Showing posts with label Shares. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Shares. Show all posts

Tuesday, July 02, 2019

UNASHIG: Procedure for Claiming the Refund of an Insurance Premium Prepayment


Subject to terms and conditions specified hereunder, Unashig will proceed to instruct the bank to refund a prepaid Insurance Premium of a specified amount as soon as we receive a signed and dated letter from a Member stating a specific amount. Refunds are allowed only before the relevant cover takes effect for the Member.

The letterhead should show the Member's full postal address and phone number, and should be addressed to Unashig Kenya PLC, P.O. Box 2000-00100, Nairobi. Any approved payment will be made through bank-to-bank transfer (that is, RTGS or SWIFT). Consequently, the body of the letter should include the following bank details from you (the Member):
1) Your Account Name
2) Your Account Number
3) Your Bank and Bank Branch
4) Your Bank's Swift Code
5) The physical address of your place of residence [LR.No, House Number, Residential Estate, Nearest Road, and Town/County]. Note that this is a requirement in the RTGS or Swift form which Unashig must submit to the bank for each payment.
6) The Bank Transfer and/or M-Pesa transaction code(s), amount(s) and date(s) related to the sum(s) claimed. This requirement is important for verification and audit purposes, and is crucial to resolving disputes between claimants and those who might have actually remitted the claimed sums.

You don’t have to send your letter through the Post Office. It is easier for you to send it as an email attachment to unashig.kenya@gmail.com. We will receive it faster that way, as well. A copy of your letter will be attached to our written instruction to the bank to refund the cash directly into your own bank account.

Concerning claims for any other payments to Unashig, you are advised that the following items are non-refundable:
-- Unashig Membership Application Fee
-- Insurance Processing Fee [Remember that receiving the deposits and managing the bank account entails one-off and recurrent bank charges as well as administrative costs]
-- Purchase of Class A Share
-- Purchase of Class B shares.

The cost incurred in purchasing one or more Unashig shares is non-refundable.Share ownership is a form of property or asset ownership. A Member remains a shareholder even after exiting any particular Health Insurance Scheme, or any other venture, which Unashig may spearhead or or offer. However, even though shares once bought cannot simply be returned to the issuing company (Unashig Kenya PLC) for a refund, the Unashig Board is duty-bound to create or enter into an agreement with an over-the-counter exchange or do any such other thing as will facilitate the purchase and/or sale of, or trade in, Unashig Kenya PLC shares. The company is not quite ready to do so just yet, in view of its infancy. Still, this will hopefully happen at some point after the first AGM.


UPDATE:
Members are further advised that, following a Unashig Board Decision in July 2019, it will take 30 working days to process and refund any sum claimed. There is also a service charge for processing the refund. This charge is the sum of the actual bank levy on the amount remitted AND 2% of the gross amount to be remitted. This 2% is meant to cover Unashig's internal (i.e. management) costs incurred in processing the claim, and includes the logistics of reaching the 3 mandatory signatories required for each refund AND the physically delivery of the requisite instructions to the Bank.

Friday, December 28, 2018

Unashig: Quantitative Update on "The Road to Enhanced Health Insurance"

[This Quantitative Update was first posted here on December 28, 2018 at 12:39 AM. See the Log of Subsequent Updates at the bottom of the page]


