CSO 302 (Qualitative Research Methods): CAT Questions, September (2017) - January (2018) Semester

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL WORK

CSO 302 CAT QUESTIONS: SEPT 2017 - JAN 2018 SEMESTER

INSTRUCTION:
Answer Any TWO Questions, One from Section 1 and one from Section 2.

SECTION 1:
1. Using your skills in qualitative analysis, including thick description, compare and contrast the main ways in which Kenyans of different walks of life and in different counties responded to the repeated Presidential election of 2017; and, as a sociologist, explain why you think they did so.

2. Citing concrete examples, critically discuss the similarities and distinguishing characteristics of a naturalistic observation and an experiment in sociological research?

SECTION 2:
3. 'There are no innocent positions in social research’. Using your own knowledge of qualitative research, defend the validity of the statement. What are the main guiding principles in the choice of qualitative research methods? Illustrate your answer with clear examples.

4. Describe any three (3) types of data collection methods in qualitative research and provide descriptive examples of instances in which each method may be used. Discuss what they offer in terms of representativeness and generalization.


DEADLINE AND EXPECTATIONS:
1. In view of the unusual circumstances of the current semester, the deadline for submitting your CAT Answers will be 5 minutes before the start of this semester's Final Examination in CSO 302 (Qualitative Research methods).

2. Submissions made after the exams will be penalized by deducting 1 mark for each day of lateness.

3. All answers must be word-processed on A4 paper, font 12 and double-spaced, and should not be less than 4 pages or more than 7 pages in length.

CAT Questions for CSO 302 ~ Qualitative Research Methods, March-June 2017 Semester

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

CSO 302: QUALITATIVE RESEARCH METHODS

SEMESTER: March-June 2017 [Regular + Module II Programmes]

CAT QUESTIONS [Released: 10:00 a.m., May 11^th 2017]

INSTRUCTION: ANSWER A TOTAL OF TWO QUESTIONS, ONE FROM SECTION 1 AND ONE FROM SECTION 2.

Click here to access the CAT questions, two from each Lecturer.

CSO103 - Introduction to Comparative Sociology, Updated Partial Course Outline and Reading List

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE SOCIOLOGY ~ CSO 103.

[Partial Course Outline and Reading List, Updated in November 2016]

PROF. MAURI YAMBO

INTRODUCTION

CSO 103 is a first year course designed to introduce students to aspects of social structure common to all societies. The idea is to highlight concepts which serve as templates for a comparative or cross-cultural study of selected societies in today’s world.

CLICK HERE To Read More About The COURSE OUTLINE. 

CLICK HERE To Go To The READING LIST

APPENDIX

1. LECTURE NOTES:
1.1. Yambo, Mauri (2012) “Components of Social Control” (Topic 3)
http://mauriyambo.blogspot.co.ke/2012/05/components-of-social-control.html

1.2. Yambo, Mauri (2016) “Topic 4: Social Differentiation, Stratification and Class”
http://mauriyambo.blogspot.co.ke/2016/03/social-differentiation-stratification.html?q=topic+4

2. FINAL EXAMINATION PAPERS IN CSO 103:
2.1. Past Final Examination Papers (Batch 1):  http://mauriyambo.blogspot.co.ke/2013/04/cso103-introduction-to-comparative.html?q=cso+103

CAT Questions for CSO 405: Sociology of Work and Industry. May-August 2016 Semester

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

CSO 405: SOCIOLOGY OF WORK AND INDUSTRY

SEMESTER: May – August 2016 [Regular & Module II Programmes]

CAT QUESTIONS [Released: 10:52 p.m., 19^th July 2016]


Click Here to Download the CAT Questions

           

Sociology and Work Redesign

I last taught this graduate course, Sociology and Work Redesign, in May-August 2008. Time flies, as the saying goes, and my focus has shifted elsewhere for various reasons in the intervening period. But as I was going through some of my old papers this evening, I came upon a copy of the Class Presentation Topics which we covered that semester. I thought to myself that it contained some themes and technical considerations that still resonate, a short eight years later, in today's palpably more tech-mediated, and increasingly IoT-infused ways of the globalizing world. And so it occurred to me worthwhile to share the list on this blog. So here it is: Class Presentation Topics.

The course was built around the following objectives:

"To address the following questions from different perspectives: Why redesign? What are the main aspects of a redesign project? To critically outline, in historical perspective, the concepts and practices fundamental to work redesign around the world. To undertake a comparative analysis of selected models, techniques and case-studies of work redesign: from conception to execution. On the basis of that analysis, to encourage class to construct innovative models (or designs) of work organization under given assumptions. In summary, to build national and regional capacity for work redesign, and to reinforce that capacity with relevant theoretical and empirical understandings of the socio-technical underpinnings of the work-place within formal establishments or group contexts."

You may wish to click here to find the full course outline. I think sociology has much to contribute to on-going conversations about work design and redesign.


MORE READINGS (update)
Laston, George, "What EA learned about building successful mobile app infrastructure"

McDonald, Clare (2016) "Internet of things increases demand for tech skills" ComputerWorld.com 

CSO 405: Sociology of Work and Industry, Course Outline and Reading List, May-August 2016 Semester, Mod I and II

COURSE OBJECTIVE

To construct a detailed understanding of the nature of work in social life, the industrialization process in time and space, and the interface between work and industry.

COURSE DESCRIPTION/CONTENT

Key concepts in the field: labour, working class, socialization into work-roles, the quality of working life (QWL), de-skilling, alienation, motivation, hi-tech, industry, industrialization, work versus employment, and work versus leisure.  Models and theories: Human resource theory, the labour process, the theory of value, socialization theory, import substitution industrialization (ISI), export-oriented industrialization (EOI), labour market segmentation theory, social stratification, the division of labour, articulation of modes of production, de-industrialization, convergence and post-industrial society.  Industrial policies of selected countries in terms of, inter alia, employment, technological change, scale and diversity of production, the role of the informal/Jua Kali sector, ownership, quality of life and implications for the social structure.  The impact of science and technology on society, and vice versa, in terms of the past, the present and future.  Selected aspects of industrial psychology, labour law and migration.

CLICK HERE TO DOWNLOAD THE FULL TEXT

Reading List For Sections 3 and 4 of CSO 103 ~ INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE SOCIOLOGY (Third Edition April 7, 2016)

Click here to access Sections 3 and 4 of the CSO 103 Course Outline

HERE IS THE READING LIST FOR SECTIONS 3 AND 4 OF CSO 103 ~ INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE SOCIOLOGY (Third Edition April 7, 2016)

Baker, James A. (2005) The Anger Busting Workbook: Simple, Powerful Techniques for Managing Anger and Saving Relationships Houston, TX: Bayou Publishing.[Relevant to Self Control and Anger Management topics]

Cohen, Bruce (1979) Theory and Problems of Introduction to Sociology. Schaum’s Outline Series. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company.         

