there to flag off a reciprocal charter flight of NUKS members for a one-month visit to the UK, Jaramogi and his entourage disembarked at Kisumu and clearly travelled to their preferred destinations.

From July 1970 to March 1972, I was a member of the Editorial Committee of TAAMULI, a Political Science Bulletin published at the University of Dar-Es-Salaam. While at Dar, I met Agostino Neto of Angola. Walter Rodney was one of our lecturers. Paulo Freire visited. So did J.M. Kariuki. And I attended several “Sunday schools” which he – and Yoweri Museveni – attended, and where we discussed deep ideological issues from a radical perspective. With my TAAMULI colleagues, were invited guests one weekday morning at Ikulu in Dar-Es-Salaam. Our host was Mwalimu Julius Nyerere himself! There were no other guests on that occasion!

I joined the University of Nairobi as Lecturer in June 1980. I was the Editor of African Journal of Sociology from May 1981 to January 1989. And from January 1991 to January 1995, I was the Kenyan Co-ordinator of the University of Nairobi-Indiana University Exchange Programme, which I and my Indiana contact co-initiated from scratch. The Department of Sociology, of which I was then Chairman, sent five Kenyans for Ph.D studies at Indiana University, Bloomington, USA. All completed their studies. There were also Exchange Visitors from Indiana.

I myself had visited Indiana University from January 18th to 30th, 1992. While there, I also gave a Guest Lecture at Lees College in Jackson, Kentucky, on January 27th, 1992. From June 12th to 30th, 1993, I was Visiting Professor at the University of Bayreuth, in Germany; and presented a paper at a Conference on “The Power of Identity – The Identity of Power.”

From 1996 to 1999, I was a member of the National Task Force for the Review of Laws Relating to Women (in Kenya). And on December 18, 1998, I was Elected by an electorate of some 170 academic staff members for a two-year term as Dean, Faculty of Arts, at the UoN. I beat three other candidates, including an “incumbent.”

As Dean, also became a member of the Senate of the University of Nairobi. More importantly, I was central to the launch of the Module II programme in the Faculty of Arts. I was re-elected for the second and final term as Dean in 2001. By 2002, when my term ended, our Faculty’s Module II programme had grown to be the third largest by revenue at the university – from zero to over 100,000,000/- annually! I am proud that Module II under my stewardship doubled the average take-home pay of all the Faculty’s lecturers – and thereby significantly improved their quality of life, which for long had been in “ICU”.

I took the early-retirement option and left the UoN in 2002 to vie for the Kisumu Rural parliamentary seat in that year’s General Elections. I was runner-up. I returned to the university. I tried gain in 2007, and was again runner-up, having been rigged out by ODM headquarters at the nomination stage, and having had to secure nomination in an alternative party. I am back at the University of Nairobi. On another occasion, I will write to show how dirty the ODM nomination exercise was, and to describe the extensive rigging machinery that ODM operated in Kisumu Rural for the Parliamentary and Presidential elections of December 2007. For the time being, here is one media account of the rigging that took place in Kisumu Rural; and one broader observation on the 2007 elections as a whole.

I have undertaken research and consultancies on key issues in Kenya’s development. Here is a sample of titles highlighting my area of specialization (Industrial Sociology), and my broader interest in development: (a) “Poverty Eradication and Employment Creation in Kenya: Conceptual Challenges, Policy Articulation and Plan Targets”; (b) Gerrishon K. Ikiara, Mauri Yambo and Gerda Merckx, An Integrated Policy Approach to Youth employment in Kenya (Addis Ababa: ILO/JASPA); (c) Training Needs Assessment of the Kenyan Informal Sector (Nairobi: KIE, KREP, KIM and MTTAT); (d) "Demand-Supply Linkages for Scientific and Technical Skills in Kenya: Constraints, Opportunities and Discontinuities" in a book edited by Denise Weiner and titled The Role of Scientific and Engineering Societies in Development (Washington, D.C.: American Association for the Advancement of Science); (e) Kirimi Mwarania, Eddah Gachukia, Mauri Yambo and John Alwar (Eds.), Children and Women in Kenya: A Situation Analysis 1992 (Nairobi: GoK and UNICEF); (f) Technical Training and Work Experience in Kenya: A national Tracer Study of the Leavers of Harambee Institutes of Technology and Youth Polytechnics (Nairobi: DANIDA).

I will soon publish a book of poems titled Field of Aaru. The book’s title is taken from that of the main poem in the collection, which revisits the post-election violence which gripped Kenya following the general elections of 27th December 2007. My “narrative” ends with the departure from Kenya of that great peacemaker, Koffi Annan, in February 2008.

Tuesday, May 13, 2008

The Price of Liberty in Kenya: Grand Coalition versus Grand Opposition

The overwhelming majority of Kenyans agreed, it seems to me, that a Grand Coalition Government was necessary on two purely pragmatic grounds. First, it was the only sure way to prevent the country from falling apart in an orgy of violence following last December's general elections. Second, it was not really possible to determine which candidate had actually won the Presidential race -- much as ODM had claimed, using its own inconclusive and even flawed evidence, that Raila had won without question. And yet, it was clear to nearly everyone, Kibaki and PNU had stolen the Presidential vote -- with a lot of help from Kivuitu and others at ECK.