1) By mid-2017, 570 UoN academics under the umbrella of Unashig had filled forms signaling the wish (or intention) to participate in a group-funded Enhanced Health Insurance scheme to be brokered with NHIF. The number was subsequently sent to and used by NHIF to compute the average premiums and related benefits and limits applicable to sets of scenarios proposed by Unashig's Board of Directors. It was always understood by both parties, however, that the number actually paying for cover might be noticeably lower than 570. Gross membership size (or nominal roll) has gradually grown since, and now (February 19th 2019) stands at 655; but net membership is down to 548. This reduced number takes into account several deaths which have since occurred, exits from the group (for one reason or another, including the acquisition of broadly similar cover through the spouses' employers) and corrections for the initial double-counting of married couples who had separately applied to join. Out of the net membership of 548 there are 202 women, who represent 36.9% of the total. A total of 170 members have more recently declared a readiness to pay the annual premium as a lump sum. A lump sum requirement, as opposed to various installment payment options, was stated in writing by NHIF only several months ago. NHIF also insisted that members must pay their premiums through their organization -- Unashig. In our drive to launch the scheme as soon as we could, Unashig proceeded to set a new target of 400 (+/- 50) members for the first year of cover. However, concerned by the slow pace of premium subscriptions, and in response to calls by those who had already paid the premium into the Unashig holding account at the bank, the Unashig Board in January 2019 set a deadline of February 28th, 2019 for the payment of the required premium of KES 66,000 per family-size of M+3 or less -- and agreed on a minimum of 100 fully subscribed members for the purpose. The plan was to approach NHIF at the end of February with the much reduced number in order to get the insurance scheme finally started in March 2019. The driving idea was to negotiate the best possible package of benefits in the context of a significantly reduced number of fully paid up members.

2) Comparing actual registration-by-payment with the minimum target of 100, we note the following patterns and shortfalls since Unashig opened two bank accounts for the purpose in November 2018:
a) A total of 229 persons have to-date paid the required membership application fee, compared to 221 at the last reported count on February 6th 2019.
b) One hundred and two members have now paid the set annual premium either in full (95 Members) or in significant part (7 Members). This is a slow but significant increase over the 70 members who had either paid in full (58) or in part (12) as of February 6th, 2019.
c) One hundred and twenty one Members (121) have fully paid the insurance processing fee, compared with 84 on February 6th. It is to be presumed that most, if not all, intend to participate in the group cover by paying the full premium.
d) One hundred and twenty three (123) past and present UoN academics -- compared to 105 on February 6th -- have each bought the one Class A share permitted in Unashig's Memorandum of Association. We take this as an even more definitive affirmation of their intention to stay involved in Unashig's flagship initiative -- the Enhanced Health Insurance scheme -- which was set in motion in March 2017. Class A shares confer voting rights within Unashig.
e) One hundred and three (103) Full and Associate Members have now paid for a total of 259 Class B shares, compared to 82 shareholders who held 205 Class B shares on February 6th. That's more than twice the number of Class A shares so far bought. However, Class B shares average at only 2.52 per holder. While this apparent appetite for Class B shares suggests a robust alignment with Unashig's two-pronged Health+Wealth strategy, the numbers involved in the purchases do not yet constitute a critical mass of enthusiasm. This is particularly so given that the number of authorized Class B shares stands at 6,000. Much persuading remains to be done.
f) A total of KES 6,576,500/- has so far been raised as Enhanced Health Insurance premium from 95 Members (paying in full), 7 Members making significant part payments (ranging from KES 30,000 to KES 46,000/-), and a few others paying even less. This total is to be compared with a gross of KES 5,621,500/- collected as of February 6th, and 4,120,000/- as of January 4th.
g) Unashig's drive to own quoted shares traded on the Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE) has so far (February 19th) built up a kitty valued at KES 765,000/-. As of February 6th, a total of KES 662,500/- (comprising KES 210,000/- and KES 452,500/-, respectively) had been raised from Class A and Class B share subscriptions). This compared favourably with a sum of KES 500,000/- which had been raised by December 28, 2018. We're working to push the total to KES 1,000,000/- as soon as we can. Our first investments, in Safaricom PLC and Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE) shares, amounted to just under KES 330,000/-. We subsequently invested in six additional securities, namely: Equity Bank, Home Afrika, Kenya Reinsurance Corporation, Nation Media Group, Stanlib Fahari I-REIT, and Williamson Tea. The underlying goal is, inter alia, to rapidly grow Unashig's portfolio and in the process own a growing piece of Kenya's "growth engine". Another set of purchases is due in the coming days. There will be more Blue Chip and other investments as members continue to support the drive through Class A and B share purchases.




Update Log ~ This post was updated on: December 29, 2018: 12:25 AM, 12:39 AM; December 31: 11:40 PM; January 1, 2019: 7:59 PM; January 4: 10:20 AM, 2:53 PM, 11:55 PM; February 6: 11:06 PM; February 19: 12:32 AM.