Drum, Kevin (2012) “Social Mobility in America: It’s All about the Poor” www.motherjones.com

Featherstone, Richard and Mathieu Deflem (2003) “Anomie and Strain: Context and Consequences of Merton’s Two Theories” Sociological Inquiry 73 (4): 471-489, 2003.

Final Examination Papers: CSO 103, December 2008 to December 2012 [Uploaded by Mauri Yambo]

Forman, Johanna Mendelson (2013) “Cuba’s Emerging Middle Class and Growing Private Sector” in Huffington Post, November 11, 2013

Gates, Bill and Melinda Gates (2014) “2014 Gates Annual Letter: 3 Myths that Block Progress for the

Poor” www.gatesfoundation.org

Gibbs, Jack P. (1989) Control: Sociology’s Central Notion. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. [Themes covered in the book include: The notion of control; basic types of control; inanimate, biotic and human control; and conflict and social class. Gibbs touches on the consensus-conflict debate, arguing that “The opposite of consensus is dissensus, not conflict” (p. 287). Has brief but interesting comments on certain leading conflict theorists]       

Gibbs, Jack (1990) “The Sociology of Deviance and Social Control”, pp. 483-524, in Morris Rosenberg and Ralph. H. Turner, eds. 1990. Social Psychology: Sociological Perspectives. New Brunswick, NY: Transaction Publishers, Rutgers.         

Hirschi, Travis (1971) Causes of Delinquency. Berkeley: University of California Press. [This is a preview. Read what you can about Perspectives on Delinquency, Causes of Delinquency, Strain Theory Control Theory of Delinquency, Conventional Activities]

Hutson, Matthew (2014) “Social Darwinism Isn’t Dead: Rich people think they really are different from you and me” www.slate.com [Discusses the problematic of “Social Class Essentialism”]

Ingham, Harrison and Joseph Luft’s, “Johari Window Model” (This is meant for “understanding and training self-awareness, personal development… interpersonal development”, etc.). Note: Joe + Harry = Johari. Compare that model with this version by Alan Chapman (2003) 

Juma, Victor (2010) “Kenya Ranked Among Most Unequal Societies”. Business Daily, November 5.

Leke, Acha, et al. 2010. “What’s Driving Africa’s Growth?” McKinsey & Company, www.mckinsey.com

Maguire, Mike, Rod Morgan and Robert Reiner, Eds (2012) The Oxford Handbook of Criminology. 5^th Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.    

Merton, Robert (1938) “Social Structure and Anomie” American Sociological Review, Vol. 3, No. 5, October 1938, pp. 672-682  

Mugwe, David (2011) “Kenyans in UK earn above average incomes” Business Daily, January 18, 2011. 

Parsons, Talcott (1964) “Evolutionary Universals in Society”, American Sociological Review, Vol. 29, Issue 3 (June 1964), pp. 339-357.    

Social Engineering Texts [Note that the Sociologist’s understanding and usage of  the term social engineering is contrary to the misleading usages/definitions of the  terms – usages perhaps based on extreme interpretation or implementation of the idea of “psychological manipulation” – that have in the last five or so clogged the Google search engine. I have in mind terms such as: phishing, confidence trick/trickster, pretexting, ‘diversion theft’, computer/information security, ‘forced’ system access (or break-in or hacking), fraud and deception. Here are some texts to keep you on the right track]:     

a.   Sociological conceptualization of “Social Engineering”.  See http://www.thefreedictionary.com        

b.   Thomas Avery (2000) “Popper on ‘Social Engineering’: A Classical Liberal View”, Reason Papers Vol. 26: 29-38 (Summer 2000). www.reasonpapers.com            

c.   Vincent Navarro. 2003. “Policy Without Politics: The Limits of Social Engineering” American Journal of Public Health, January 2003, 93 (1), 64-67.      

Williams, Katherine S. 2012. Textbook on Criminology. 7^th Edition. Oxford: Oxford

University Press. [Read Chapter 13 on Control Theories, pp. 370-403]

CLICK: A 2014 power point sketch of Williams’ thinking about control theories.

Yambo, Mauri (2012) “Components of Social Control” (Topic 3) www.mauriyambo.blogspot.com

Yambo, Mauri (2013) “So Living in a Middle Class Area With a Large Middle Class Boosts a Poor Child’s Prospects of Rising to Middle Class?” www.mauriyambo.com     

Yambo, Mauri (2016) “Topic 4: Social Differentiation, Stratification and Class” www.mauriyambo.blogspot.com

CSO 302: CAT Questions For Sept-Dec 2015 Semester ~ Qualitative Research Methods

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

CSO 302: QUALITATIVE RESEARCH METHODS

SEMESTER: September-December 2015 [Module II Programme]

CAT QUESTIONS [Released: 7.30 a.m., November 06^th 2015]

CLICK Here To Access the CAT Questions 

DEADLINE: Saturday ~ November 28, 2015, Strictly by 11.00 a.m.

Representativeness: A Key Standard of scientific Research

Nine key standards, or principles, of scientific research can be gleaned from texts on research method. As I see them, these are:

1. Universality

2. Replicability

3. Control
4. Measurability
5. Validity
6. Reliability (Pending)

7. Objectivity (Pending)

8. Ethics 

9. Representativeness.

I say something about each of the nine standards in other posts. What I want to briefly talk about here is representativeness.

Representativeness[1] [ = Generalizability]: The representativeness standard is applied differently in quantitative and qualitative research. In quantitative research, representativeness refers to the degree to which the sample selected for study can legitimately be said to reflect or embody the broad characteristics of the population in which it is embedded. More pragmatically, a sample is representative if it embodies the specific characteristics of the population that are of interest to a given researcher or study.  Thus, if we were to beam or project a transparency of the sample's outline or contours or segments (or proportions) onto a screen 'pre-loaded' with the population's outline or contours or segments (or proportions), we should expect the two images to perfectly match when the respective scales match. The fundamental question to be 'frontally' interrogated or incontrovertibly answered in any specific quantitative research, as Weber was amply aware, is where and how the material so pre-loaded is, was or can/should be obtained in the first place. 

Broadly speaking, quantitative research begins with the assumption that the contours of a population, in terms of size and structure, are accurately and adequately documented in relevant census or other survey data related to the population; and that the researcher has ample access to the data. The quantitative researcher is enjoined to select a sample the size and components of which are statistically and structurally proportionate to the population that they are supposed to represent. However, for many vexing problems which researchers seek to tackle, and research questions which they may want to answer, such ready-made population maps are in reality non-existent.

Qualitative sociological or anthropological research, likewise, is premised on a pre-existing and deep pre-understanding of the 'broad nature' of the society or population in question, based on prior studies and/or a variety of other sources. However, the reality of field research does not often enough bear out the premise. Consequently, pre-understanding must itself be constructed as an 'immediate' prelude to -- indeed, even as a necessary part of -- the anticipated study, Such pre-understanding then becomes the basis for constructing what Weber, with great insight, termed ideal types. 