What was not in dispute was that ODM was the single largest party in the new parliament. Its leader was Raila Amolo Odinga. So when Koffi Annan eventually brokered a compromise at the end of last February, it was clear that power-sharing would have to be spearheaded by Kibaki and Raila. Since Kibaki was not going to give up the President's seat -- being, inter alia, the incumbent -- and nobody, not even Raila, had the wherewithall or wits to ease him out, the only viable option was to create the Executive Prime Minister's seat for Raila, and to work out a formula for equal power-sharing at the cabinet and other levels (in particular, at the level of Assistant Ministers, Permanent Secretaries, Ambassadors and High Commissioners, and top positions in the parastatals). Surrogates were to negotiate details of the deal, with the two principals having the final say regarding issues on which the negotiators failed to agree. Eventually, there was no real agreement between the negotiating teams, and the two principals decided to take the bull by the horn at Sagana.

The size and composition of the cabinet, and the apportioning of ministries between PNU and ODM, as agreed at Sagana, clearly signalled to most Kenyans that ODM had been seriously, if not cynically, short-changed. Kibaki, long dismissed as indecisive and incapable of standing toe-to-toe with Raila (Agwambo), had not only outwitted Raila but also proved to be a savvier negotiator. In the process, he had exposed to the wider public a character flaw in Raila which some close observers of Raila's public life have for some time now quietly worried and/or grumbled about -- not without a large dose of despair and even exasperation.

The flaw is, simply, that when left alone with "the other side," he is more likely than not to end up siding/agreeing with that side -- to his side's chagrin. Some observers believe that they have figured him out even more finely, arguing that what drives Raila is not any malice toward any friend or ally -- but purely and simply self-interest (regardless of the consequences).

Raila argues that the power-sharing was more than numerically equitable, if you look at it all with a fine tooth-comb. But no one believes him. Not even his thousands of fanatical, long suffering, followers in Kisumu City and its environs -- as the events of last Saturday suggest. He argues, moreover, that the ministries that he negotiated with Kibaki for ODM were fairly distributed among the ODM fraternity. But no one believes that either -- with the possible exception of the actual beneficiaries of that rather skewed distribution. There is considerable disquiet about that skewness in Rift Valley and Nyanza, and even parts of Western Province -- all bedrock of ODM support. And there is exasperation that he did not get the ministries of foreign affairs and finance.

Now, as I see it, it is this disquiet that is driving the call for a Grand Opposition in parliament -- to be underpinned by an act of parliament for additional political cover. And Raila is, of course, vehemently opposed to the idea. Is there any merit -- is there a compelling reason -- for the Grand Opposition?

In principle, Raila is right. There should be no grounds whatsoever for members of a party, elected to parliament under its banner, to technically decamp to another grouping of whatever kind -- for this has the very real potential of taking away, extra-democratically, their party's legitimately won parliamentary/legislative power. Parliamentary majority represents any party's understanding of the very basis of parliamentary/legislative power in a multi-party democracy. It is what drives all inter-party contests during and between general elections. It is why party discipline is taken so seriously. A party's parliamentary voting block is its only armament.

Proponents of a legislated Grand Opposition, on the other hand, argue that they are driven by an equally, if not loftier, principle: keeping the country from sliding back into a de facto one-party state. That is, creating a circuit-breaker against those who might be tempted to revive the Moi-era type of dictatorship. They imagine that only a Grand Opposition can resonate with the public as the people's voice, quite distinct from the government's voice. Moreover, only such a legislated Grand Opposition would qualify as an official opposition -- and an official opposition is provided for in the constitution. In their view, the Grand Coalition violates this important constitutional provision.

Yet it can equally or more persuasively be argued that what gives potency to the call for a Grand Coalition is a set of very pragmatic considerations -- not quite considerations of principle. One, ODM is controlled by a hard-core of self-centred individuals who, unless kept constantly on their toes, will simply use party and governmental structures to favour themselves and reward their cronies, while using party discipline to put rebellious backbenchers themselves on a short leash. The backbenchers seek to avoid the danger of being "whipped" at will to support all programmes and motions, even of questionable value, tabled in parliament by their colleagues "in government". They do not want to be denied by the party hierarchy the opportunity to participate meaningfully in setting parliament's agenda and running its committees. They do not want to be compelled to look the other way when bad governance rears its head.

Two, ODM backbenchers, in particular, have seen how dismally their "principal" performed during his final negotiations with Kibaki for cabinet and Permanent Secretary slots. They are bound to wonder how many more skewed deals between the President and the Prime Minister they can endure in silence till the next general elections. More specifically, they fear that the government agenda for the next five years will be PNU-driven, at the expense of broad-based ODM interests. They fear, moreover, that the Prime Minister does not see the danger, given his poor one-on-one negotiating skills. They can point to how the IDP issue is being handled as another clear evidence of this. In their view, it has been mandled hurriedly, one-sidedly, without due regard to history, and with Raila's acquiescence.