Wednesday, August 25, 2010

The Risk of Online Share Trading

Online share trading poses many risks to the investors, particularly on platforms with non-existent or rudimentary security systems. One suspects thatthere are plenty around in Kenya and elsewhere in Africa.

Occasionally "testing the system" in order to ensure security is not sufficient to give 'bankable' assurance, and so does not give comfort to the savvy investor. From the start, Online Share Trading services are typically fully covered, through carefully worded disclaimers in small-print, against litigation by their client-investors who may be hit by fraudsters. No one will fully compensate the investor who loses assets through online fraud undetected in time by otherwise aggressive service providers.

One way to eliminate this risk is to stay out of online trading completely. Another, for the more tech savvy operating in vulnerable/hackable environments, would be for service providers to offer the opportunity to buy, but not to sell, shares online. Who would want to buy shares for me, secretly? There is no palpable danger there. But a byzantine underworld of hackers may easily plot and remotely execute fraudulent "sell" orders using stolen email and share-account passwords, accompanied by illegal and lightning (and irrecoverable) transfers of funds out of investors' accounts.

It seems to me that the safest sell orders will always require long paper-trails.

Friday, May 29, 2009

Directors' Shareholding at Cooperative Bank of Kenya: A Stink to High Heaven

Like other Kenyans, I am proud of our country's cooperative movement, which is a shining example around the world. And I am proud of the Cooperative Bank of Kenya (CBK), a state institution which had its IPO only last December. Before the IPO, only cooperative societies had a real chance of buying CBK shares in bulk. For retail investors, there was one over-the-counter route to obtaining CBK shares, for a good number of years. This was what is now Suntra Investment Bank, which is presently weakened by scandal of huge proportions.

I have just had a look at CBK's Annual Report and Accounts for 2008, which has just been released. I am talking in particular of pages 144 to 146, which, thanks to an aspect of Kenya's corporate law, obliges the bank and other publicly quoted companies to show the distribution of shares among the bank's top 10 shareholders, the bank's own Directors, and different categories of the bank's shareholders. If you peruse those pages too, you will, as I do, smell a rat that stinks to high heaven.

CBK has a total of 3,492,369,900 issued shares, and a total of 116,068 shareholders. That averages at 30,088 shares per shareholder, regardless of category. More importantly, Kenyan individual shareholders own 939,112,300 shares, and there are 112,774 of them. This averages at only 8,327 shares per Kenyan individual shareholder. Alas, among CBK'S seventeen Directors (who own a total of 138,995,700 shares), the average is a staggering 8,176,217 shares (that's more than 981 times the number owned by the average Kenyan investor).

In fact, if you compute the average for Kenyan individual investors without including the shares held by the Directors: the total number of shares held by Kenyan individuals (non-directors) drops to 800,116,600 shares, and the average among the 112,757 of them drops to 7,095 shares per individual (which is 1,152 times less than the average for the Directors).

We can look at the directors' allocations to themselves in even starker light, as follows:
1. The Managing Director owned, as at the end of December 2008, a total of 68,121,000 shares.
2. The Chairman of the Board owned 8,000,000 shares
3.The Vice Chairman owned 7,700,000 shares
4. The Company Secretary owned 5,090,000 shares
5. The Commissioner of Cooperatives owned 2,750,000 shares
6. Five other Directors also owned just over 5 million shares each
7. Three other Directors owned exactly 5,000,000 shares each
8. One Director owned 2,750,000 shares
9. One Director owned 2,310,000 shares, and another owned 2,300,000 shares
10. The "poorest Director", representing the Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Finance, owned what you may call a "token" of 1,000,000 shares! [Currently each share sells at around KES 6.50, or US$0.083]

The circumstances under which these stupendous amounts were allocated and paid for require a forensic investigation. The Directors should step aside while this happens, for, clearly, there has been no transparency here. Previous annual reports of the company may suggest where these shares came from over the years. For at least a couple of years after the bomb blast, annual reports showed significant amounts of issued shares, without explanation as to who was receiving them. The public has reason to need to know now. At the SACCOs, and at the bank's registry, officials did not seem to ever know that additional shares were being made available each year for purchase by members. What Suntra did over the counter, as far as one knew, was to match retail buyers and retail sellers who had owned their shares for some time, perhaps even since before the bomb blast, which nearly reduced the bank to a rubble, in August 1998.