Concerning ideal types (idealtypus, in German), Weber (1978: 19-22) argues as follows:

"Sociology seeks to formulate type concepts and generalized uniformities of empirical process. … As in the case of every generalizing science, the abstract character of the concepts of sociology is responsible for the fact that, compared with actual historical reality, they are relatively lacking in fullness of concrete content. To compensate for this disadvantage, sociological analysis can offer a greater precision of concepts. … In all cases, rational or irrational, sociological analysis both abstracts from reality and at the same time helps us to understand it, in that it shows with what degree of approximation a concrete historical phenomenon can be subsumed under one or more of these concepts. For example, the same historical phenomenon may be in one aspect feudal, in another patrimonial, in another bureaucratic, and in still another charismatic. In order to give a precise meaning to these terms, it is necessary for the sociologist to formulate pure ideal types of the corresponding forms of action which in each case involve the highest possible degree of logical integration … But precisely because this is true, it is probably seldom if ever [the case] that a real phenomenon can be found which corresponds exactly to one of these ideally constructed pure types. The case is similar to a physical reaction which has been calculated on the assumption of an absolute vacuum. … When reference is made to 'typical' cases, the term should always be understood, unless otherwise stated, as meaning ideal types, which may in turn be rational or irrational …"

Thus, in qualitative research, as Sarantakos has noted, “sampling...is not based on probability theory, and the size of the sample is usually too small to reflect the attributes of the population concerned. Instead, the sampling procedures used are related to theoretical sampling and are geared towards essential and typical units. Selection [that is, the quest for representativeness] does not stress random procedures but rather theoretical sampling, that is, [it is geared] towards the theoretically important units” (Sarantakos, 1994: 27).

Though it is not usually known or talked about -- or, more importantly, fully appreciated in sociological, or qualitative research, circles -- the fact is that Max Weber's notion of ideal types long ago preemptively freed sociology's qualitative researchers from what one may call the conceptual 'yoke of the quantitative sample'. Incidentally, sociologists' counterparts in anthropology have never felt as constrained by this version of the tyranny of numbers. 

As Priyadarshini (n.d.) has tried to say, moreover:

"Just as an ideal model is constructed by the natural scientists as an instrument and means for knowing nature, so the social scientist creates [ideal types] as a tool for systematizing and comprehending individual facts, against which the investigator can measure reality. It [serves that purpose] because of its separation from empirical reality and difference from it."

Importantly, in this regard, Sarantakos (1994: 27) has further, and pointedly, clarified that while “qualitative researchers consider generalisations to be important, they relate them to the typical cases they study, not to random theory and principles. Generalisation becomes obvious out of the intersubjective clarification of validity. The essential argument here is that generalisation is based on the typical case studied, which is thought to be representative of a species...; what qualitative research claims is that such findings can be interpreted beyond the cases studied and are examples of an ‘exemplar generalisation’, or ‘analytic generalisation’...”

REFERENCES:

Priyadarshini, S. (n.d.) "Weber's 'Ideal Types': Definition, Meaning, Purpose and Use"

Sarantakos, Sartirios (1994) Social Research. London: The Macmillan Press

Weber, Max (1978) Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology (Guenther Ross and Claus Wittich, editors and translators). Berkeley: University of California Press.

---

[1] In quantitative studies this means having such characteristics/capacity/quality as do capture or reflect all the key aspects of the population (or that segment of the population that is of interest).

CSO 405 ~ Sociology of Work and Industry, Past Exam Papers: September 24, 1985 to December 15, 2014

Hi Class,

I am making available here only those past papers that I've had access to because I examined or co-examined them. In principle, there should be a complete depository of all past examination papers in the UoN Library, and, in the spirit of the times, preferably online. I doubt that is the case. Hence this alternative, or panya, route to the same thing.

I have previously made these papers available to class as hard copies or email attachments. Even that has not been satisfactory. I should have already also put them online via my blog -- as I have done with a number of other courses -- and thought I had. My negligence. Last Monday, the current Class Rep alerted me to the fact that the blog didn't have them. I promised to rectify the situation. Happy to do so now.

Click here to access the Past Papers, which cover the period September 24, 1985 to December 11, 2014.

Reading, and misreading, past papers is an old scholastic tradition. Valuable if the reading is guided by proper method and insight, a disaster or certainly lost opportunity if not. I remember the practice from my high school days. We did not invent the tradition, for sure.  And we had no clue what content analysis was back then, let alone systematic review, or, more broadly, qualitative analysis. But we were always consciously on a pattern-recognition mode of sorts -- our holy grail.

Gday,



MY

PS: Read Here what I have previously said about Past Papers

Emergency Toolkit Laboratory (CSO 587): Introduction to the Course

What is an emergency? It is any out of the ordinary event which threatens to do harm or actually does harm to human well-being, life and property; or to the natural environment. All disasters are emergencies, but not all emergencies are disasters. Disasters are catastrophic/traumatic, critical events which occur because we haven’t, didn't or couldn't do anything or enough to prevent, mitigate or respond to them. 

What does the term toolkit mean in the phrase emergency toolkit? A toolkit is more than one tool. It is a combination (collection, array or repertoire) of tools used to respond to or preempt or otherwise manage a critical event or an emergency. But, given the practical challenges typically faced in emergency situations, there will probably be frequent need for something bigger than a kit: a toolchest, or even a container.

In the present context, the term tool refers to a range of practical resources: technologies – hardware, software and orgware (and even spiritware) – systems, processes, methods, procedures ("How Tos"), templates, standards, indicators, questionnaires, checklists, guidelines, forms, formats, formulae, plans, blueprints, manuals, records, reports and references.

An Emergency Toolkit is therefore a basket of emergency management resources available for use by specialized staff and others involved in the various stages of an emergency: mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery.

We title this course Emergency Toolkit Laboratory because a lab is where you scrutinize, open up, dissect, dismantle, unpackage (= disassemble, take apart or unbundle in a controlled way), test, tinker with, experiment with and/or repackage (= re-assemble in a value-adding way) high-value resources. 

In this lab, therefore, we will try to:

(a)   catalogue and describe the tools that we can identify from our readings, discussions or experiences;

(b)   "un-package" available tools and critically evaluate them as a preamble to modifying them or re-packaging them, or coming up with better or entirely new ones; and 

(c)   following all that, put together various toolkits and specify their uses based on (or in relation to) certain emergency scenarios that we will develop, and cases that we will cite and interrogate.

Note:

1. Orgware = the organizational contexts and/or ownership claims attached to specific tools or technologies of interest.

2. Spiritware = The spiritual dimensions, preconditions and/or connotations that emergency actors of one kind or another may attach to certain technologies or their use thereof.

Prof. Mauri Yambo, Department of Sociology, University of Nairobi

UPDATED: February 14, 2018

CSO 595 ~ Natural and Technological Hazards, Past Exam Papers, 10 September 1999 to 21 December 2012

I have taught this course since 1999 to MA students (Disaster Management cluster) in the Department of Sociology, University of Nairobi. Here below is a link to past (final) examination papers for the period up to December 2012. Click here to see the questions. I invite critical comments.