Since the 1980s, Raila has cultivated the political persona of a fearless, unstoppable representative of the people's will -- and a fearsome adversary with a fanatical power-base. The political brand he has created is next to none in Kenya and the region. He has rightfully earned the nickname Agwambo. So it was in amazement that the massive rally in Kisumu last Saturday, and the millions who tuned to their TVs or radio, heard him characterize ODM's entry into the Coalition Government as a surrender. "He who surrenders lives to fight another day," he argued. It might have been a slip of the tongue. The saying is,correctly, "He who retreats lives to..." He seemed to have realized the misspeak, as he immediately added the Maoist phrase "Two steps forward, one step backward" -- which captures the notion of inexorable forward-motion, despite short-term reverses. But what the audience heard was "surrender!" The live audience did not seem to like much of what he had to say that day, and was very loud about it -- and that must be a worry.

In Kisumu, and at Bondo, he was particularly worked up about the idea of a Grand Opposition. He argued that it was unnecessary and intended to undermine the government -- of which ODM was now, belatedly to be sure, a part. He asked its proponents, whom he labelled frustrated self-seekers, to resign and seek a fresh mandate from the voters.

But the proponents are already accusing him and others opposed to the move(such as ODM-K's Kalonzo Musyoka) of "dictatorial and draconian" tendencies, and of personalizing the issue. They insist that they will carry on, and will not resign their parliamentary seats. It is not known, however, wnat would happen to the Grand Opposition if its proponents -- particularly Isaac Ruto, Ababu Namwamba and Julius Kones -- were to be offered Assistant Minister positions tomorrow; or if they were to be thrown out of their political parties, forcing them to stand for re-election.

Having written the bulk of the foregoing yesterday, I now read in today's (Wednesday's) local daily that the Speaker of the National Assembly, Mr. Kenneth Marende, yesterday threw a spanner in the works. He announced that backbench MPs were free to form a Grand Opposition without having to stand for re-election. There was, indeed, as he pointed out, a provision for an opposition in parliament, although parliament could expunge the provision if it deemed it detrimental. Clearly, however, expunging it would require the concurrence of the 85 or so MPs who already support the Grand Opposition, and whose support would be required to deliver the new constitution promised by ODM by April 2009.

On largely pragmatic grounds, I think the Grand Coalition is a good idea whose time has suddenly, surprisingly, emphatically, come. It is an idea which was hardly conceivable even two months ago. It is intended to undermine the Prime Minister. Rather, it underscores the old adage that the price of liberty is eternal vigilance. The Prime Minister should support it for the good of the country, and for his own good. Do I think that we will have a new constitution by April 2009? We may have a new constitution, but not the kind of comprehensive constitution which ODM has been promising. Far from it, given the twists and turns we have witnessed since January 2008.

Sunday, February 04, 2007

The Burden of Dependence: A Household Survey of Unemployed Dependents in Selected Urban and Rural Areas in Kenya

By Mauri Yambo

[This material first written in March-July 1994. Some editorial work done in February 2007]


I. INTRODUCTION

I.1. Background

In Welfare States, the cost of maintaining the unemployed is shared by all the taxpayers – in other words, by the society as a whole. In a country like Kenya, however, the burden must be borne by the "host" family – largely the individual's close relatives. Most of what has been written about the dynamics of maintaining the unemployed in Welfare States (see, for example, Wilensky and Lebeaux, 1965; Levitan, 1980) has adopted a macro focus; in other words, a focus on the state and civic levels of assistance – and how the individual responds to these. While such a focus correctly reflects the patterns of maintenance in Welfare States, it is not a very fruitful kind of approach to adopt when dealing with issues related to the welfare of the unemployed in a country such as Kenya.

I.2. Problem Statement

Available literature on unemployment in this country has tended to highlight the consequences of unemployment for two polar extremes – the individual and the society as a whole (see, for example, ILO, 1972; Republic of Kenya, 1983, 1986: 7-9). A very crucial middle, the host household, has been paid much less attention than it deserves – both in theory and in policy prescriptions. Consequently, the impression one gets from the literature is that next to or even more than the unemployed individual, it is the society as a whole that bears most of the direct burden of adult dependence that arises from unemployment. Strictly speaking, however, the direct costs of dependence are borne by the host households, as Kenya is not a welfare state.

The concept of "dependent" is usually associated with minors and other persons who are culturally, physically or by statute inhibited from engaging in independent means of livelihood. Being thus unable to support themselves, their welfare is taken to be the natural responsibility of the parents or "guardians." Their dependence reflects a culturally defined or accepted natural order of things.

However, the school leaver or adult who becomes a dependent by reason of unemployment does not represent – as a preschool child or primary school pupil does, for example – a stage in the human life cycle through which we must all inevitably pass. Those who do maintain unemployed, able-bodied adults or school leavers may not quite see that role as an extension of the norm that minors must be maintained by their parents or guardians. Alternatively, they may see the role as reflecting nothing more than a temporary obligation, the cultural acceptance of which may no longer be as unambiguous as it once might have been. Unless they are severely handicapped, adults of working age are sooner than later expected, and expect, to support themselves. Failure to do so inevitably creates tensions between the dependent and at least some members of the hose household (see for example, Kileff, 1975: 93).

As far as one can determine, no previous study in Kenya has paid any extended attention to the specific problems of unemployed dependents as they relate to their hosts or to their wider milieux.[1] Similarly, no study in Kenya has examined in any depth the economic and microsocial impact of such dependence on host households. Indeed, in the context of the household, little attempt has been made to address the question posed by ILO (1972:69) fifteen years ago: "But what in fact do we know about what actually happens to young people who, when they leave school, do not immediately obtain further education or wage-earning work in the formal sector?"

