Showing posts with label Standard. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Standard. Show all posts

Friday, November 27, 2015

Validity ~ A Key Standard of Scientific Research

Validity ~ A Key Standard of scientific Research


By Prof. Mauri Yambo
(1996; updates: 2004, 2006, 2015)


INTRODUCTION

Nine key standards, or principles, of scientific research can be gleaned from texts on research method. As I see them, they are:


3. Control
4. Measurability
5. Validity
6. Reliability (Pending)
7. Objectivity (Pending)
8. Ethics 
9. Representativeness.

I say something about each of the nine standards in separate posts, as shown in the links above. What I want to briefly talk about here is the validity standard. 


Validity means the applicability, genuineness, appropriateness or truthfulness of the methods, instruments, tools, measures (or indicators), or arguments used in the quest for knowledge, or search for answers to vexing questions – and therefore of the conclusions arrived at.  


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[CSO 302, CSO 501]

Sunday, November 08, 2015

Measurability: A Key Standard of Scientific Research

Nine key standards, or principles, of scientific research can be gleaned from texts on research method. As I see them, these are:


3. Control
4. Measurability
5. Validity
6. Reliability (Pending)
7. Objectivity (Pending)
8. Ethics 
9. Representativeness.

I say something about each of the nine standards in separate posts, as shown in the links above. What I want to briefly talk about here is the measurability standard. 

Measurability 

Measurability means susceptibility to measurement. It means, in other words, that what is to be measured must embody quantities and/or qualities -- or have features, dimensions or characteristics -- that can be subjected to appropriate or 'true' measurement. Concerning the defining characteristics of a measurement, Bell (1999) notes that:
"A measurement tells us about a property of something. It might tell us how heavy an object is, or how hot, or how long it is. A measurement gives a number to that property. Measurements are always made using an instrument of some kind. Rulers, stopwatches, weighing scales, and thermometers are all measuring instruments. The result of a measurement is normally in two parts: a number and a unit of measurement, e.g. ‘How long is it?... 2 metres." 
The measurability rule is anchored on the above conceptions, and so requires that the variables around which the researcher intends to collect data should be measurable, or susceptible to acceptable ‘measurement’ (Leedy, 1980: 46)[1]. This is easier done in the natural sciences than in the social sciences; in quantitative studies than in qualitative. Still, one must, in the social sciences too, endeavor to quantify, measure and evaluate. Indeed, the guiding principle of the measurability rule -- its corollary, in other words -- is this: "What can be measured must be measured." Thus, not measuring what can be measured is not an option allowed anyone.

In quantitative research, the measurability standard features prominently in all methodological procedures that revolve around, or build up to, hypothesis testing. The testability of a hypothesis is indeed a function of the measurability of the variables that constitute it. Such measurability is, in turn, dependent on the indicators chosen to represent them; but one is not entirely free to choose just any indicator(s). They must be such as most peers or reviewers or supervisors or sponsors can be persuaded to accept as valid and reliable. Still, one has some leeway in choosing the indicators one wishes to use, so long as the reviewers, supervisors or funding entities are prepared to see or accept one's findings “in the light" of the chosen indicators.

Viswanathan (2010: 285-210) has interrogated in depth the challenges encountered in "Measure development procedures," particularly in connection with quantitatively-oriented social science research. Among these challenges, which he believes are not sufficiently appreciated, is the underpinning assumption, which he faults, that "a construct can be [readily and invariably] isolated and examined." Here is his line of thinking:
"By measuring or manipulating individual constructs, relationships between constructs are studied and substantive hypotheses about these relationships are tested. The very notion that numbers can be assigned to attributes of people, objects, or events is presumed on being able to study attributes or constructs separate from other constructs. After all, measurement relates to rules for assigning numbers to attributes of people, objects and events. [But] this is not the case for many phenomena. A complex network of constructs may influence a phenomenon and may not be separable into individual constructs for purposes of measurement." 
Measurability procedures implemented in qualitative -- that is, 'non-numerical' -- research attempt, not always successfully, to overcome or circumvent such intractables as Viswanathan has pointed out. These procedures include, for example, “comparative judgement (arranging factors in a hierarchy of importance)” or  “scaling (correct versus incorrect responses to a given set of questions)” (Leedy, 1980: 46). Other ‘non-numerical’ strategies that have been used, according to Worsley (1992: 113)[2] include: “careful classification[3], organizing and combining of field-notes [which] requires patient checking and cross-checking and the application of systematic techniques.” But he acknowledges that “numerical methods are sometimes applied to field-data too” (Worsley, 1992: 113). Indicators are often used as proxies/surrogates for more fuzzy or abstract concepts, such as status (Worsley, 1992: 96). Such indicators are inevitably numerical. 

