ABSTRACT*
The main objective of this paper is to study the extent to which the goals of employment creation and poverty eradication have been achieved in Kenya. A conceptual framework is proposed, which suggests that there is an underlying logical chain of action which programme designers do or should follow, and which observers should track. It is problem-oriented and binary in character. Its starting point is the basic development problems common to the SDD (Social Dimensions of Development) and SED (Small Enterprise Development) programmes, and to successive National Development Plans and related Sessional Papers. These problems are, specifically: Poverty and Unemployment.
The latest development plan shows that about eleven million Kenyans live in absolute poverty in 1997, mostly in rural areas. Some 53% of female-headed households are poor, and female-headed households represent 30% of all households in the country. UNDP's 1997 Human Development Report ranks Kenya 32nd among 78 developing countries in terms of the new Human Poverty Index (HPI), and 134th among 175 developed and developing countries in terms of the older Human Development Index (HDI). Some 26.1% of Kenyans suffer from "human poverty". In contrast, 50% of Kenyans suffered income poverty in 1989-94, earning less than $1 (PPP$) per day. In terms of the national poverty line, however, the number of Kenyans in poverty was 37% of the total during that period.
Kenya's 1997 HPI ranking suggests that income poverty is a greater problem for Kenyans than "human poverty". This is still a matter of concern, for it is likely that households will not long preserve gains made against "human poverty" if their income poverty persists. The centrality of employment in assured poverty reduction thus needs to be re-emphasized, particularly where inroads against "human poverty" are increasingly being made.
It is argued here that there is at present a deficit of 260,000 employment opportunities in Kenya per year. An Employment Parity Plan is proposed for the period 1999 to 2009, at the end of which there will be a parity between new employment opportunities and new labour market entrants each year. This plan also features in a set of 18 national targets which are specified to address the problems of poverty and unemployment. Indicated as well are the resources required to realize most targets, and a method for determining the required resource levels for the rest is suggested. Finally, ways of obtaining the required resources are suggested.
CLICK HERE TO READ THE WHOLE PAPER
*Note: This paper, written in 1997, is a condensed version of a paper I wrote in the same year.
Showing posts with label Income. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Income. Show all posts
Tuesday, June 07, 2016
POVERTY ERADICATION AND EMPLOYMENT CREATION IN KENYA: Conceptual Challenges, Policy Articulation and Plan Targets
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Thursday, September 05, 2013
So Living in an Area with a Large Middle Class Boosts a Poor Child's Prospects of Rising to Middle Class Status?
In a celebrated US study of income mobility, economist Raj Chetty and three colleagues have found that location -- the area or city in which one lives -- is highly correlated with one's social mobility chances. More specifically, living in a predominantly middle class area boosts a poor child's chances for intergenerational mobility into middle class status. Conversely, policy measures aimed directly at growing the middle class today have the consequence of giving an upward mobility push to children now living in poverty or the lower class.
Whether a location has the 'nourishment' which directly confer middle class status to the next generation, or is instead merely the reflection and 'effect' of middle class living, remains an unresolved question -- but one which does not hold back the enthusiasm patently displayed by Chetty and his colleagues. The full study is not readily available online, as far as I can see, but you will find a useful summary and equally valuable links here>>>
Whether a location has the 'nourishment' which directly confer middle class status to the next generation, or is instead merely the reflection and 'effect' of middle class living, remains an unresolved question -- but one which does not hold back the enthusiasm patently displayed by Chetty and his colleagues. The full study is not readily available online, as far as I can see, but you will find a useful summary and equally valuable links here>>>
Thursday, June 26, 2008
TRAINING AND PRODUCTION IN KENYA'S HARAMBEE INSTITUTES OF TECHNOLOGY
By Mauri Yambo
[NOTE: This paper was presented at a Seminar on Education with Production in Kenya, which was held at Silver Springs Hotel, Nairobi, on November 24-25, 1988. The paper’s full title, then, was “TRAINING AND PRODUCTION IN HARAMBEE INSTITUTES OF TECHNOLOGY: Discussant’s Comments on Chapter 5 of the Sifuna and Shiundu Report.” It is reproduced verbatim below for the record only. While the HIT wave has long since passed, the conceptual and policy issues touched on here remain “live” to-day, some twenty years on -- as I see it]
I. INTRODUCTION
My comments are very brief and, deliberately, provocative. Brief because chapter 5 of the “state-of-the-art” review under discussion captures the core elements of the controversy surrounding the principle of training with production as it has evolved in Kenya. Provocative because – and I would like to say this as emphatically as I can – I see no reason to remain ambivalent about the employment implications for ex-trainees of the production units which have been established within Harambee Institutes of Technology (HIT).