Granted, the ILO made an attempt to answer its own question, but this was as sketchy as it was theoretical. Hardly a substitute for a detailed, empirically grounded analysis, but a useful pointer to the kinds of factors to look out for in a more in-depth study. For example the ILO (1972: 69-72); see also Paterson, 1980: 13-17; Rempel and Lobdell, 1985: 1920) pointed out that the unemployed or underemployed individual:

is almost certainly bound to rely upon his family and thus to take his place in a family network which will provide him with his livelihood and a base from which to look for a way of satisfying his long-term needs. Thus he will often not be unemployed, but he may be severely frustrated in being unable to obtain the sort of work he wants. The family will also make demands upon his time, initiative and energy - for example, to help with planting and weeding, or to assist a family member who is more profitably employed. Those looking for formal opportunities stay at the homes of those who already have formal employment (usually in the towns) utilizing any contacts they may have but at the same time, often acting as part-time servants.

However, neither the ILO (1972) nor Paterson (1980) nor Rempel and Lobdell (1985) made any attempt to measure the relative magnitudes of the various pressures or demands on the unemployed. Nor were the consequences of the burden of hosting the unemployed examined from the perspective of the host households.

I.3. Objectives

The study had one broad objective: To help fill the still considerable gap in our knowledge concerning the contribution of host households to the maintenance of the unemployed, the social consequences of dependence on the unemployed, and the ways in which the unemployed incorporate their dependence into their overall job-search strategies.

More specifically, the study sought:

1. To show in some detail the socio-economic characteristics of unemployed dependents and the households which host them, in selected urban and rural areas of Kenya; and propose ways in which such knowledge can be harnessed to minimize or overcome dependence on those households. The crude characteristics which may have in the past been suggested by first impressions are no substitute for the kind of systematized presentation proposed here.

2. To give a detailed account of costs which host households incur when they support unemployed dependents. The costs to be assessed are not only monetary in nature - in other words, related to household income - but also socio-psychological. In the latter category of "costs" will be included the objectively measured and/or subjectively perceived consequences of adult dependence in terms of the three broad household objectives discussed by Rempel and Lobdell (1985:5-6). In other words, in terms of household well-being in general.

3. To examine the problems or constraints which unemployed dependents encounter as dependents, and in the course of looking for wage employment or other income-earning opportunities; problems/constraints which arise from or perpetuate their status as unemployed dependents. In this connection, their job-seeking behaviour, and skill-profiles, will be critically examined.

4. On the demand side, to examine pertinent secondary data as a means of identifying the conditions or opportunities which might be exploited to ensure a more rapid expansion of wage and self-employment for specified categories of unemployed dependents in specified areas of Kenya.

I.4. Scope and Limitations

Though unemployed dependents were the focus of this study, they were looked at in the context of their host households. It is not possible to examine the burden of dependence without this approach. As a minimum, the unemployed dependent was treated as a de facto member of the household which maintained him/her until one form or another of employment was secured, if at all.

Unemployed dependents in three urban areas (Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu) and two rural districts (Kakamega and Nyeri) in Kenya were interviewed. Since the three towns and two rural districts were purposively selected, the findings of the study are restricted to the study areas. No attempt is made to generalize the findings beyond the said areas. However, useful findings concerning the study areas are by definition likely to have inferential implications for a significant portion of the dependence landscape in the country as a whole.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

This brief review serves four main purposes. First, it draws from the literature on household composition, crowding and well-being in general such theoretical and conceptual insights as are salient to the study of unemployed dependents and household welfare in Kenya. It also assesses the adequacy or comprehensiveness of the currently available data in terms of those theoretical and conceptual elements. Second, it highlights the main lines of thinking in the available literature on employment and unemployment in Kenya, particularly in terms of the sources of unemployment and strategies for rapid employment creation.

The dearth of detailed discussion of unemployed dependents in the literature is underscored. This part of the review also sets the stage for a more detailed treatment of objectives 3 and 4 in the final report of the proposed study. Third, it examines the extent to which the data bases already existing in the country can be utilized to further the objectives of this study. Fourth, it generates hypotheses to be tested using the primary data to be collected during field work.

II.1. On Household Composition, Income and Well-Being

The introduction of one or more individuals into the daily life of a household inevitably has, as a minimum, consequences for the pattern of interaction within the built environment the household claims as its preserve. Rempel and Lobdell (1985:5) have correctly argued that:


Household behaviour and objectives are inextricably linked to the size and demographic composition of the household. Both change over time as individuals age and as households experience births, deaths and migration.


Births, deaths and migration are key determinants of household composition. Births add to household membership, deaths subtract from it. So does migration, if it is defined narrowly as out-migration.

As far as the proposed study is concerned, rural-urban migration is of greater interest than births and deaths. If rural-urban migration reduces, albeit "temporarily," the memberships of affected rural households, it has the effect of increasing the memberships of the specific urban households that provide shelter to the new arrivals. As Southall and Gutkind (1957: 132; see also, Paterson, 1980: 17; Rempel and Todaro, 1972: 215; Rempel and Lobdell, 1985:19-20) have observed," relatives use those living in the town as their first contacts in the process of settling down to an urban existence."

