Showing posts with label Sampling. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Sampling. Show all posts

Saturday, October 31, 2015

Representativeness: A Key Standard of scientific Research

Nine key standards, or principles, of scientific research can be gleaned from texts on research method. As I see them, these are:

3. Control
4. Measurability
5. Validity
6. Reliability (Pending)
7. Objectivity (Pending)
8. Ethics 
9. Representativeness.

I say something about each of the nine standards in other posts. What I want to briefly talk about here is representativeness.


Representativeness[1] [ = Generalizability]: The representativeness standard is applied differently in quantitative and qualitative research. In quantitative research, representativeness refers to the degree to which the sample selected for study can legitimately be said to reflect or embody the broad characteristics of the population in which it is embedded. More pragmatically, a sample is representative if it embodies the specific characteristics of the population that are of interest to a given researcher or study.  Thus, if we were to beam or project a transparency of the sample's outline or contours or segments (or proportions) onto a screen 'pre-loaded' with the population's outline or contours or segments (or proportions), we should expect the two images to perfectly match when the respective scales match. The fundamental question to be 'frontally' interrogated or incontrovertibly answered in any specific quantitative research, as Weber was amply aware, is where and how the material so pre-loaded is, was or can/should be obtained in the first place. 

Broadly speaking, quantitative research begins with the assumption that the contours of a population, in terms of size and structure, are accurately and adequately documented in relevant census or other survey data related to the population; and that the researcher has ample access to the data. The quantitative researcher is enjoined to select a sample the size and components of which are statistically and structurally proportionate to the population that they are supposed to represent. However, for many vexing problems which researchers seek to tackle, and research questions which they may want to answer, such ready-made population maps are in reality non-existent.

Qualitative sociological or anthropological research, likewise, is premised on a pre-existing and deep pre-understanding of the 'broad nature' of the society or population in question, based on prior studies and/or a variety of other sources. However, the reality of field research does not often enough bear out the premise. Consequently, pre-understanding must itself be constructed as an 'immediate' prelude to -- indeed, even as a necessary part of -- the anticipated study, Such pre-understanding then becomes the basis for constructing what Weber, with great insight, termed ideal types. 

Concerning ideal types (idealtypus, in German), Weber (1978: 19-22) argues as follows:
"Sociology seeks to formulate type concepts and generalized uniformities of empirical process. … As in the case of every generalizing science, the abstract character of the concepts of sociology is responsible for the fact that, compared with actual historical reality, they are relatively lacking in fullness of concrete content. To compensate for this disadvantage, sociological analysis can offer a greater precision of concepts. … In all cases, rational or irrational, sociological analysis both abstracts from reality and at the same time helps us to understand it, in that it shows with what degree of approximation a concrete historical phenomenon can be subsumed under one or more of these concepts. For example, the same historical phenomenon may be in one aspect feudal, in another patrimonial, in another bureaucratic, and in still another charismatic. In order to give a precise meaning to these terms, it is necessary for the sociologist to formulate pure ideal types of the corresponding forms of action which in each case involve the highest possible degree of logical integration … But precisely because this is true, it is probably seldom if ever [the case] that a real phenomenon can be found which corresponds exactly to one of these ideally constructed pure types. The case is similar to a physical reaction which has been calculated on the assumption of an absolute vacuum. … When reference is made to 'typical' cases, the term should always be understood, unless otherwise stated, as meaning ideal types, which may in turn be rational or irrational …"
Thus, in qualitative research, as Sarantakos has noted, “sampling...is not based on probability theory, and the size of the sample is usually too small to reflect the attributes of the population concerned. Instead, the sampling procedures used are related to theoretical sampling and are geared towards essential and typical units. Selection [that is, the quest for representativeness] does not stress random procedures but rather theoretical sampling, that is, [it is geared] towards the theoretically important units” (Sarantakos, 1994: 27).

Though it is not usually known or talked about -- or, more importantly, fully appreciated in sociological, or qualitative research, circles -- the fact is that Max Weber's notion of ideal types long ago preemptively freed sociology's qualitative researchers from what one may call the conceptual 'yoke of the quantitative sample'. Incidentally, sociologists' counterparts in anthropology have never felt as constrained by this version of the tyranny of numbers. 

As Priyadarshini (n.d.) has tried to say, moreover:
"Just as an ideal model is constructed by the natural scientists as an instrument and means for knowing nature, so the social scientist creates [ideal types] as a tool for systematizing and comprehending individual facts, against which the investigator can measure reality. It [serves that purpose] because of its separation from empirical reality and difference from it."
Importantly, in this regard, Sarantakos (1994: 27) has further, and pointedly, clarified that while “qualitative researchers consider generalisations to be important, they relate them to the typical cases they study, not to random theory and principles. Generalisation becomes obvious out of the intersubjective clarification of validity. The essential argument here is that generalisation is based on the typical case studied, which is thought to be representative of a species...; what qualitative research claims is that such findings can be interpreted beyond the cases studied and are examples of an ‘exemplar generalisation’, or ‘analytic generalisation’...”


REFERENCES:

Priyadarshini, S. (n.d.) "Weber's 'Ideal Types': Definition, Meaning, Purpose and Use"


Sarantakos, Sartirios (1994) Social Research. London: The Macmillan Press

Weber, Max (1978) Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology (Guenther Ross and Claus Wittich, editors and translators). Berkeley: University of California Press.




[1] In quantitative studies this means having such characteristics/capacity/quality as do capture or reflect all the key aspects of the population (or that segment of the population that is of interest).

Sunday, July 12, 2015

"Weaving is Digital" ~ Teshome Gabriel and Fabian Wagnuster

QUOTE: "In fact, despite the newness often attributed to computer technology, much of its vocabulary, as well as that of the internet, draws on relational concepts borrowed from back-strap weaving. Terms such as texture, pattern, layering, links, nodes, sampling, net, network, web, web weaver, and threads belong to a lexicon employed in both weaving and computing. On a structural level, they both rely on the use of crossing, interweaving lines" ~ Teshome Gabriel and Fabian Wagnuster