The shares previously held by individual cooperative societies, amounting to 64.56% of the total, were (wisely in my view) grouped together, just before the IPO, under a corporate entity called Co-opholdings Co-operative Society Ltd. This ensured, and still does, control of the bank by the country's cooperative movement. However, the then acting Minister for Finance, John Michuki, issued a strange edict prior to the IPO which keeps secret for some five years or so the identities of the societies (and perhaps other "entities") brought together under that corporate entity. Let us hope that there are not even more rats under cover there. Five years may be too long to find out the truth!

Monday, March 23, 2009

The Kisumu Molasses Company

Today's dailies report that Raila Odinga, Kenya's PM, has pledged that members of the public who contributed shares to the molasses plant (close to twenty years ago!), will be allocated shares "once we are listed in the stock exchange." My guess is that listing will not take place any time soon; certainly not before the 2012 General Elections (I don't think Uhuru Kenyatta, who as Finance Minister has a say, will countenance that), and probably not before 2017 (or even 2020, or even 2030). So, if there was any cheering at the Tom Mboya Labour College where the announcement was made, who's kidding whom?

The bigger question, though, is this: What makes Raila Odinga think he's the one to decide when -- or, as has clearly been the case to-date, if -- co-shareholders of the molasses plant are to be allowed into the company, to share in the olemo with the Odinga family?

On page 20 of the busiess section of Daily Nation of March 23, 2009, Raila himself reveals that: "Locals contributed Sh 1.7 billion and a developer (Spectre International) brought $15 million (Sh 1.2 billion). This enabled the moribund plant to get on its feet." Does that not give "locals" a controlling 58.62% of the company? Instead of the Odinga family, shouldn't they, and those who set up the company prior to its becoming moribund, be calling the shots?

A pertinent point here is this: The Luo have no royal family, and never had! Just imagine what Kikuyus would have thought of James Mwangi if he had adopted the same selfish attitude with respect to the founding shareholders of what is now the giant Equity Bank -- in which I myself have a very few shares!

Yes, we can blame past governments for Nyanza's backwardness; but the condenscending attitude displayed by Raila over the weekend is very much part of the reason Nyanza continues to stagnate and whine in despondency. In effect, the buck stops with him. Increasingly, the electorate is restless in the face of this perpetuity -- which is worse in many ways than the impunity everyone is talking about these days. This is impunity squared; and the joke is in the absence of detail and credibility.

The only silver lining I see in the pronouncement is that the intense pressure on the Odinga family by grass-roots Luo is finally having some effect. But promises will not do; nor will passing the buck to the usual "bogeymen".

And then there is the historic injustice personified by the Luo Thrift Union. When will that be addressed? This was no Mbi-I-Kamiti, nor Nyakinyua, nor those many group land-buying companies that Central Province is so well known for.

If you ask me, the share allocation at Kisumu Molasses Company should have been effected at least a decade ago. In fact, subscribers should as a matter of course already know how many shares they have, and should already be co-beneficiaries of any dividend distribution so far authorized and made. They should not be treated like other retail investors who might wish to scramble for "peanut" share allocations during a promissory IPO which may not come in the lifetime of many in the rapidly aging and permanently deprived "cheering crowd" of Nyanza.

The time to allocate the shares is now, long before the 2012 election frenzy; and this does not require NSE listing. This should be the kind of gonywa Nyanza electors should be shouting about. The time to get serious is now. The people want to concentrate on development. It is the politicians who will not put politics aside. The people are not perpetually running for president, it is Raila who is -- clearly not satisfied with being Prime Minister. Perhaps we should bite the bullet and keep the "Premiership" out of the constitution. Out, out, kabisa. It does not seem to be doing anyone any "real good" (power-wise), least of all Raila.