I have chosen to concentrate my attention on this ambivalence (see examples of it on pages 106-107 of the review) as resolving/dissolving it is central to rationalizing practical, hands-on training within the institutes while at the same time maximizing self-employment opportunities in the catchment areas of the respective institutes. As I see it, the weight of the evidence already adduced empirically and logically in the available literature points clearly to the untenability of the view that production units are beneficial to the ex-trainees or the local communities. In other words, their opportunity costs far outweigh their benefits to the said target groups. Let me demonstrate this point by way of nine propositions.
II. NINE PROPOSITIONS IN SUPPORT OF AN ARGUMENT
PROPOSITION 1: The main beneficiaries of the production units are not the ones presumed – trainees, leavers and the local community – but rather the institutions themselves, their managements and, as Sifuna and Shiundu reveal (see page 105 of the review), the “outsiders” who hold shares in some of the production units. Contrary to the general impression one is given, the existence of these production units has not made any HIT financially self-sufficient to-date. There is still the old clamouring for community and donor funding.
PROPOSITION 2: The primary purpose of a training institution is to help trainees to acquire or enhance particular skills, not to make money or act as employer of the first resort to people it was supposed to deliver to the larger labour market.
PROPOSITION 3: By deliberately engaging in income earning activities in the local area, a HIT in effect competes with its own leavers, and enjoys undue advantage over them in that competition.
PROPOSITION 4: Production units set up mainly as revenue earners – that is to say, units “whose main goal is production” (page 89) – are by definition the negation of the principle of “training with production” or “production through training.”
PROPOSITION 5: No contract so far entered into by any HIT could not have successfully been completed by individual HIT leavers or groups/companies of leavers – if given the same opportunity. It is self-serving for HIT administrators to justify their monopoly of the larger contracts on the grounds that these are beyond the capabilities of individual leavers. Indeed, by monopolizing the larger contracts, HIT only retard the growth of a technically-oriented, indigenous, rural entrepreneurship.
PROPOSITION 6: If one takes into account the number of self-employment opportunities “denied” by the involvement of HIT in local contracts, one finds no proof that HIT have contributed to “increasing employment opportunities for rural people,” as claimed on page 107.
PROPOSITION 7: Extensive HIT involvement in contract work in time exacerbates migration to urban areas by – and even unemployment among – HIT leavers from respective local areas. One point is certain, no HIT has the capability to employ all the trainees it turns out, given current enrollment rates.
PROPOSITION 8: A less problematic way to generate revenue to meet development and recurrent expenses in HIT is to rationalize the fee structure, so that it more closely approximates the actual cost of providing training. This can be supplemented with periodic Harambees in which artisans and others gainfully engaged in the respective local areas can be expected to participate fully. The institutes can also benefit by opening up to more than just school leavers.
PROPOSITION 9: In order to give trainees the necessary practical experience, it is sufficient to set up what Sifuna and Shiundu (page 89) refer to as “production through training” programmes. The primary objective in such programmes must be to train, not sell products.
III. CONCLUSION
I conclude by re-stating the point I made at the beginning. There is no reason to remain ambivalent about the negative employment consequences of production units. Failure to address the issue forcefully at this time will only help entrench the mistaken view that production units are a savior to the HIT network, and a creditable source of employment for the leavers.