There is considerable disagreement on the exact impact of migration on household composition. Southall and Gutkind reported that male siblings were more likely than female ones to be found living with older brothers in town. They noted, moreover, that "Not many women come to town without family contacts" (Southall and Gutkind, 1957:133). Rempel and Lobdell (1985: 19-20), writing nearly thirty years later, supported their observations when they noted that rural-urban migrants are usually young, unmarried and male; and, further, that "out-migration is more likely to be considered an option....if the village already has established a `beachhead' elsewhere" (Rempel and Lobdell, 1985:20). What is not certain, however, is whether Rempel and Lobdell based their comment on updated data or were merely recycling Rempel's findings of roughly fifteen years ago.

In her study of Ghanaian workers, Peil (1972: 163) found that while "very few migrants to towns have their own room from the start," the process of securing accommodation may not be as straightforward as suggested by Southall and Gutkind (1957:132) or Rempel and Lobdell (1985:20). She noted that (Peil, 1972: 163-164):

Nearly two-fifths of the rural migrans had to find accommodation for themselves from the start. A few....were in housing supplied by their employer. Space is not always found with the closest relative. There were cases of men with siblings or a parent in town who stayed with a more distant relative, possibly because the former was already overcrowded. Friends and institutions provided nearly a third of the accommodation....Institutional accommodation include schools and barracks, the help of the local tribal head and masters to whom the young men were apprenticed. Quite a few migrants stayed with strangers met casually on the street or fellow townsmen who were unknown but to whom the migrant had been referred.

Peil's observations seem to reflect some of the patterns which casual observation suggests have been emerging in Kenya in recent years. Similarly, casual observation suggests that rural-urban migration is no longer as male-dominated as it once was. Indeed, a recent study found that youth polytechnic-trained females have the same propensity to reside in urban areas as their male counterparts (Yambo, 1986:147-149). Who the females live with while in urban areas was not looked into, however. In order to determine how closely the empirical situation in Kenya at the present time reflects the observations made by Peil (1972), Southall and Gutkind (1957) and Rempel and Lobdell (1985), the relationship between the unemployed dependent and the host will be examined in some detail in this study. Similarly, other relevant background characteristics of respondents will be recorded. This should enable us to determine the frequency with which particular types of relationships between dependent and host occur within the overall sample.

Hosting unemployed or other adult dependents does not seem to be confined to the lower socio-economic strata. Kileff (1975:93) found that it was common practice even in exclusive black neighbourhoods in pre-independence Harare, in Zimbabwe, to do so. As he put it (Kileff, (1975:93):

All the families have or have had relatives living with them. In some cases it is a grandparent or a sibling. Other times it is nieces or nephews.... One family has educated the husband's nephew through secondary school. He is still living with them and many people think he is their own son. An extreme case is that of a woman who said that the biggest problem in her life occurred when four of her husband's relatives came to live with them.

Whether or not Harare's black elite also accommodated adult dependents not related to them is not clear from Kileff's account. Nor did Kileff give the percentages of households accommodating specified categories of dependents (This is a common weakness of the studies reviewed here).

Boswell (1975:150) went even further. He argued that elite households in Lusaka, Zambia, were more likely to have visitors and non-nuclear relatives than other households. His explanation for this was that the elite he studied "had a total of four or five rooms at their disposal, .... [and so] could more easily house.... visitors than the [nonelities] who had only one room and a small kitchen space" (Boswell, 1975: 150; see also Lillydahl, 1976:109). The inference from this is that the amount of built space occupied by the household is another important determinant of household composition.

However, Boswell's reasoning is not quite corroborated by what Grillo (1973:42) found among railway workers in Kampala, Uganda. He found that 42.6 percent of his sample of non-elite households reported having a friend or relative staying in the house. What is more, "over 20% of the households contained more than seven persons" (Grillo, 1973:40). In other words, some sections of the non-elite community had a significantly higher household density than the average of 5.6 persons reported for Lusaka's elite residential area of New Kamwala (Boswell, 1975: 151). In reality, then, the number of rooms a household has at its disposal may not have an unambiguous impact on household composition. To resolve the debate as far as our sample urban areas are concerned, we will test the hypothesis that the number of rooms a household possesses is positively related to the number of persons within the household.

In testing this and other hypotheses, two points noted by Grillo (1973:42) must be observed, however. First, he noted that there was a tendency among the railway workers to spread out their post-puberty sons around several households at night. This was done in deference to the norm that a son "should not share the same roof as his father" (Grillo, 1973:42). The household densities he reported were therefore lower than they appeared. However, even after we reduce these household densities in proportion to the "sleeping time" spent by the sons in other households, the average density is likely to remain as high as reported by Boswell, if not higher. The second and more important point is that the railway workers studied by Grillo tended to play host to any given guest for a relatively short period - "between three to six months" (Grillo, 1973:42). This "high turnover" means that "in the course of a year a household may have several different guests passing through, and most households have at least one" (Grillo, 1973:42). This high turnover rate must be incorporated into any assessment of household crowding, or of the overall burden of dependents on the household.

It is commonly argued that the more mouths a society or, by implication, a family has to feed, the greater the difficulty it encounters in attempting to provide adequately for its basic and other needs (see, for example, Lillydahl 1976:159; Republic of Kenya, 1983:38, ILO, 1972:124-126). In other words, the larger the size of the household, the lower its quality of life, generally speaking. The implication of his is that a certain unknown percentage of households which host unemployed dependents may be doing so only at the expense of the quality of their family life, or of their core household objectives (for a discussion of three core household objectives see Rempel and Lobdell, 1985:5-6).