Sunday, January 21, 2007

Stanbic Bank Uganda IPO, and the Lessons to be Learnt From It

By Mauri Yambo

Stanbic Bank Uganda has announced the results of its recent IPO, which ran from Friday, November 24th to Friday, December 22nd 2006. The IPO was part of the larger move by the bank to list all of its 5,118,866,970 issued shares on the Main Investment Market Segment of the Uganda Securities Exchange (USE) in Kampala.

A total of 37,449 investors applied for the equivalent of 3 billion shares. However, only 1,023,773,394 shares, representing 20% of the issued share capital, were involved in the IPO. These were offered at 70 Uganda Shillings (UShs) per share, the equivalent of Kenya Shillings (KShs) 2.85 or 4 US cents. The IPO thus attracted a 200% over-subscription. Out of the 37,449 applicants, there were 15,488 Ugandan individuals and 407 Ugandan institutions. There were, in addition, 20,091 non-Ugandan individual investors and 1,463 non-Ugandan institutions.

The prospectus had indicated that the objective of the Stanbic listing was, broadly, “the economic empowerment of the Ugandan public,” and more specifically the promotion of “share ownership particularly among the people of Uganda.” Preference was clearly going to be given to individual Ugandan investors. Not surprisingly, each Ugandan individual (some 15,452 individuals in total) who had applied for up to 2,150,000 shares has been allotted all the shares applied for. The remaining 36 individuals, who had applied for more, have also be allotted 2,150,000 shares each.

The other three categories of investors have been lumped together and each applicant has been allotted the shares applied for, up to a maximum of 109,500 shares. It seems that employees of Stanbic Bank Uganda have been treated along the same lines, even though the prospectus had reserved for them 1% of the offered shares – some 51,118,670 shares in all.

While Ugandan individuals bid for shares worth UShs 41.1 billion, non-Ugandan individuals applied for shares worth UShs 56.1 billion. And while Ugandan institutions applied for shares valued at UShs 30.7 billion, their non-Ugandan counterparts applied for shares worth a total of UShs 82.3 billion.

The allotment formula has ensured that the 10% shareholding which the Ugandan government was disposing of through the IPO has shifted into the hands of individual Ugandans. That did not happen by chance but by government design; but was ultimately made possible by the fact that enough individual Ugandans applied for the requisite number of shares. Thus, only the 10% offered by the Standard Bank Group of South Africa has been allowed to pass into the hands of the other three categories of applicants, including Ugandan institutions.

It is a distinct possibility that Ugandan institutions would have been used to keep “within Uganda” any portion of the 10% offloaded by the government which individuals might have failed to mop up. As it turned out, however, their participation has kept even more of the entire 20% on offer within Uganda – at least for now. Secondary market dynamics might significantly change this initial picture, and should not be interfered with by any authority. In any case, such interference cannot go on for long with impunity.

Available evidence suggests that most individual investors in Kenya had applied for between 1,000 and 10,000 shares. This means that each will receive all the shares applied for. For the first time since the KenGen IPO last year, there will be no refund cheque for such investors to queue for. They will still have to queue, though – for their share certificates. It is not clear how many Kenyan individuals applied for 109,500 shares or more, but the number is probably significantly greater than the 36 reported for Uganda. One suspects that most individual Ugandan applicants were also in the category of 1,000 to 10,000 shares. However, the next such offer might witness many hitherto small but determined investors bidding for up to a 30,000- to 50,000-share ceiling. This is how the East African securities market is going to grow – one interesting step at a time.

Stanbic Bank Uganda is refunding some UShs 140bn – the equivalent of KShs 5.7bn or US$ 81.5 million – to big institutional and individual applicants within and outside Uganda. That refund happens to be larger than the amount which the Kenyan government has just received from its disposal of 91,999,220 shares in Mumias Sugar Company, at KShs 49.50 per share. A large chunk of the Stanbic refund most likely is on its way back to Kenya, there to await the next IPO or to be endorsed to investment banks and brokers for the purchase of more Stanbic shares when Stanbic’s admission to the Official List of the USE takes effect on Thursday, 25th January, 2007 – the very same date when secondary market trading in the shares is scheduled to commences at the USE.