[NOTE: This paper was presented at a Seminar on Education with Production in Kenya, which was held at Silver Springs Hotel, Nairobi, on November 24-25, 1988. The paper’s full title, then, was “TRAINING AND PRODUCTION IN HARAMBEE INSTITUTES OF TECHNOLOGY: Discussant’s Comments on Chapter 5 of the Sifuna and Shiundu Report.” It is reproduced verbatim below for the record only. While the HIT wave has long since passed, the conceptual and policy issues touched on here remain “live” to-day, some twenty years on -- as I see it]
I. INTRODUCTION
My comments are very brief and, deliberately, provocative. Brief because chapter 5 of the “state-of-the-art” review under discussion captures the core elements of the controversy surrounding the principle of training with production as it has evolved in Kenya. Provocative because – and I would like to say this as emphatically as I can – I see no reason to remain ambivalent about the employment implications for ex-trainees of the production units which have been established within Harambee Institutes of Technology (HIT).
I have chosen to concentrate my attention on this ambivalence (see examples of it on pages 106-107 of the review) as resolving/dissolving it is central to rationalizing practical, hands-on training within the institutes while at the same time maximizing self-employment opportunities in the catchment areas of the respective institutes. As I see it, the weight of the evidence already adduced empirically and logically in the available literature points clearly to the untenability of the view that production units are beneficial to the ex-trainees or the local communities. In other words, their opportunity costs far outweigh their benefits to the said target groups. Let me demonstrate this point by way of nine propositions.
II. NINE PROPOSITIONS IN SUPPORT OF AN ARGUMENT
PROPOSITION 1: The main beneficiaries of the production units are not the ones presumed – trainees, leavers and the local community – but rather the institutions themselves, their managements and, as Sifuna and Shiundu reveal (see page 105 of the review), the “outsiders” who hold shares in some of the production units. Contrary to the general impression one is given, the existence of these production units has not made any HIT financially self-sufficient to-date. There is still the old clamouring for community and donor funding.
PROPOSITION 2: The primary purpose of a training institution is to help trainees to acquire or enhance particular skills, not to make money or act as employer of the first resort to people it was supposed to deliver to the larger labour market.
PROPOSITION 3: By deliberately engaging in income earning activities in the local area, a HIT in effect competes with its own leavers, and enjoys undue advantage over them in that competition.
PROPOSITION 4: Production units set up mainly as revenue earners – that is to say, units “whose main goal is production” (page 89) – are by definition the negation of the principle of “training with production” or “production through training.”
PROPOSITION 5: No contract so far entered into by any HIT could not have successfully been completed by individual HIT leavers or groups/companies of leavers – if given the same opportunity. It is self-serving for HIT administrators to justify their monopoly of the larger contracts on the grounds that these are beyond the capabilities of individual leavers. Indeed, by monopolizing the larger contracts, HIT only retard the growth of a technically-oriented, indigenous, rural entrepreneurship.
PROPOSITION 6: If one takes into account the number of self-employment opportunities “denied” by the involvement of HIT in local contracts, one finds no proof that HIT have contributed to “increasing employment opportunities for rural people,” as claimed on page 107.
PROPOSITION 7: Extensive HIT involvement in contract work in time exacerbates migration to urban areas by – and even unemployment among – HIT leavers from respective local areas. One point is certain, no HIT has the capability to employ all the trainees it turns out, given current enrollment rates.
PROPOSITION 8: A less problematic way to generate revenue to meet development and recurrent expenses in HIT is to rationalize the fee structure, so that it more closely approximates the actual cost of providing training. This can be supplemented with periodic Harambees in which artisans and others gainfully engaged in the respective local areas can be expected to participate fully. The institutes can also benefit by opening up to more than just school leavers.
PROPOSITION 9: In order to give trainees the necessary practical experience, it is sufficient to set up what Sifuna and Shiundu (page 89) refer to as “production through training” programmes. The primary objective in such programmes must be to train, not sell products.
III. CONCLUSION
I conclude by re-stating the point I made at the beginning. There is no reason to remain ambivalent about the negative employment consequences of production units. Failure to address the issue forcefully at this time will only help entrench the mistaken view that production units are a savior to the HIT network, and a creditable source of employment for the leavers.
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Wednesday, June 11, 2008
Faculty of Arts: A Note on Module II Revenue, 1999-2002
I was elected Dean of the Faculty of Arts, University of Nairobi, in December 1998. As Dean, I oversaw the launch of the Module II programme in the Faculty of Arts in 1999. Work toward the launch had in fact begun in the latter half of 1998, and I was involved in that too.