However, in her own study of household saving patterns in urban Kenya, Lillydahl (1976:159) found that "saving is not differentially affected by additional children after the second child." This suggests that households are able to maintain their target levels of savings/surplus - other words, to achieve one of the core household objectives suggested by Rempel and Lobdell - regardless of household size. If that is so, is there something else that the household sacrifices? Lillydahl (1976:160) argued that:


Although there is considerable variance in the number of adults per household, household saving is invariant to adult demands on consumption suggesting that adults finance their added consumption either by scale economies or by added income, or at the expense of the quality of the average household consumption.


If it is true, as Lillydahl suggested, that there are three possible ways of "financing" increased consumption, one still has the task of determining the relative significance of the three "strategies" for specified household categories. Lillydahl did not address herself to that question. In the course of the literature review, no study focusing on Kenya that did so was found.

It can be argued, however, that while the additional income "strategy" is plausible for parents faced with the prospect of an additional child - an additional parental responsibility which by its nature is long-term - it is not really a viable option for a household which may not know when or for how long it will next have to play host to a non-nuclear relative or other "temporary" dependent. This is particularly so if it turns out, as Grillo (1973:42) suggested, that most "guests" stay for only three to six months. It would appear equally obvious that even if they wanted to, most households are not able to maintain such "guests" by means of their savings for more than a few weeks (Lillydahl's finding suggest that few households would see that as the most rational way of utilizing their limited savings). Similarly, for most households, scale economies are likely to be exhausted after the second child or so. Consequently, it is hypothesized in this proposal that additional adults can be maintained only at the expense of the quality of material consumption within the household. In testing the hypothesis, one would of course have to determine the extent to which the additional adult actually participates in material consumption within the household. As Gutkind (1968:387) pointed out, not all of the unemployed are entirely dependent on their hosts. Some are able to maintain "remarkable measure of independence" by being involved in occasional jobs (Gutkind, 1968:387).

Household well-being is not measured entirely in terms of the level of consumption of tangible goods, or of the quality of goods consumed. It is also a function, inter alia, of the quality of household interaction and the amount of space - in terms of such measures as persons per room - within which the interaction occurs.

The quality of interaction is in turn a function of the numbers and categories of actors involved. In other words, the level of crowding is an important variable in any consideration of household well-being. As Gove, Hughes and Galle (1979:59; see also Baldassare, 1981:110) have argued:


relationships in the home are enduring and play a very important role in determining the well-being and behaviour of the individual... Disruption of these relationships due to overcrowding is thus apt to have serious repercussions.


However, recent empirical research abroad on the consequences of crowding within the household has left unresolved the question of whether or not household crowding has significant effect on household well-being. Booth and Edwards (1976) arrived at the conclusion that household crowding did not have significant effect on family relations. On the other hand, Gove, Hughes and Galle (1979) found that household crowding was strongly related to poor mental health, poor family relations and poor child care. Furthermore, Gove and Hughes (1980:865-869) dismissed the findings of Booth and Edwards (1976) on grounds of serious methodological errors. In a subsequent study, Edwards, Booth and Edwards (1982:254 - 255) found that while the type of dwelling a family lived in had modest effects on family relationships, these effects were independent of the level of crowding within the dwelling. In other words, the study reaffirmed the finding by Booth and Edwards (1976) that crowding had no significant effect on family relations.

Baldassare took the debate several steps further. First, he argued that "some individuals and households can adjust to high density while others have special problems with this situation "(Baldassare, 1981:110). Second, he suggested that "the social characteristics of households or their inhabitants may create either unique difficulties or opportunities for adjusting to high density" (Baldassare, 1981:110). Third, he argued that "the ability to control household space and its uses "has a direct bearing on one's ability to adjust to high density - and on "the expressed degree of satisfaction by household members" (Baldassare, 1981:110 and 116). That is to say, the level of adjustment and satisfaction varied positively with the level of power wielded within the household. In the context of the proposed study, this suggests that we should expect the adult dependent living in a crowded household to manifest a lower level of adjustment or a higher level of dissatisfaction than the head or co-head (wife) of the household. However, Kileff's (1975:93) study of Harare (then called Salisbury) yielded evidence suggesting that in the African context married women may be prone to even lower levels of adjustment or higher levels of dissatisfaction when non-nuclear relatives from the husband's side contribute to crowding in the household. The hypothesis that household crowding more negatively affects the household co-head than the unemployed dependent will be tested in terms of the level of adjustment or dissatisfaction.

Just as Berger and Luckmann (1967:47-183) argued that we apprehend society in two ways, objectively and subjectively; so have Gove, Hughes and Galle (1979:62 and 64-66) argued that household crowding has an objective as well as a mediating subjective dimension. The notions of "well-being" and "quality of life" are equally value-loaded, much as we strive to attach objective indicators to them. In view of this, it is important to incorporate in the proposed study the subjective aspects and/or repercussions of adult dependence, household crowding and household well-being. This subjective dimension was lacking in the otherwise useful studies by Lillydahl (1976:109) and Boswell (1975:150), for instance. A focus on the subjective dimension generates questions such as: Do perceptions of household crowding tally with objective measures of household density? Are the elite psychologically better conditioned to accommodated unemployed dependents than non-elites? These questions will be addressed.