Those shares are likely to be trading at UShs 210 (KShs 9/-) or higher within a few days or weeks. And if that happens, at least 36 individual Ugandans will be “instantly” richer by US$ 184,550. But the other investors will not be doing badly themselves – in terms of their initial investments, if not relatively speaking.

A number of lessons will be learnt from, or reinforced by, the Stanbic IPO, which (incidentally inspired by the KenGen IPO) has emphatically set a new regional standard for offloading state-owned assets to the investing public. This is a standard very likely to be replicated in future Ugandan and Tanzanian IPOs – perhaps even more stringently in Tanzania.

The first lesson is that while the rich do get richer, the poor and the not so rich can also get richer! They can be visibly enabled to grow their own liquid assets even from very humble beginnings, and to be materially better off. When the ship sets sail, they can be on the ship – not forlornly waving at the water’s edge. Consequently, it must be government policy that the benefits of price discovery at the stock market quite deliberately accrue to individual investors in general – and to the small investor in particular and in full. Governments should not be in the business of making companies rich at the expense of the people. In large IPOs, therefore, an allocation formula which reserves a portion to institutional or big investors and thus necessitates refunds to small investors should be classified as an intentional economic crime.

Second, and related to the first, state-owned assets being disposed of through IPOs should in the first instance be offered to individual citizens. This does not lock out other investors. They should be at liberty to buy the shares when post-IPO trading begins at the stock exchange; and thus to be active, but not the only, participants in price discovery. In any case, IPOs are hardly large enough to satisfy the volume needs of institutional investors, and yet are small enough for them collectively, if permitted, to lock out small investors – long-term! This is true considering that while small investors do not typically hold on to their shares for long – unrelenting pressures on the household economy do not allow them to do so – large and institutional investors do!

Third, private sector firms should nevertheless have a free hand in designing their IPOs in order to protect their interests. Clearly, however, common sense must prevail here – as has happened in the Stanbic IPO, and in the Scangroup, Equity and Eveready IPOs before that. The interests of their various stakeholders, and the stock market as a whole, must also be taken into account.

Fourth, the book-building approach, successfully resisted by public opinion during the KenGen IPO, should never be allowed.

Fifth, in stock-market investing, there are many rules-of-thumb we should know, but these five are worth stating here: (a) the early bird catches the worm, (b) the long-term investor tends to recoup his/her short-term losses or costs, and to thrive, (c) your gains are in proportion to the risks you are willing and able to take, (d) the long-term security of investments comes not from owning shares in one or two companies, however solid, but in wide diversification; that is, in building a progressively larger portfolio, and (e) treat your portfolio with the same care and attention as the ardent pastoralist treats his or her livestock, and you will realize the same compounding effect.

Sixth, while we say, “THREE CHEERS TO UGANDA!”, it has not escaped attention that the biggest beneficiaries of IPOs continue to be the initial shareholders who remain with the largest chunk of a company after small investors and others have made it possible to discover its true value per share. In the Stanbic case, the IPO involved only 20% of all issued shares; but the market value of the other 80% will now be known, though it remains squarely in the hands of Stanbic Africa Holdings Limited, a subsidiary of Standard Bank Group based in South Africa. From this angle, the 20% offer looks pretty miserly – even usurious. Future IPOs should be placed at the 30% to 40% range.

Finally, the ordinary Kenyan investor in Stanbic will now have to learn to track his/her investment not simply in terms of market price, trading volume and P/E but also in terms of the foreign exchange implications of investing abroad. In a globalizing world, this is an aspect of learning that will come none-too-soon, and will be of great benefit in the long run. Indeed, Ugandan and Tanzanian investors, not to mention Somalis and Ethiopians and perhaps Rwandese and Congolese, already involved in the Nairobi Stock Exchange are generally farther up the learning curve than Kenyans in this respect. However, catching up should not be hard to do for Kenyans at home – who have hitherto been more insular.