On the Contradictions of 'Pluralism': A Theoretical and Empirical Overview

By Dr. Mauri Yambo

January 30, 1985

1. INTRODUCTION

If one accepts the view that all contemporary societies are heterogeneous, one finds it difficult to isolate societies [perhaps better understood nowadays as nation-states] in which the term "plural" cannot apply. What Gutkind (1957: 351) said nearly thirty years ago [nearly sixty now] of "multiracialism" applies equally well to the term "plural societies" -- particularly when defined as loosely as Mazrui (1969: 333) does. In other words, the term implies a polarity between its existence and nonexistence. CLICK HERE TO READ THE WHOLE PAPER IN ITS ORIGINAL FORM.

The paper was presented at a workshop on The Role of the Judiciary in Plural Societies, January 30 - February 4, 1985; Nairobi and Eldoret (Sirikwa Hotel). The workshop was organized by Kenya's Public Law Institute and the International Centre for Ethnic Studies, Colombo, Sri Lanka.

The Theoretical and the Empirical: Two Salient Dimensions of the Comparative Argument

The comparative argument cannot be fully closed with empirical evidence alone, but with implicit or explicit reference to theory as well. This is the only way to make sense of whatever it is that the comparative eye draws attention to. It is theory which in one way or another affirms and settles the basis for comparison, in the first place. 

Certainly, the empirical dimension provides the evidence that one can observe, as one must. However, the data it generates cannot have shape or form without help from the explanatory and agenda-setting power of theory. 

Thus, the theoretical dimension contextualizes the process by which the verdict is delivered, as well as the verdict itself. It follows from all this that the two -- the theoretical and the empirical -- are inseparable sides of the same comparative coin.