One may also, in connection with the nominal level of measurement (the simplest level), and even with the ordinal level of measurement, calculate frequencies/percentages, and cross-classify in qualitative research. Scaling, moreover, is not just about correct v. incorrect. Incorporating comparative judgement, one may also use scales of: high v. low, do v. don’t, very high to very low, very good to very bad, strongly agree to strongly disagree.

To be fair to everyone, no one is quite attempting stubbornly to square the circle in this measurability conversation. Still, the challenges of measuring require, and will surely be tempered with, constant and open-minded vigilance -- as well as an abundance of capacity to deal with critiques and contrary views, including (so be it) one's own self-criticism. Bell (1999: 1), like others before her, subsumes this conversation under the theme "uncertainty of measurement". Thus:
"Uncertainty of measurement is the doubt that exists about the result of any measurement. You might think that well-made rulers, clocks and thermometers should be trustworthy, and give the right answers. But for every measurement - even the most careful - there is always a margin of doubt. In everyday speech, this might be expressed as ‘give or take’ ... e.g. a stick might be two metres long ‘give or take a centimetre’."



[1] Sarantakos talks of the need for precision in measurement (pp. 18-26)
[2] Peter Worsley, ed. 1992. The New Introducing Sociology. Revised Third Edition. London: Penguin Books.
[3] Another word for classification, given by Worsley (1992: 97) is categorization; and both, he argues, are an often overlooked “form of measurement” – even if they are “the simplest level” (that is, the nominal level) of measurement. There are in total four levels of measurement, the others being, in an ascending order of complexity: Ordinal (or rank-order), interval and ‘ratio’ scale (Worsley, 1992: 97-98).



REFERENCES

Bell, Stephanie (1999) Measurement Good Practice Guide: A Beginner's manual to Uncertainty of Measurement. (No. 11, Issue 2). Taddington: National Physics Laboratory

Leedy, Paul D. (1980) Practical Research: Planning and Design. Second Edition. New York:  Macmillan Publishing Co.,

Sarantakos, Sartirios (1994) Social Research. London: The Macmillan Press

Viswanathan, Mathu (2010) "Understanding the Intangibles of Measurement in the Social Sciences," pp. 285-312, in Geoffrey Walford, Eric Tucker and Mathu Viswanathan, Eds. (2010) The SAGE Handbook of Measurement. Los Angeles: SAGE 

Worsley, Peter, ed (1992) The New Introducing Sociology. Revised Third Edition. London: Penguin Books


Saturday, October 31, 2015

Representativeness: A Key Standard of scientific Research

Nine key standards, or principles, of scientific research can be gleaned from texts on research method. As I see them, these are:

3. Control
4. Measurability
5. Validity
6. Reliability (Pending)
7. Objectivity (Pending)
8. Ethics 
9. Representativeness.

I say something about each of the nine standards in other posts. What I want to briefly talk about here is representativeness.


Representativeness[1] [ = Generalizability]: The representativeness standard is applied differently in quantitative and qualitative research. In quantitative research, representativeness refers to the degree to which the sample selected for study can legitimately be said to reflect or embody the broad characteristics of the population in which it is embedded. More pragmatically, a sample is representative if it embodies the specific characteristics of the population that are of interest to a given researcher or study.  Thus, if we were to beam or project a transparency of the sample's outline or contours or segments (or proportions) onto a screen 'pre-loaded' with the population's outline or contours or segments (or proportions), we should expect the two images to perfectly match when the respective scales match. The fundamental question to be 'frontally' interrogated or incontrovertibly answered in any specific quantitative research, as Weber was amply aware, is where and how the material so pre-loaded is, was or can/should be obtained in the first place. 