Through the development of a wide range of innovative, market-driven curricula under the Module II (Parallel) Programme, I steered the transformation of the Faculty of Arts into the country's cutting-edge player in university education. That programme opened up university-level learning opportunities for hundreds of Kenyans who had previously been shut out, and enabled many for the first time to further their education while keeping their jobs -- in other words, while at the same time continuing to earn a living.
During my watch, the Faculty's Module II revenue grew as follows, having been nil in the period running from July 1st, 1997 to June 30, 1998:
1. 1998/1999: Kshs. 12 million
2. 1999-2000: Kshs. 52 million
3. 2000/2001: Kshs 80 million
4. 2001/2002: Kshs. 105 million.
By the time I left office in late 2002, the Faculty had grossed some Kshs. 280 million in about four years of actual Module II operation. Only the Faculties of Commerce and Medicine had grossed more. Not many of Kenya's SME's could beat that.
The Faculty had in the process more than doubled the gross monthly income of about 100 lecturers involved in Module II teaching within the Faculty. It did so while saving the country millions of shillings in foreign exchange, which might have been spent by the same students if they had opted to go to foreign universities.
In so doubling lecturers’ income, Module II had great material effect on their personal lives. It rescued their household economies (in particular, a good number of cars) from ICU, as we used to say. I got some credit for that as Dean, but in reality we all made it happen with our collective effort; indeed, with our own sweat!
Those were heady days, as I recall -- certainly for me. Over time, however, one gets used to the gains (any gains, and any fruits of effort, in fact). Change -- changed circumstances, that is -- however much fought for, and however much for the better, becomes, inexorably, routine. And while routine embodies remembrance, it also tends to blur the very reasons which brought it about in the first place.
For a while there, Faculties first pushed for and then enjoyed a real devolution with respect to Module II resources -- vis-a-vis Central Administration. It seemed that we had created a way of doing things which nobody could seriously reverse. In effect, we had "CDF" before Kenya's Parliament invented CDF. Gradually, however, that window of devolved power closed (after my term), and Faculties are all the poorer for it.
Through the development of a wide range of innovative, market-driven curricula under the Module II (Parallel) Programme, I steered the transformation of the Faculty of Arts into the country's cutting-edge player in university education. That programme opened up university-level learning opportunities for hundreds of Kenyans who had previously been shut out, and enabled many for the first time to further their education while keeping their jobs -- in other words, while at the same time continuing to earn a living.
During my watch, the Faculty's Module II revenue grew as follows, having been nil in the period running from July 1st, 1997 to June 30, 1998:
1. 1998/1999: Kshs. 12 million
2. 1999-2000: Kshs. 52 million
3. 2000/2001: Kshs 80 million
4. 2001/2002: Kshs. 105 million.
By the time I left office in late 2002, the Faculty had grossed some Kshs. 280 million in about four years of actual Module II operation. Only the Faculties of Commerce and Medicine had grossed more. Not many of Kenya's SME's could beat that.
The Faculty had in the process more than doubled the gross monthly income of about 100 lecturers involved in Module II teaching within the Faculty. It did so while saving the country millions of shillings in foreign exchange, which might have been spent by the same students if they had opted to go to foreign universities.
In so doubling lecturers’ income, Module II had great material effect on their personal lives. It rescued their household economies (in particular, a good number of cars) from ICU, as we used to say. I got some credit for that as Dean, but in reality we all made it happen with our collective effort; indeed, with our own sweat!
Those were heady days, as I recall -- certainly for me. Over time, however, one gets used to the gains (any gains, and any fruits of effort, in fact). Change -- changed circumstances, that is -- however much fought for, and however much for the better, becomes, inexorably, routine. And while routine embodies remembrance, it also tends to blur the very reasons which brought it about in the first place.
For a while there, Faculties first pushed for and then enjoyed a real devolution with respect to Module II resources -- vis-a-vis Central Administration. It seemed that we had created a way of doing things which nobody could seriously reverse. In effect, we had "CDF" before Kenya's Parliament invented CDF. Gradually, however, that window of devolved power closed (after my term), and Faculties are all the poorer for it.
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