CSO 103 ~ Introduction to Comparative Sociology, Partial Course Outline and Reading List

To Get the Latest Version of this Document CLICK HERE

[The old Reading List is no longer available]

 I co-teach this course, and cover two broad topics, namely:

Topic 3: Social Control, Socialization and Deviance:

Here, we interrogate the need for social control and, additionally, cover the following subtopics:

-        Definition and Context of ‘Control’ in Society

-        Levels of control: Self and Social Control

o   Aspects of Self Control

o   Aspects of Social Control

o   Interfaces between Self Control and Social Control

-        Explaining Deviance: Sources, Patterns and Consequences

-        Social Engineering.

Topic 4: Social Differentiation, Social Stratification and Social Class:

The subtopics covered here are:

-        Conceptualizing Social Differentiation

-        Changing Social Differentiation Patterns in Africa

-        Social Stratification and Structuration

-        Social Class and the Rise of the African Middle Class.

NOTE: The old Reading List is no longer available. Click here to get the latest list.

Prof. Mauri Yambo

September-December 2013

Components of Social Control

I.                   Introduction

To understand the concept of control, it is useful to associate it with at least seven other concepts, themselves associated with the automobile: ignition (connected to the fuel-gauge), 'view' (or vision), gear (forward and reverse), steering, accelerator (connected to the speedometer)) and brakes. The ignition must be 'turned on', directly or remotely (or virtually), or even the sufficiently fuelled automobile will not start; and ‘turning it off’ stops all activity. The gear must be engaged and the accelerator stepped on, or the ‘turned on’ vehicle will only ‘idle’, even with properly functioning wheels and 'shocks'. Without the steering wheel and a clear view, we know the moving vehicle will soon go where we don’t want it to! Without the brakes, we are at the mercy of momentum and gradient. However, for a stationary vehicle, shorn of all velocity, the main control device is the 'system' of brakes, not the steering wheel.

A side question: Is society as we know it a perpetual state of ignition or not, in motion or stationary, or all of these in various ways and contexts?

Among the earliest sociological conversations about social-control is the pre-20^th century article by Edward Alsworth Ross (1896: 513-535).Ross (1896: 519) saw social-control as follows:

“By social control … I mean that ascendancy over the aims and acts of the individual which is exercised on behalf of the group. It is a sway that is not casual or incidental, but is purposive and at its inception conscious. It is kept up partly by definite organs, formally constituted and supported by the will of society, and partly by informal spontaneous agencies that, consciously or unconsciously, serve the social interest and function under constant supervision from above.”

He added that even though both social control and social coordination are designed “to make certain rules or standards prevail”, they do not mean the same thing. Thus:

“An ordinance requiring street cars to stop at the further crossing or directing passing teamsters to turn to the right, coordinates rather than controls. Control harmonizes clashing activities by checking some and stimulating others. Coordination combines activities already harmonious in respect of their ends” (Ross, 1896: 519).

In her book titled Textbook on Criminology [this is the latest edition], Williams (1997: 370) observes that the central assumption, or the starting point, of social control theorists of the last thirty years or so is that “every individual is born free to break the law. It is criminality which is natural, and conformity needs explanation.” That is to say, the central tendency of human agency is “law breaking” or deviation (deviance) from, not compliance (conformity) with, norms or conventions.

Of course Williams is aware that this perspective is in direct opposition to what one may call the standard approach to criminality and deviance, whereby it is “assumed that conformity is normal or natural, and criminality is abnormal” (Williams, 1997: 370). Based on this standard approach, the reasoning that emerges is that “there is no justification for individuals to break the law unless something abnormal is present” in the individual actor (in the form of biological or personal defects) or in the wider society (Williams, 1997: 370).

For those who subscribe to this standard approach – those who think that deviance/criminality is abnormal – the charged question they would pose to those who think that it is normal is this:  If deviance or criminality is “normal” and if “conformity needs explanation”, then “why don’t we all break the law?” (Williams, 1997: 370). The answer to the above question, given by those who see deviance/criminality as the normal state of affairs, is this: We don’t all break the law because of the “power” of conformity – conformity which society instills in its members’ behaviors through effective socialization and/or direct social control. In the absence of these ‘twin’ pillars, it is reasonable to expect deviance or criminal behavior to take root or express itself from a very early age.

But that is exactly the answer that the proponents of the standard view, who see “deviance as abnormal”, would give! Our social and generally sociable nature as humans leads us in the direction of conformity. Furthermore, the longer and more consistently we interact with others with the same mindset, the more likely it will be for us, most of us, to stay the course.

Why or how so? Because conformity projects a society’s or community’s array of dos and don’ts onto the observed behaviors of its members, even when such dos and don’ts cannot be seen to be naturally rooted in “human nature”. Thus, walking is a natural human habit, and so are eating and sleeping. But the prohibition against walking naked in the street is a cultural prohibition, not naturally occurring abstention – though the naturalist might ask why not, since we are all born with no clothing. We sleep on the bed, and not under it. We expel the usual bodily wastes in privacy – unless such privacy cannot be had when there is absolutely no more time to wait.

Williams (1997: 370) illustrates the point about conformity with two illuminating examples:

“… there is nothing natural about driving [on] one side of the road, and yet motorists do keep to the required side. It is not natural to buy rather than take food when one sees it, and yet in our society most people buy rather than take. There is clearly nothing natural about conformity, as most of our formative years are spent learning what is permitted behaviour and what is not, and often why the difference exists”.

Socialization processes and agencies, operating throughout our lives, are key to the continuation of conformity – and social control. Williams (1997: 371) emphasizes, however, that “…conformity is always seen as fragile, as something which might be broken at any time if the reason for conformity is weakened, lost or momentarily broken.”

Socialization refers, to a large extent, to the internalization of norms; and there is a tortured link between Social Control and the Internalization of Norms. As Cohen (1979: 91) sees it:

“The individual internalizes the norms of a culture as a result of a successful socialization process. When internalization occurs, the individual does not have to stop and think about what is right or wrong, proper or improper. The person follows the norm almost as a matter of reflex, and whether or not the person is being observed by others, he or she will continue to manifest ‘proper’ behavior as a result of the internalization of the norms. An individual is motivated towards adherence of established norms because of inner controls, such as conscience [MY (Feb 19, 2009): or ethics/morality, religious beliefs, professional knowledge, training, past experience, profit-maximization, etc], rather than a fear of discovery by others that he or she has engaged in improper behavior. Through the process of internalization of norms, most necessary social controls are exercised internally by each of us.”

These internalized norms are what Pierre Bourdieu refers to as habitus; and from this we can see clearly that habitus (habit) is not only the product of socialization but, more importantly in the present conversation, the internalized instrument of social control]. Cohen (1979: 91) adds the important observation that: “Most of the behavior of an overwhelming majority of the population is in conformity with the behavior expected of us. Individuals know it is inherently wrong to murder, steal, cheat, and abuse others. These acts are contrary to our standards of morality and to the values we have learned…”

.