The foregoing review underscores the fact that while there is a lot in the literature reviewed that pertains to Kenya, very little attempt has been made hitherto to relate the actual empirical situation in Kenya to the richness of the theoretical issues only briefly touched upon above.

II.2 On Unemployment and Employment Creation

There is an ever growing body of literature on the unemployment problem in Kenya (see, for example, Ghai, 1970; ILO, 1972; Kinyanjui, 1974; Republic of Kenya, 1983, 1986). In all this literature, however, there is very little that touches upon or alludes to the problem of unemployed dependents, as we have already seen. The essence of the argument in the literature is as follows (see Yambo, 1986:3): Increasing unemployment among school leavers is seen mainly as a consequence either of the largely theoretical or "academic" education which the youth get in school, or the youth's consequent preference for white-collar jobs (Republic of Kenya, 1983:50; see also Gutkind, 1968:388).

The educational system is singled out as the main factor engendering both tendencies, as it has not paid adequate attention to "practical skills" in its curricula. Alternatively, it is accused of failure to peg its output to the level of identified demand for specified skills. All this has resulted in (a) imbalance at various levels between the types and quantity of skills produced and those actually demanded; and, (b) a paradox of "acute shortage of manpower and massive unemployment" (Republic of Kenya, 1983:48-49).

One solution that has been proposed is an expanded system of technical and vocational training in the country (Republic of Kenya, 1976:91-99; and 1981a:39-48). However, the need to temper such expansion with "a coherent policy on manpower planning, development and utilization" (Republic of Kenya, 1983:49, see also Yambo, 1985) has been underscored. Indeed, a recent study found that the system technical training already in place in the country has a capacity and comprehensiveness which approximate current and likely demand for the respective skills (Yambo, 1986:196-198). More importantly, the study found that 17.8 percent of Youth Polytechnic leavers and 9.4 percent of Harambee Institute of Technology leavers were unemployed at the time of interview (Yambo, 1986:116). In other words, technical training alone cannot solve the unemployment problem. The real challenge now is how to expand the demand for an increasingly sophisticated labour.

Before we turn to strategies for employment creation, let us look at some of the unemployment figures. According to the latest national development plan, the level of unemployment in Kenya stood at 10.5 percent of the total labour force in 1981, compared to 7.1 percent in 1976. In 1984, the level of unemployment was estimated to be 13.1 percent of the labour force (see Republic of Kenya, 1986:8). In other words, unemployment affected an increasing number of Kenyans between 1976 and 1984. During most of that period-that is to say, 1976 to 1981 - employment grew at an average rate of 3 percent per year (Republic of Kenya, 1983b:6), well below the annual population growth rate.

Government planners have noted that the number of unemployed Kenyans is likely to grow in the years ahead. Thus (see Republic of Kenya, 1986:7):


Even if the economy created jobs at 3.4 percent a year from 1984 to 2000 which would be a small improvement over the decade from 1972 to 1982, the unemployment rate would increase substantially.


In order for the employment growth rate to keep just ahead of population growth rate, it would have to grow at about 4.2 percent per annum on average. However, Government planners note that such a growth rate "would be unprecedented in Kenya's history" (Republic of Kenya, 1986:8).

According to the 1968-69 urban household budget survey (see ILO, 1972:56), unemployment among dependent adult male members of surveyed households (in other words, among non-head males) in the urban areas covered in this study was as follows: Nairobi, 15.2 percent; Mombasa, 20.0 percent; and Kisumu, 11.7 percent. Similarly, the percentage of females whose work was confined to household duties was as follows: Nairobi, 77.5 percent among married women and 50.0 percent among unmarried ones; Mombasa, 85.1 percent among married women and 67.2 percent among unmarried ones; and Kisumu, 86.1 percent among married women and 50.4 percent among unmarried women. In gender terms, the data suggest that though dependence among males was significant, adult dependence is primarily female dependence.

The dependence rates cited are compounded by the fact that in each of the three urban areas, a percentage of household heads was also unemployed: 4.2 percent in Nairobi, 9.8 percent in Mombasa and 4.0 percent in Kisumu (ILO, 1972:56). No follow-up studies to update and expand on the findings of the 1968-69 survey were discovered in the course of the library search for literature. However, the impression one gets is of a continuing high level of dependence in the three urban areas. It is not known to what extent urban households with unemployed heads maintained other unemployed adults. Theory suggests that there should be a zero or near-zero incidence of such households, unless the affected households have other or substitute breadwinners. Information on this point will be sought in the proposed study.

Let us now go back to the question of demand for labour. As Ghai (1970:10-16) pointed out, a number of measures have been undertaken to directly or indirectly reduce unemployment in post-colonial Kenya. During the first decade or so after independence, there were five main measures to that effect. First, Tripartite Agreements involving the government, employers and Trade Unions whereby public and private sector employers agreed to recruit 10 percent more workers. Second, unemployment relief through road construction projects. Third, settlement schemes to re-settle the landless. Fourth, Kenyanization of commerce, industry – and, one may add, the civil service. Fifth, technical and vocational training through the National Youth Service, Youth Polytechnics, technical schools and similar institutions.

