Zimbabwe: Power-Sharing and Triple Redemption

The recent power-sharing agreement in Zimbabwe, brokered by South Africa's Thabo Mbeki, is a cause for optimism for the future of governmentality in Zimbabwe, but more importantly of its long-suffering citizens in the complexity of their day-to-day lives. Skeptical as many observers were that such a deal was at all possible -- Mugabe had been so demonized, particularly in pronouncements out of London and Washington, and had so demonized himself (in rantings out of his own mouth) as to make hope for any sensible outcome of the elections itself hopeless -- there you are! We (let me use that plural and all-inclusive word) do have a deal; as good a deal as such products of political manoeuvre can be. Indeed, for Tsvangirai, a better deal nominally (in fact qualitatively, as some may insist) than Kenya's Raila brokered for himself and ODM last March.

So here we are. One obvious consequence of the deal is, to me, a triple redemption of sorts for the principals. Mugabe has succeeded in brokering his own redemption. He has recouped a measure of the social (and/or political) capital that had so precipitously eroded from his bleeding hands -- certainly in African eyes. Now, we can and will all bury him, when the time comes, without equivocation. Raila will most likely attend, perhaps with 100 bulls in tow, and with such flamboyance and depth of engagement in these matters as only he, in all of Africa, can muster.

Mbeki, likewise, has redeemed himself from the self-inflicted and precipitous slide into ignominy and ineffectualness which had been, particularly in the last year or two (if we say nothing of his quaint narrative of the causality of HIV/Aids), the hallmark of his leadership in South Africa (remember South Africa's xenophobia against fellow Africans, remember the Zuma case) and Africa as a whole (remember Darfur). In Zimbabwe, he snatched victory and optimism from the jaws of defeat and defeatism, and of pessimism. Now he can ride into that sunset, which we will all ride into -- if we are lucky to be alive when the sun sets -- with the knowledge that, whatever mars his presidential record, he will always be remembered with some fondness by all who think and remember deeply.

Tsvangirai, whom I had thought a coward when he called off his campain for the run-off elections, has redeemed himself in my eyes and, it is obvious to me, the eyes of millions of Zimbabweans. He has redeemed himself not so much in securing a deal (any coward can do that), but a good deal -- at least on paper. The taste of the pudding is in the eating, of course, but you can't eat your cake if you don't have (or bake) it! He has the ingredients, though there will be delays such as we have already witnessed -- and perhaps power outages.

Zimbabweans insist on a view that they are not Kenyans, which they are and are not, and that they do their things differently -- and perhaps in a more dignified way. The jury is out. There are many hints in the Zimbabwean deal that the Kenyan model was very much on the minds of the negotiators. Tsvangirai probably secured a better deal because Raila's, which he was clearly aware of, was in the eyes of many bad. This capacity for a quantum leap is the late-comer's advantage. Likewise, Mugabe was probably inclined to give Tsvangirai (his Oliver Twist) more because Kibaki's selfishness would be seen by history to have been greater -- in which case, on that score, Mugabe would not be at the bottom of African history's list. Did Mbeki whisper that prospect in his ear, I would like to know?