A norm is

“...a standard or rule, regulating behaviour in a social setting. [As a concept, a norm represents the widely shared idea in Sociology] that social life, as an ordered and continuous process, is dependent upon shared expectations and obligations” (Jary and Jary, 1999: 453). Thus, add Jary and Jary, Parsons concept of normative order is central to the idea of the social system – which underscores the view that norms are related to socialization, social roles and even social control; and, moreover, operate at all levels of society (ibid.).

A social norm, on the other hand, is:

 “A rule or standard of behavior defined by the shared expectations of two or more people regarding what behavior is to be considered socially acceptable. Social norms provide guidelines to the range of behavior appropriate and applicable to particular social situations” (Theodorson and Theodorson (1969: 276-7)

The authors add that “…one’s role obligations in a social group are defined by that group’s social norms. Social norms are studied by observing overt behavior (what people do), as well as by observing what people say their norms are.” Moreover, many sociologists see the following as examples of normative structure based on shared expectations of behaviour: society, social institutions, social roles, and moral systems (Theodorson and Theodorson, 1969: 277). However, the reader is cautioned to note that what people say and do are often at variance. This commonly observed phenomenon has given rise to the sarcastic remark: “Do as I say, not as I do.”

A clustering of norms is the basis for the conceptualization of normative integration. By normative integration, sociologists typically have in mind a coherent set of mutually reinforcing norms that is comprehensive or large enough to address all the main contingencies – or ‘cover all the main bases’ – pertaining to an extended or sustainable social group. It is, in other words:

“The interrelationship of the social norms of a group into a consistent pattern so organized that there are relatively few seriously conflicting social or psychological expectations or obligations on the members that stem directly from the norms of the group. Normative integration within a social group is a function of its members’ values”( Theodorson and Theodorson, 1969: 277).

There are two kinds of norms, prescribing and proscribing, but Cohen prefers the terms: ‘proscribed’ and ‘prescribed’. Thus, to nevertheless use Cohen’s words, prescribing norms specify “those things that an individual should do”, while proscribing norms point to things “that an individual must not do” (Cohen, 1979: 91).

II.  Levels of Control (of day-to-day or ‘Extreme’ Human Behaviour)

The control of day-to-day or ‘extreme’ behavior operates at two broad levels in society: Self and Social. These can be further analyzed as follows:

1. Self-Control:

Self control refers to “physical actions and emotional states”, as well as the use of symbols of all kinds that are peculiar to the individual actor, and which anchor the actor’s response to sudden judgment situations or more long-term pressures toward deviant acts of commission or even omission. Self control is internally energized control of overt or covert behaviour, and/or of verbal or other symbolic utterances or projections or broadcasts – reflected in, for example, toilet “behaviour” (adherence to appropriate forms of which, in adults, are taken as a given), personal hygiene, personal grooming, personal manners, aversion to foul language, avoidance of minor or grand taboos of all kinds, and other personalized or ‘socialized’ do’s and don’ts. All this starts (must start) very early in life; and reflects the “choices” that the individual “makes” and the opportunities he/she misses – out of the array of possibilities he/she periodically or habitually comes upon.

To Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990), the core explanation for criminal (or deviant) behaviour is the “absence of self-control.” Self-control is a deliberate – or, so to speak, ‘reasoned’ – and internally driven behaviour control technique or capability that the individual typically learns, particularly within the orbit of the family, in the formative years of life. This is a capability which is thereafter, in their view, “highly resistant to change.”  

Prof. Ariely (2011) observes that scientists are only now beginning “to realize how central self-control is to many important life outcomes.” Yet how exactly does self-control come into the social control, or ‘life outcomes’, equation, and how does it work? Despite their impact on such outcomes, he argues, socio-economic status (SES) and IQ are not easily manipulated for the desired social control effects, since they are “highly resistant to intervention.” We cannot be sure that the resources we invest in them will invariably, or in a timely way, effect the change we intend in the behaviors of target actors. So we must resort to or devise – and have indeed resorted to or devised – an alternative option: Self-control. Click here for more of Ariely’s thinking:

And yet, as Ariely notes, when you think about the dynamics of the modern world, every cross-current – from marketing/advertising to retail and professional services – “is essentially designed to challenge every grain of our self-control.” In this fast-paced and super-hyped world, so to speak, retailers and marketers and hustlers and agents and “such like” tempt us in every way and at every turn to buy or commit ourselves now and not later – to leap and possibly think all at once.

Ariely (2011) cites a study which, having controlled for the effects of SES and IQ, sought to determine the role of self-control in people’s lives. The study ‘revealed’, inter alia, that:

“Individuals with low self-control experienced negative outcomes [in health, wealth and public safety], with greater rates of health issues like sexually transmitted infections, substance dependence, financial problems including poor credit and lack of savings, single-parent child-rearing, and even crime.”

Ariely then asks what the source of “the mysterious force of self-control” might be, and why there are differences among people in the ability to activate effective self-control. And he wonders:

 “…are the [people] who are better at self control able to control and actively reduce how tempted they are by the immediate rewards in their environment, or are they just better at coming up with ways to distract themselves and this way avoid acting on their temptation?”

He has no concrete answer to that question, but thinks that it “may very well be the latter.” He adds that this would be good if it were so. Why” “…because it is probably much easier to teach people tricks to deal with self-control issues than to train them with a zen-like ability to avoid experiencing temptation when it is very close to our faces.” 

Low self-control predisposes one to deviant tendencies or behaviour, but does not necessarily lead to actual deviant behaviour. For it to do so, there must be “opportunity” for such behavior (Williams, 1997: 373, citing Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990). Certainly, such opportunity can be reduced, minimized or eliminated by reinforcing self-control as such, or by the interplay of self-control and social control, or through social control alone.

Self-control has two overlapping pillars: (1) Self-Concept and, (2) Personal or Individual Control. Both are internal to the individual, and understanding them helps us to better understand the broader concept of elf-control.

1.1. Self-Concept:

Concerning self-concept, Saul McLeod (2008) starts off by noting that “To be aware of oneself is to have a concept of oneself.” To be aware of oneself, thus, is not only to perceive that one is but also to have a sense of who’s the one who is. This should usually include the realization that one is not, in the place one is, alone – but with another or others in a surrounding. Citing Lewis (1990), McLeod points out that self-concept has two components: (a) the existential self, and, (b) the categorical self.

The existential self is in fact the self characterized in the above lines. It represents the most elementary awareness of one’s existence. It refers to the individual – an infant to start with – being aware that he/she exists and is alive as a separate and distinct entity or human being, standing apart from any other. This awareness of self as a separate identity, is at the core of the individual’s capacity to distinguish between “me” and “not me”, and to know that “I” am “me” and not, for example, the ‘other” whom the infant will soon enough come to know as mummy or daddy or sister or brother.  