The Tripartite Agreements and road construction projects turned out to have only a short-term impact on unemployment; and the latter proved too costly as well, and had to be abandoned (Ghai, 1970:10). The settlement schemes were "by far the greatest contribution to the relief of unemployment.... By the middle of 1968, some 45,000 families had been settled under various types of schemes" (Ghai, 1970:10). However, the "settlement scheme" option has since lost virtually all steam, as land has become increasingly scarce. Similarly, the goal of Kenyanization, having been practically fully achieved, is no longer a viable measure. Technical training as a solution to unemployment, to which attention was only beginning to turn at the end of the sixties, was virtually elevated to the level of the panacea in the public mind in the first half of the Eighties. However, the limitations of technical training per se as the solution to unemployment are now increasingly appreciated.

For the first half of the Seventies, Ghai recommended four ways of generating employment. First, "higher rates of output growth" (Ghai, 1970:12). Second, the formulation of an effective income policy to prevent both "rapidly rising wages" and a widening of the gap between rural and urban real incomes. He argued that rapidly rising wages encourage labour saving in general; and a widening rural-urban income gap exacerbates urban unemployment through increased rural-urban migration (Ghai, 1970: 12). Fourth, as a prerequisite for all the rest, a concerted effort "to control population growth" (Ghai, 1970:16).

Clearly, the four measures he suggested have by no means been overtaken by events in the Nineties. The achievement of higher rates of output remains as central to government plans as it was then. Yet the actual results have varied from year to year, due to internal and external factors. His recommendation concerning wage and population growth rates remains controversial. The former has not been pursued with any great vigour. Indeed, Unionists who otherwise champion the cause of labour intensive production would appear more inclined to oppose than support measures to prevent rapid wage increases. Family planning programmes, rather than population control per se, have been considerably intensified in the last few years. The suggestion that we pay particular attention to rural development was at least implicitly been taken up in the Eighties via the District Focus for Rural Development. How effective the District Focus has been as a strategy for generating employment in specified rural areas has not yet been determined, however.

Three additional generators of employment have recently received considerable attention - though the concept they embody are not all that new. They are: the export -led of economic growth (Republic of Kenya, 1986:96-98), the Jua Kali/informal sector (Republic of Kenya, 1986:54-58), massive government expenditure on such programmes as rural electrification and large scale housing construction programmes (Kasina, 1987: B23-B25).

II.3. On Existing Data Bases

A survey of data bases in the country suggests that none contains the full range of data on adult dependants which are required in a study such as this. For instance, there is no database with current information on the distribution of households with unemployed dependants by income group, household size or geographical location.

The most comprehensive database in terms of the objectives of the study is the national population census. For the 1969 census year, information levels of household members, as well as on their house hold heads. The rural or urban areas of residence of all enumerated persons was also recorded. (Republic of Kenya, 1971a:80-82; 1971b:50). For the 1979 census year, the respondents' relationship to their respective household heads were explored in somewhat greater detail (Republic of Kenya, 1981b:19). The sex, age and educational levels of all enumerated persons were once again recorded. It is worth noting, however, that though the 1969 and 1979 censuses treated the household as the unit of analysis, it is not certain that the actual unit of analysis . The tables given in Republic of Kenya (1971b :80-82; and 19781b: 50-52) suggest that the individual was effective unit of analysis.

Another important source of national level data, it would appear, is the urban household survey apparently carried out in the very early seventies. It is upon this data base that Lillydahl (1976:115) relied for her thesis, which we have already made reference to. No further details concerning , for example, the urban areas covered in the survey are available as at time of writing. Indeed no clear reference to the survey has been identified in any of the other sources consulted. The urban food purchasing survey of 1977 (see Republic of Kenya and FAO, 1977) which closely approximates the urban household survey mentioned by Lillydahl, was conducted after Lillydahl's thesis had been written, Mysteriously, Republic of Kenya and FAO make no mention of the urban household survey. It is probably the case though the survey was carried out, it has never been officially released.

One would have expected the most recent Integrated Rural Surveys carried our in 1976-1979 to be major source of data pertaining to our sample. However, a look at the modular questionnaires used (Republic of Kenya, 1981c.33-40) shows that the surveys were not geared to generate data on unemployment dependants.

The foregoing brief survey illustrates the fact that besides the national census data, the full analysis of which is yet to be published, one must go back to the 1963 survey of income, expenditure and consumption of Nairobi's middle income Africans for secondary data with close parallels to the proposed study (see Republic of Kenya, 1964 34-37). The survey relates respondents income and household size to their relationship to the other household members. The focus is on middle income Africans - not unemployed dependents. However, the composition of the respondent' households given in considerable detail. Still, neither the census nor the census nor the survey data a substitute for the data needs of the proposed study. Our research objectives, the hypotheses isolated for testing, demand the collection of more focused more up to data. However, where possible or necessary, and more up to data in secondary source will be made.

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[The concept for this study was the brainchild of W. Khagula, who in the early nineties was trying to launch, in the end unsuccessfully, a Kenya Workers’ Relief Association (KWRA). He was the CEO. I wrote the proposal, including all of the foregoing, and directed the data collection phase, following funding from Ford Foundation. Preliminary findings were made and reported to the Donor; but time and funds ran out, and KWRA had its


[1] A postgraduate student is about to launch such a study in Nairobi, for her M.A. thesis.