Broadly speaking, quantitative research begins with the assumption that the contours of a population, in terms of size and structure, are accurately and adequately documented in relevant census or other survey data related to the population; and that the researcher has ample access to the data. The quantitative researcher is enjoined to select a sample the size and components of which are statistically and structurally proportionate to the population that they are supposed to represent. However, for many vexing problems which researchers seek to tackle, and research questions which they may want to answer, such ready-made population maps are in reality non-existent.

Qualitative sociological or anthropological research, likewise, is premised on a pre-existing and deep pre-understanding of the 'broad nature' of the society or population in question, based on prior studies and/or a variety of other sources. However, the reality of field research does not often enough bear out the premise. Consequently, pre-understanding must itself be constructed as an 'immediate' prelude to -- indeed, even as a necessary part of -- the anticipated study, Such pre-understanding then becomes the basis for constructing what Weber, with great insight, termed ideal types. 

Concerning ideal types (idealtypus, in German), Weber (1978: 19-22) argues as follows:
"Sociology seeks to formulate type concepts and generalized uniformities of empirical process. … As in the case of every generalizing science, the abstract character of the concepts of sociology is responsible for the fact that, compared with actual historical reality, they are relatively lacking in fullness of concrete content. To compensate for this disadvantage, sociological analysis can offer a greater precision of concepts. … In all cases, rational or irrational, sociological analysis both abstracts from reality and at the same time helps us to understand it, in that it shows with what degree of approximation a concrete historical phenomenon can be subsumed under one or more of these concepts. For example, the same historical phenomenon may be in one aspect feudal, in another patrimonial, in another bureaucratic, and in still another charismatic. In order to give a precise meaning to these terms, it is necessary for the sociologist to formulate pure ideal types of the corresponding forms of action which in each case involve the highest possible degree of logical integration … But precisely because this is true, it is probably seldom if ever [the case] that a real phenomenon can be found which corresponds exactly to one of these ideally constructed pure types. The case is similar to a physical reaction which has been calculated on the assumption of an absolute vacuum. … When reference is made to 'typical' cases, the term should always be understood, unless otherwise stated, as meaning ideal types, which may in turn be rational or irrational …"
Thus, in qualitative research, as Sarantakos has noted, “sampling...is not based on probability theory, and the size of the sample is usually too small to reflect the attributes of the population concerned. Instead, the sampling procedures used are related to theoretical sampling and are geared towards essential and typical units. Selection [that is, the quest for representativeness] does not stress random procedures but rather theoretical sampling, that is, [it is geared] towards the theoretically important units” (Sarantakos, 1994: 27).

Though it is not usually known or talked about -- or, more importantly, fully appreciated in sociological, or qualitative research, circles -- the fact is that Max Weber's notion of ideal types long ago preemptively freed sociology's qualitative researchers from what one may call the conceptual 'yoke of the quantitative sample'. Incidentally, sociologists' counterparts in anthropology have never felt as constrained by this version of the tyranny of numbers. 

As Priyadarshini (n.d.) has tried to say, moreover:
"Just as an ideal model is constructed by the natural scientists as an instrument and means for knowing nature, so the social scientist creates [ideal types] as a tool for systematizing and comprehending individual facts, against which the investigator can measure reality. It [serves that purpose] because of its separation from empirical reality and difference from it."
Importantly, in this regard, Sarantakos (1994: 27) has further, and pointedly, clarified that while “qualitative researchers consider generalisations to be important, they relate them to the typical cases they study, not to random theory and principles. Generalisation becomes obvious out of the intersubjective clarification of validity. The essential argument here is that generalisation is based on the typical case studied, which is thought to be representative of a species...; what qualitative research claims is that such findings can be interpreted beyond the cases studied and are examples of an ‘exemplar generalisation’, or ‘analytic generalisation’...”


REFERENCES:

Priyadarshini, S. (n.d.) "Weber's 'Ideal Types': Definition, Meaning, Purpose and Use"


Sarantakos, Sartirios (1994) Social Research. London: The Macmillan Press

Weber, Max (1978) Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology (Guenther Ross and Claus Wittich, editors and translators). Berkeley: University of California Press.




[1] In quantitative studies this means having such characteristics/capacity/quality as do capture or reflect all the key aspects of the population (or that segment of the population that is of interest).