To have self-concept is to be self-conscious. Only a ‘fully’ conscious mind can be fully self-conscious, but this capacity grows with age, though it is frequently lost in some to the influence of alcohol, other drugs and certain diseases or illnesses. Thus, for an infant: to be self-conscious, and therefore to have self-concept, is to know, for example, that the feeling of discomfort or contentment that I am feeling right now is not only a true feeling but my own feeling as well, and not another’s. It is to know that the sense of fear or exhilaration that I am enduring or having is my sense; or that the unfamiliar faces all around are indeed unfamiliar to me and around me; or that the playful other who’s alone with me right here is playing with none other than me – and that it is I who’s experiencing all this playfulness in return.

McLeod characterizes the categorical self as follows: “Having realized that he or she exists as a separate experiencing being, the child next becomes aware that he or she is also an object in the world. Just as other objects including people have properties that can be experienced (big, small, red, smooth and so on) so the child is becoming aware of him or her self as an object which can be experienced and which has properties. The self too can be put into categories such as age, gender, size or skill.”

The Mosby’s Medical Dictionary (2009) defines self-concept as “the composite of ideas, feelings, and attitudes that a person has about his or her own identity, worth, capabilities, and limitations. Such factors as the values and opinions of others, especially in the formative years of early childhood, play an important part in the development of the self-concept.” On the other hand, the American Heritage Medical Dictionary (2007) sees it as “An individual's assessment of his or her status on a single trait or on many human dimensions using societal or personal norms as criteria” (for both definitions, click here). These definitions certainly allude to self-concept as more consciously grasped later in life.

David Demo (1992: 309) argues that self-concept is not static, but changes over time: “…the content and structure of self concept change with each stage of self-development, and with each stage there is evidence of both stability and malleability from one context to another.” It is, in other words, “situationally variable” (Demo, 1992:  306). He insists that:

“to understand self-concept we must conceptualize it as a moving baseline with fluctuations across situations…and life stages. This involves recognizing that the self-concept is simultaneously a complex structure and a process, that it is stable, but that it is also dynamic” (Demo, 1992: 304).

Reckless (1967, 1973) suggests that self-concept is an internal quality in the individual, and (in Williams’ words) argues that “those individuals with a strong and favourable self-concept were [are] best insulated against the drives and pulls towards criminality. A favourable self-concept might be illustrated by saying that the individuals view themselves in a positive way: as having values to live up to; as being law-abiding; and as having an idea of being of use and value to society and those in it” (Williams, 1997: 372).

Self-concept is thus the springboard of self-esteem, the latter trending high or low in tandem with the former.

1.2. Personal or Individual Control:

Reiss (1951) sees ‘personal control’ as meaning “how well the juvenile [MY: the individual] manages to resist using socially unacceptable methods[1] to reach his goals” (Williams, 1997: 371). Note that this definition is “based in the psychological diagnosis of the development of the super-ego, and therefore indicates a Freudian basis” (Williams, 1997: 371). The conforming individual – the one with high personal control – thus has “a healthy super-ego” (Williams, 1997: 371). Personal-control thus drives the individual’s life-choices – that is, the kinds of choices, short-term and long-term, that the individual makes in the course of his/her life.

Nowadays, a common feature of business school curriculum is self/personal control, relabeled SELF-MANAGEMENT (see UNISA’s Centre for Business Management). Self-Management encompasses: Time management, Grooming, Interpersonal Relations, Discipline,

2. Social Control:

Social control, which is EXTERNAL to the individual, refers to society’s strategy or means or capacity to secure orderly processes (of social change and/or continuity), within and to some extent around it,  through the behaviors and interactions of its members -- in whole or in certain specified contexts.

To most sociologists, Williams (1997: 370) notes, social control “includes all the social processes which militate for [MY: which promote] conformity, from infant socialization, through school and job to the public and state control systems such as the police, the courts and the punishment systems.”

In other words, social control refers to “the ability of social groups or institutions to make norms or rules effective. Conformity resulting from social controls tends to involve submission to the rules and norms of society”(Williams, 1997: 371). Note that “submission” implies that a level of self/personal control is required for self-control to work.

In the same vein, Bruce Cohen (1979: 90)[2] points out that “Social control is really an extension of the socialization process.” In other words, through “the process of socialization, the person learns what behavior is acceptable in various situations and learns to differentiate between proper and improper behavior patterns”(Cohen, 1979: 90).

Thus, social control “refers to the means and methods that are used to order or induce a person to conform to the expectations of a particular group or the larger society. If social control is effectively exerted, the individual’s behavior will be consistent with the type of behavior expected. Social control is mutually exerted; we influence the behavior of others, and in turn they influence our behavior”(Cohen, 1979: 90).

However, the argument that social control is “the means by which a group keeps its members behaving in mutually expected ways” (Cohen, 1979: 93) is true only if by “mutually expected ways” we mean that the members are seen to behave according to the values and norms upheld by the collective conscience – that is to say, by the conventional (and non-conventional) society . Those who defy conventions (the collective conscience) are treated by those who don’t (its subscribers) as unconventional and therefore as deviants [we will define deviance in a moment].

Social control, according to Cohen, thus refers to:

(a) all manner of “tools” (principles, values, norms, strategies, instruments/technologies and institutions) which conventional society utilizes in order to secure the conformity of its members with its conventions; and,

(b) the attainment of the goals, as well as the consequences, of such effort.

Taking into account the fact that deviants do exist, other sociologists (and I) would rather argue that social control operates to deny deviants a say or role in molding “the expected ways of behaving” – that is, it operates to keep them out of the circle of consensus circumscribed by the relevant aspect(s) of the collective conscience -- and to demand simply that they conform to (or return to the “fold” of) the values and norms that make up the collective conscience. What is the device by which we distinguish the wishes of conventional society from those of deviants? It is collective conscience.

Having said that, let us note that, according to Gibbs (1985: 765) [Jack Gibbs “Social Control,” pp. 765-768, in Adam Kuper and Jessica Kuper, eds. (1985), The Social Science Encyclopedia. London and New York: Routledge], “the now prevailing conception of social control in sociology” is the counteraction-of-deviance (that is, the counteraction of the failure of self-control) conception given by Talcott Parsons (1951), namely, that:

”The theory of social control…is the analysis of those processes… which tend to counteract… deviant tendencies… Every social system has, in addition to the obvious rewards for conformative [behavior] and punishments for deviant behavior, a complex system of unplanned and largely unconscious mechanisms which serve to counteract deviant tendencies.” [We will see the limitations of this conception in a moment]

Thus, clearly, social control has been seen as both intentional/purposive/deliberate/conscious (that is, some preventive or reactive action that we choose to take) and unconscious/unintentional/ (accidental?) (rooted in the collective conscience). But Gibbs (1985: 765) argues, wrongly I think, that in this definition Parsons denies the relevance of intentional social control or suggests that it does not exist. He does not.

Intention is an important concept in social control. Without the notion of intention, Gibbs (1985: 765) rightly notes, “the distinction between successful and unsuccessful social control is lost.” And if it is lost, he adds, we cannot even attempt to answer these two important questions:

(a)   “Why are some means of social control employed more than others?” 

(b)   “Does social control counteract deviant tendencies?”

Gibbs (1985: 765) observes that one advantage of the foregoing view of social control – the intention perspective – is that it helps to answer the question: “What is social about social control?” Two characteristics of social control make it social: (a) it “has a normative quality” [unlike bank robbery, for example, which we may label “counter-normative”; and (b) it is “distinct from everyday interaction” – such as “hailing a cab”(Gibbs, 1985: 765).

There are, in Gibbs’ view, two intractable difficulties with the idea of social control as counteraction of deviance. These are:

(a)   The conception risks being tautological – that is, if we see social control as the counteraction of deviance, and deviance as the absence or failure of social control, then we have explained nothing (Gibbs, 1985: 765).

(b)   It ignores the occurrence of certain large-scale “manipulations” of non-deviant or normal human behavior – such as through media advertising and ideologically-charged political campaigns; for example, those of the Nazi party against the Weimar Republic (Gibbs, 1985: 765).

Based on the foregoing, Gibbs (1985: 765) suggests an alternative to the counteraction-of-deviance definition of social control: The Third-Party Conception of Social Control. Before he gets to that, however, he points out that social control is indeed possible without the intervention of a third party; and proceeds to set aside such control as tangential to his main interest: showing how third-party control, properly conceived, operates.

III.                The Conception of Social Control without a Third-Party:

Gibbs (1985:765) starts by giving the following definition of [Third Party] social control:

“Social control is an attempt by one or more individuals (the first party in either case) to manipulate the behavior of one or more other individuals (the second party in either case) through still another individual or individuals (the third party in either case) by means other than a chain of command or requests.”

I have difficulty with this restriction to “an attempt” as opposed to the ‘real deal’. I would prefer to have a definition that stresses actual as opposed to attempted manipulation. From his view of social control, Gibbs (1985: 766) excludes two elements of control behavior, on the grounds, which I disagree with, that they are “conspicuous in everyday interaction, especially in bureaucratic or military social units”, namely:

n  Proximate Control: That is, “control without a third party” [Examples: Customer requests (asks for) an item at a shop or customer desk or elsewhere; or “a mother physically restrains her child” (Gibbs, 1985: 765-766)]. This exclusion would be acceptable only if we acknowledged that proximate control is already accommodated in (indeed is integral to) the counteraction-of-deviance approach – to which the third-party approach is a gap-filling alternative [MY]

n  Sequential Control: This refers to orders/controls executed in a sequence – that is, executed through a “chain of command;” for example from A through B to C [Example, “when X orders Y to order Z” (Gibbs, 1985: 766)]. [MY: March 3, 2009]But the problem with excluding “chain of command”, and therefore sequential control, from the definition of third-party control is that it contradicts the foundational notion of third-party, as Gibbs himself has presented it, and therefore severely reduces the value of his definition as an (as the) alternative to Parsons’ counteraction-of-deviance approach – in the context of which “chain of command” is in fact an unavoidable concept.

Gibbs’ examples open the way to inserting or at least considering an additional way in which one may argue that control without a third party operates; what Smith (1993) calls the ‘relations of ruling’:

n  The ‘relations of ruling’ element/approach, which extends the conversation beyond what we have seen so far, focuses on “social domination”, and, as noted, has been introduced by Dorothy Smith (1993)  Her notion of relations of ruling is encapsulated in the emotive word patriarchy, and the phrase “male power”. It refers to culturally and historically deep-rooted inequality in power relations between men and women. This inequality is reflected in a world in which women have been “in various ways silenced [and] deprived of the authority to speak"; a world in which women have “participated unknowingly” – their experience lacking a “voice” and “indeed a language”. How did this come about? It happened because, as women have come to discover, they “had taken from the cultural and intellectual world created by men the terms, themes, conceptions of the subject and subjectivity, of feeling, emotion, goals, relations, and an object world assembled in textually mediated discourses and from the standpoint of men occupying the apparatuses of ruling. [Women]…understand this organization of power as ‘patriarchy’, a term that [identifies] both the personal and public relations of male power.”

The ruling apparatuses she refers to are “those institutions of administration, management, and professional authority, and of intellectual and cultural discourses, which organize, regulate, lead and direct, contemporary capitalist societies”. The power relations – the “forms of communication and action” – entailed therein “are distinctively mediated by texts” (Smith, 1993: 2).

In the view of Applerouth and Edles (2007: 322), Smith uses the term “Relations of Ruling” to underscore the fact that social domination operates, not (as I may add) strictly through third parties of any kind, and not only through the usual matrices of bureaucratic management, formal organization and the media, but also through texts, such as:  medical records, census reports, psychiatric evaluations, employment files (Applerouth and Edles, 2007: 322). These texts -- ’the complex of discourses, scientific, technical, and cultural’ – do in fact “intersect, interpenetrate, and coordinate” the matrices. Moreover, “behind and within the ‘apparently neutral and impersonal rationality of the ruling apparatus’ is concealed a ‘male subtext.’ Women are ‘excluded from the practices of power within textually mediated relations of ruling’” (Applerouth and Edles, 2007: 322). As an example of scholarly discourse and practice, sociology does not escape this charge (Applerouth and Edles, 2007: 322; Smith, 1993: 2).

IV.               Gibb’s Conception of Third-Party Social Control:

Gibbs (1985) identifies the following five types of social control associated with his notion of third-party control:

(a)   Referential Social Control: This is witnessed at the micro and macro levels of society; for example when, at the micro level, a child tells a sister or brother: “Give me back my candy or I will tell Mother.” Here, as Gibbs (1985: 766) describes it, “The first party (the child in this instance) attempts to manipulate the behavior of the second party (the sibling) by making reference to a third party (the mother)”.

(b)   Allegative Social Control: To use the above example of siblings and their mother, this kind of social control occurs when the ‘offended’ child, instead of issuing the threat, reports the sibling directly to mother, who then acts against the ‘offending’ child. Court cases offer frequently-occurring examples: The plaintiff (first party) makes allegations about the defendant (second party) before a judge or jury (third party) in the hope that the allegations are persuasive enough for the judge/jury to pass judgment in favor of the plaintiff (Gibbs, 1985: 766).

(c)    Vicarious Social Control: Here, the organizing principles are deterrence or inducement. When the court punishes an offender, would-be offenders are deterred; and when an employer awards an employee for hard work, fellow employees may see the reason to improve their work habits (Gibbs, 1985: 766).

(d)   Modulative Social Control: Gibbs (1985: 766) gives this example comes from advertising: “when an advertiser (first party) pays a celebrity (third party) to extol some product on television, the advertiser assumes that the celebrity has some influence over consumers (second party).” Gibbs (ibid) also notes in this case that law can be used to reduce the influence of ‘agitators’ or to promote class/caste interests through selective legal prohibitions or proscriptions.