Friday, October 30, 2015

Control: A Key Standard of Scientific Method


Nine key standards, or principles, of scientific research can be gleaned from texts on research method. As I see them, these are:

3. Control
4. Measurability
5. Validity
6. Reliability (Pending)
7. Objectivity (Pending)
8. Ethics 
9. Representativeness.

I say something about each of the nine standards in other posts. What I want to briefly talk about here is the control standard. 

Control

By control we mean establishing or maintaining the integrity or identity or boundaries of the sample/specimen/subject/site against all disturbance, unwanted/unintended influence or “contamination” by external/extraneous factors or even by the researcher himself or herself. In effect, control means quality control. 

In experimental design, Yu (n.d.) points out, the kind of control called for is, specifically, variance control  -- which is indeed a form of quality control. According to Leedy, control suggests establishing parameters: “Parameters are important. All research is conducted within an area sealed off by given parametric limitations. By such control, we isolate those factors which are critical to the research. Control is important for replication. An experiment should be repeated under the identical conditions and in the identical way in which it was first carried out. It is also important for consistency with the research design” (Leedy, 1980: 46).

Giorgio (n.d.) notes that, in the laboratory setting, the control function tends to be too narrowly carried out in practice, in a way that even conceptually distorts the meaning of control. Thus:
"...control practically comes to mean manipulate. That is because the laboratory setting is itself the creation of the scientist, and it is deliberately created in order for the researcher to be able to dictate to the situation. Any thing that is left to chance is seen as a demerit. The dictionary con firms these ideas by defining control as exercising “authority or dominating influence over; to hold in restraint or check; to direct or regulate.” Thus a strong sense of control means being able to do things at will, to be able to have desires transformed into realities in as brief a time as it takes to accomplish the task."
But, he argues, "control does not have to be defined so narrowly." Thus, for him, control:
"...could mean to be respectfully present in a situation so that one could respond knowledgeably and appropriately with readiness to the perceived spontaneous happenings of a situation. In this sense, control refers to a certain kind of “intentional presence,” a certain way of looking, an informed being present that at the same time does not actively intervene in the unfolding of the event to be observed... [The] knowledge that the researcher has guides his expectations so that he knows how to interpret or evaluate his ongoing perceptions. The researcher can do this without active intervention, but it is still a form of control because directedness and restraint are used by the researcher in perceiving the situation. Thus control implies observation, that is, it is an educated looking."
Admittedly, in the social sciences, in contrast to the natural sciences, control is more varied and more nuanced, and sometimes more problematic, but not impossible. For example, determining the parameters of, or controlling for variance in, a social research includes such considerations as scope and study limitations. Moreover, one can ensure control over the following, among others: [1] the setting of the interview, or the conditions under which the respondent is interviewed, [2] the accuracy/precision of the questions asked and the responses given. [3] the language of the interview. [4] the quality of training given to interviewers, other research assistants and supervisors. [5] the actual supervision process. [6] the parameters of both the experimental and the control group.

Archaeologists and paleontologists, who do not represent the image of the typical natural scientist, and who routinely work away from the public view, offer outstanding templates for quality control in their persistent quest for new discoveries. They are quite adept at protecting the sites of their ongoing work against contamination and interference, in time and space. In important ways, the work of the crime (or accident) investigator, often partially done in full view of the media and the public, at its best obeys the strictures of the control standard,

Clearly, controls are crucial not just in experimental designs and field observations, but also, and perhaps more dramatically so, in all situations in which the conscious and pre-emptive gathering and establishing of incontrovertible evidence is called for; for example, in the prosecutor's mandate, or in the context of a claim to/of the discovery of a consequential artifact. Both of which are typically subjected to strict and detailed scrutiny, skepticism and even attack.



REFERENCES:

Leedy, Paul D. (1980) Practical Research: Planning and Design. Second Edition. New York:  Macmillan Publishing Co.,

Giorgi, Amedeo (n.d.) "The Role of Observation and Control in Laboratory and Field Research Settings"

Jaikumar, Maheswari (2014) "Experimental Research Design" Slideshare.net

Mann, CJ (2003) "Observational Research Methods. Research Design II: Cohort, Cross Sectional and Case-Control Studies"

Yu, Chong-Ho (n.d.) "Experimental Design as Variance Control"