(e)   Prelusive Social Control: This kind of control is constructed around some knowledge of what prospective controlees “hate, fear, value and respect” – knowledge which could be manipulated to deter/reverse or bring under control the actual or potentially vexing aspects of the behaviours of certain second parties (that is, of certain would-be controlees). Hate is a common passion. The post-election violence of 2007/2008 in Kenya was driven by much 'prelusive' calculation.One kind of fear that many people have is the fear of drowning. An illustrative example of the exploitation of fear is water boarding [Here's a demonstration], a torture technique used to induce the sensation of drowning which has been used since at least the 14th century and more recently been used by US security forces in Viet Nam and in the "War on Terror" to extract information and confessions from suspects. Gibbs (1985: 766) claims that prelusive social control is “the most-highly organized type” of third-party social control. He suggests that the questions to ask in order to gain the knowledge are these: (1) “Which kind of control would be most effective?” (2) “Who should be subject to special efforts at control?” In order to obtain answers to these questions, Gibbs suggests that the first party should assign a third party to undertake any of the following four tasks: (i) generate requisite information of likely second parties, including via surveillance; (ii) carry out a study on the relative effectiveness of alternative social control modes; (iii) “create conditions that facilitate control”; (iv) selectively exclude second party categories or strata “from certain social or spatial contexts, as in the case of immigration laws” (Gibbs, 1985: 766).

V.                  Why is Social Control Important as a Mode of Practice?

To start with, let us reiterate a point already made, that social control refers to the process by which members of a society come to conform to, or not deviate from, the prevailing or dominant norms – prevailing or dominant as long as we remember that within the orbit/domain of a counter-culture (or sub-culture), these norms will in fact be counter-norms (or sub-norms)]

Social Control is important because, as Cohen (1979: 90) argues, behavior which has proven conducive to the proper functioning of society must be maintained, for society’s own good. Or, alternatively, behaviour deemed crucial to social order must be consciously nurtured and enforced. This nurturing occurs through a future-oriented, expectations-driven, template-rich or SOP-predicated socialization of the members. Cohen is thus of the belief that “proper social control” is activated when what we may call “routine” socialization fails to realize its purposes. In other words, direct social control measures are alternatives to ‘failed’ socialization processes.  Thus, the activation of such social control measures reflects the need, where socialization has for whatever reason fallen short of its intended purposes, to maintain a preponderance of behaviors that are consistent with established, or preferred, norms – in order, ultimately, to maintain the required levels of preferred social organization and order.

VI.               Formal and Informal Social Control:

1.      Formal control mechanisms include ”those written rules, regulations, codes of behavior, and laws that specify in writing how procedures should be carried out, how individuals occupying specific roles should behave, and what form of punishment or penalty will be imposed on those who disobey” (Cohen, 1979: 94). Those with authority to administer these control mechanisms include: Government officials, legislators, police, courts, probation officers, professional organizations (Cohen, 1979: 95) – as well as employers and heads of institutions such as schools and colleges.

Examples of formal social control techniques (ibid): Imprisonment (of the criminal), Hospitalization/confinement of the psychotic (or someone with an infectious disease), Probation (for the drug abuser, petty offender), (physical punishment, p. 94), (dismissal p. 95), (fines, expulsion, death sentence, deregistration, p. 97).

2. Informal control mechanisms are distinct from formal ones because, to put it simply, they are not anchored on formally-bureaucratically or institutionally constructed rules, procedures, expectations and/or sanctions. Examples of informal social control techniques: Informal Group Rejection or Ostracism (or Shunning); Gossip; Laughter; Public Naming, Jeering/Ridicule/Scolding or Disowning; Demonstration, or the threat of any of these, the activation of One’s Conscience (see, for example, Cohen, 1979: 90, 92, 97).

VII.             QUESTION: Why is self (personal) control crucial to social control?

ANSWER: The decision/failure to comply with social norms rests with the ‘individual’ in the first place. That is, it is a function of self-control. Social control serves to facilitate such decision and/or to respond to, or preempt/prevent, such failure. It is the individual who ‘decides’ or fails to conform. It is society that rewards such decision or seeks to punish or preempt/prevent or reverse such failure (see, also, Cohen, 1979: 91).

Self-control facilitates social control by providing internal restraints to deviation. Restraining oneself from violating social control measures ensures the voluntary enforcement of those measures; that is to say, facilitates the unproblematic application/success of the measures. Social control is nevertheless a necessary and valuable option (society’s Plan B) because self control often fails. Social control stands on two feet: (a) voluntary compliance (self-control); and, (b) enforcement.

When enforcement entities/agents are weak, the lack of self-control creates room for a downward spiral toward the “breakdown of law-and-order,” as we saw during Kenya’s post-election violence of 2007/8. Other examples from Kenya are the periodic outbreaks of Mungiki violence, and chaos in the matatu transport sub-sector.

When self-control accommodates or mirrors social control – that is, when social control signals lock into “kindred spirits” lodged in self-control – their combined effect on the individual’s behavior is more assuredly unproblematic and seamless; in a word, ‘socially’ desirable.Voluntary compliance with social control measures, due to self-control, obviates (rids us of) the need and cost of enforcement and sanctions.

When self control and social values and norms match – that is, are in harmony – social control inevitably reigns. Without self-control, it is virtually impossible to even imagine that informal social control can effectively operate. Likewise, in the absence of self-control, it is nearly impossible for social control (informal or formal) to operate effectively without sanctions (positive or negative). It is not possible to socially control the behaviour of an individual who lacks the requisite amount of self-control, except by means of effective formalized social control measures.

VIII.                Conclusion

There is no doubt in my mind that self-control has its roots in an instinct which all living species must surely have – the instinct to survive against all danger; danger arising from predators of all kinds, or simply from natural events. So it is not a uniquely human trait. However, as we understand it today, self-control in humans is a particularly valuable example of soft-culture at work. I have tried to sketch in these notes how self-control and social-control interconnect and mutually reinforce each other – and how social processes and society in general are shaped by the multiple ways in which the interfaces between the two do or may play out. In all of this, of course, the matrix of Time and Space is the arena in which all unfolds. There is not one but many matrices. Millions of individual actors are nowadays caught up – and in a globalizing world increasingly so – in more than one matrix, and even many such.

I will say more about all of this at a later date.

Read more on self control and related themes here: As paraphrased by Williams (1997: 373), Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) view self-control as: “a subjective state whereby one individual is more [less?] vulnerable to temptations of the moment than is another. It is an assessment of how restrained each individual feels about his or her actions” [if you cannot access the hard copy of Williams' book, read this ; to access some reviews of the book, click here.  To read more on the theory of crime click here .

Prof. Mauri Yambo

[Lecture notes for CSO 103: Introduction to Comparative Sociology (Graduate students in the Theory Course may find aspects of these notes useful). Online Version 1, January-April 2012 Semester].

---

[1] Such as corruption, forgery, over-speeding, illegal logging, drug pushing, prostitution.

[2] Bruce Cohen. 1979. Theory and Problems of Introduction to Sociology. Schaum’s Outline Series. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company